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M D Abstract Anthony Kessel
Air and public health: an investigation using four historical case studies
This MD thesis explores the relationship between air and public health from early 
civilisations to the present day. Through examination of the'changing 
relationships the thesis aims to identify, and critically explore, contemporary 
problems in public health theory and practice.
This is a thesis primarily in the history of medicine or, more specifically, the 
history of public health. The thesis adopts an accepted five-stage framework for 
historical research. Within the framework, the thesis utilises two further, well 
established aspects of historical enquiry. First, it addresses the research questions 
by using historical case studies. Secondly, the historical research incorporates 
inter-disciplinary components, in particular the inclusion of ethics.
The first case study initially explores air and health in ancient civilisations, 
especially within Greek medicine and philosophy, and then examines connections 
and relationships with ideas about air and health in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain.
The second case study traces the changing relationship between air and public 
health from the mid-nineteenth century until about 1970, through examining 
developments in smoke pollution policy and scientific understanding of the effects 
of smoke on health.
The third case study covers a period of three decades up to the present day. A 
piece of air pollution epidemiological research called quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) is used as a vehicle through which to investigate philosophical, ethical 
and policy considerations in contemporary public health theory and practice.
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The fourth case study explores the approach to dealing with climate change. The 
approach is used as an instrument to probe utilitarianism as the moral foundation 
of public health, to explore other ethical frameworks, and to examine the 
relevance for environmental work within public health.
Conclusions from each case study are drawn, and analysis of the links between the 
four case studies provides recommendations for public health theory and practice.
Abstract word count: 295 words
Thesis word count: 59.683 words
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I n t r o d u c t io n
The introduction to this thesis is divided into three parts. Initially there is a 
description of the historical background to the theme of air and public health.
Next, there is a section that provides a personal account of how the thesis topic, 
and the methodological skills needed to undertake the work, have developed over 
time. In the final section of this introductory chapter, the two previous sections are 
brought together by providing an overview of how the historical methods and the 
topic developed and became more focused as the thesis evolved. This then leads 
into the more detailed discussion of methods that is contained in the following 
chapter.
. Background: air and public health
Medical ideas and remedies began to be written down about 2000BC, and 
from the records of these ancient civilisations onwards appear beliefs about 
health and illness, cause and cure. The connection between air and health in 
early societies can be first seen in the medical belief systems of at least thiee 
ancient civilisations: Egyptian, Chinese and .Tudeo-Christian.
In the medical belief system of ancient Egypt, air had a formative place in two 
different ways. Firstly, as part of an explanatory physiological system, air was 
thought to be contained in one of a mesh of vessels emerging from the heart, 
others carrying blood, urine, semen, tears, and solid wastes. This idea, air as 
part of the physiological functioning of the body, was not exclusive to the 
Egyptians, and was widely held within Greek medicine.
The second way in which air was significant in Egyptian medical thought can 
be seen in the belief that 'life lay in breath'. This idea encapsulates a special,
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supernatural, place for air in the creation, or sustenance, of life, and was not 
restricted to the Egyptians. For example, for ancient Chinese medicine and 
natural philosophy one of the two fundamental entities of nature is qi. 
Although impossible to translate, qi has been variously interpreted as air, 
vapours, or life-force, that which for living beings is the vital energy 
sustaining life itself.1 Ho and Lisowski suggest qi can be thought of as the 
instrument “composing all forms from below, and the tools and raw material 
with which all things are made”, something not dissimilar to the Greek idea of 
pneuma (covered further in the next chapter) or the modem concept of matter 
energy.2 Qi permeates the wider cosmos, reflecting further Chinese natural 
philosophical similarities with Greco-Roman thought, that the human body 
represents a microcosm of nature and society, and that demarcation makes no 
sense:
“Unlike in Europe, science and the humanities have never parted 
company in traditional China, where every conceivable object or 
phenomenon, from astronomy to astrology, from alchemy to magic, 
from ethics to politics, and from philosophy to the art of healing, was 
considered to operate under the same principles of li, qi and sAw".”3
In early Judeo-Christian culture the idea of the breath of life, contained within 
a religious framework, is also evident. Christians accepted Greek doctrines of 
humours and temperaments, but it was God who created healthy balance and 
who allowed unhealthy imbalance. Ideas of pneuma were similarly accepted 
but imbued with animistic vitalism,"' with life produced by the Spirit of God 
breathed into inanimate clay. Alongside a strong emphasis on hygiene in 
Jewish medicine (physical cleanliness bespoke spiritual purity), disease was 
essentially understood as an expression of the wrath of God, with evil
' The second is li, the entity that organises all forms from above and the roots from which all 
things are produced. All beings, including humans, receive li in their moment of coming into 
existence, and so obtain their specific nature.
" Shu is what comes between li and qi, the way that the forces o f nature operate.
Vitalism embodies the idea that the origin o f  life lies in a vital principle.
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connotations, and could therefore only be remedied by prayer, sacrifice and 
moral reform.4
These three ancient civilisations indicate that the earliest ideas of air and health 
relate to two intertwined notions. The first is the place of air in understanding the 
physiological functioning of the body, and the second embodies the spiritual 
significance of air as a life-giver. The overlapping nature of these ideas reflects 
the inseparable understanding of mind, body and spirit, which is also seen in the 
best known of ancient medical systems, Greek medicine.
As authors have pointed out, it is something of a myth to consider Greek 
medicine as a unified medical system, widely accepted at the time. Instead, 
there were different theories and practices competing in the Greek medical 
market-place, and the individual citizen was free, cost permitting, to pick and 
choose between alternatives.5 Collectively, however, Greek medicine provided 
the first rational medical theory, based on understanding humans as part of 
nature and illness as a natural phenomenon ('naturalism), complemented by an 
ontological view of diseases as specific entities best understood through 
empirical observation.6
Within Greek medicine, especially the Hippocratic texts as well as the writings of 
Aristotle and Plato, ideas connecting air and health were strong. These included: 
how air as part of the natural environment (climate, atmospheie, winds) affected 
health; how air as part of astronomical conditions affected health; how air caused 
specific diseases, such as the ‘sacred disease’, now understood as epilepsy; air as 
the bodily-sustaining pneuma; and air as one of the four elements responsible for 
balancing the body’s health.7 Later, in Roman medicine, the relationship between 
air and health was similarly strong, as can be seen in the writings of the most 
famous Roman author, Galen, who drew heavily on Hippocratic texts.1
* * *
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The association between air and health, and more specifically air and public 
health, has endured through more recent times. As has been well described, the 
development of professional public health in England in the mid-nineteenth 
century occurred against a backdrop of fears about the effects on the workforce of 
filthy air from unsanitary living conditions.8 The barrister Edwin Chadwick’s 
famous report on the living conditions of the working classes may have 
galvanised sanitary reform, but it was the stench from decaying matter and the 
diseases that were perceived to ensue that caused greatest political concern in a 
period of industrialisation.9 In one notorious summer, 1858, a long period of hot 
weather together with lack of breeze combined to create an atmosphere in London 
filled with the smells of excrement and putrid organic matter. The outdated 
sewage system, and a stagnant rotting Thames, were unable to cope, and that 
summer has since been coined ‘the great stink’.10
At the centre of this association between air and early developments in 
professional public health was the charged scientific debate over whether 
infectious diseases, the scourge of expanding economies of the nineteenth century, 
were transmitted by contagious persons or conveyed to individuals through the air 
as miasma." Whichever position one held (and the distinctions weie sometimes 
blurred) air was still important, but particularly so with miasmatic theory. There 
was a distinction, however, between miasmatic air, poisoned fiom largely organic 
sources, and other ways in which the atmosphere was dirtied.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries smoke pollution, from 
factories and homes, was also a public health concern. It has been argued, 
however, that ideas about smoke pollution changed significantly around the turn 
of the twentieth century.13 Prior to that, belief in the health effects of smoke 
pollution were mixed. While some held smoke to be detrimental others believed it 
might have a hygienic effect. In this respect, when the germ theory of disease 
largely dispelled miasmatic beliefs at the end of the nineteenth century, the focus 
on smoke pollution increased, perhaps to the extent that its impact was 
exaggerated.
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In the course of the twentieth century the relationship between air and public 
health has continued. Atmospheric pollution, indoors and outdoors,1415 has 
remained important, and the notorious smog of 1952 and subsequent Clean Air 
Act have become embedded as part of public health history.1617 Developments in 
epidemiology, including air pollution epidemiology, have bolstered the 
relationship.1819 Most recently, public health and environmental health concerns 
pertaining to climate change provide an example that the relationship between air 
and health remains important.20 21
Development of the thesis: a personal journey
It is suggested that two elements should provide the backdrop to a focused piece 
of historical research. The first is that the researcher should be familiar with the 
general research topic area, and that this should be achieved through extensive 
background reading. The second element is around the benefit of the researcher 
being enthusiastic about the particular area of study. Cleaily these two elements 
are likely to be connected, and both can be demonstrated in relation to 
development of this thesis by providing a brief account of the personal journey
undertaken.
After qualifying in medicine I completed a mandatory year as house officer, and 
then immediately undertook an MPhil degree in History and Philosophy of 
Science at Cambridge University. This Masters degree, which was completed in 
1992, helped develop an already longstanding interest in the history and 
philosophy of medicine, and has proved formative in terms of learning about 
academic methodologies and in shaping this doctorate thesis. During the MPhil 
year my examined papers were on philosophy of biology, Darwin, informed 
consent, and Freud. The Masters thesis was entitled Social Darwinism before and 
After Darwin, and was predominantly a piece of work in the social history of 
science. These papers entailed significant background reading on historical
15
methods, medical ethics, and specifically the nineteenth-century period around the 
beginnings of professional public health in England.
After several years in general medicine, which included honing academic skills in 
clinical ethics, I completed a public health MSc at the London School of Hygiene 
& Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and then in 1997 began public health training. 
These four years (1997-2001) of post-graduate training were always split between 
academic and NHS public health, and in LSHTM I began a research project in air 
pollution, supervised by Prof. Tony McMichael. This project was the quantitative 
risk assessment (QRA) that provides the scientific backdrop to one of the case 
studies in this thesis: this piece of research was published. The QRA project was 
further developed as an ‘air pollution needs assessment for the Membership of 
the Faculty of Public Health Medicine (MFPHM) Part2 exam, which was passed 
in 1999 without any amendments.24 Undertaking both the QRA research and also 
the air pollution needs assessment involved extensive background reading around 
air pollution and health which has informed this thesis.
Around this time discussions began about undertaking a larger piece of work for a 
doctorate degree, around historical developments in air and public health. 
Supervised by Dr David Greaves (expertise in history of public health and the 
medical humanities) Prof. McMichael (expertise in epidemiology, climate 
change), and Dr John Porter (expertise in public health, medical ethics, and inter­
disciplinary work), with additional input from Prof. Virginia Berridge, this thesis 
has progressed from approximately 2000 until submission (see Statement at 
front). I was encouraged to develop the work, in parallel, foi a book, and Air, the 
Environment and Public Health was duly published by Cambridge University 
Press in 2006.25
Development of the historical research and methods
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Historical research: background
There is a well-noted distinction between history and historiography. As defined 
by Austin, history is “an integrated written record of past events, based on the 
results of a search for truth.”26 In contrast, historiography is about the study, 
writing and interpretation of history, and has been defined by the same author as 
“a synthesis, building into a related whole, of facts which have to be verified.
These two notions — history as the recording of the past, and historiography as the 
amalgamation and analysis of how history is done -  may be considered 
complimentary, and are certainly inter-related within the debates about the 
academic discipline of history.27 This connectedness is illustrated in LoBiondo- 
Wood and Haber’s definition of historical research as “the systematic compilation 
of data resulting from evaluation and interpretation of facts regarding people, 
events, and occurrences of the past.”-
Although there are well known historical documentarians from earlier eras, for 
instance the Roman author Pliny, history only really began to become established 
as an academic enterprise in the second half of the nineteenth century. For 
example, in Britain the Royal Historical Society was founded in 1868 and the
Historical Association in 1906; and in the United States the American Historical
29Association was set up in 1884.
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, there were two important 
developments in academic history that are of particular significance to this thesis. 
The first relates to the compartmentalisation of academic history and the approach 
to undertaking historical research. During the last century demarcated sub-areas of 
historical research emerged: examples are political history, economic history, 
cultural history, and indeed history of medicine. Prior to the 1960s research in the 
history of medicine and the history of public health had been largely undertaken 
by notable medical figures.
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With the advent of the new sub-speciality, however, non-medical historians began 
to dominate (part of a more general expansion in social history), and they 
challenged the academic approach of their predecessors. In particular, they 
critiqued what has been termed ‘Whig history’, an approach in which the past is 
seen as a precursor to the achievements of the present. This approach got its name 
from the eighteenth-century political party which represented a progressive view 
of history.30 This positivist view of medical and scientific progress was 
superseded in the 1960s and 1970s by social historians attempting to understand 
medicine in its context and exploring the social production of health and disease.31
The second development in academic history began earlier in the last century, but
gathered pace with the evolution of history of medicine. This was the gradual
incorporation within academic history of some of the ideas and methods of other
disciplines. Historians began to understand better and accept the importance of
sociological, anthropological and philosophical approaches. This can be seen
today in the acceptance o f ‘oral history’, a technique in researching contemporary
30history that is based on social science methodology.
This second development is of salience to this thesis in two ways. First, the use of 
case studies within historical research is a reflection of their position as an 
important social science research method. And second, examination of ethical 
issues plays an important part in the historical case studies of this thesis. Like 
sociology and anthropology, ethics provides another approach that historians have 
absorbed. Within history of medicine this can be explicitly seen in continental 
Europe, where over recent years a number of universities have combined the two 
by creating departments of ethics and history in medicine.
Historical research in the thesis: an overview
Although the exact delineations vary between historians,33 undertaking a piece of 
historical research can be helpfully divided up into five stages:
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i) identification of a researchable phenomenon;
ii) forming research questions and hypotheses, and identification of a 
theoretical framework;
iii) systematic location of source materials;
iv) analysis/evaluation of evidence and information, fonning generalisations 
and conclusions; and
v) writing the report, involving description and interpretation of findings.34
In this introductory chapter, only the first stage has been discussed. The first stage 
is about identification of a researchable phenomenon through wide reading of the 
relevant literature. The preceding sections in this chapter have described how 
interest in the theme of air and public health emerged over time, from different 
perspectives, and through extensive reading of the literature. The theme of air and 
public health is, however, not only of personal interest, but of importance and 
significance in terms of the public’s health.3 This importance is magnified 
because air is part of the broader natural environment, and is considered as such in 
this thesis — general environmental issues are therefore discussed wheie relevant, 
especially in the latter parts of the thesis.
The main details on methods are presented in the next chapter.
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C h a p t e r  1
RESEARCH METHODS
In the previous chapter Sweeney’s five stages of undertaking a piece of historical
research were introduced, and the first stage — identification of a researchable
phenomenon -  was discussed.' It should be noted that other authors may divide up
the elements of the historical research slightly differently, but Sweeney s
2 3
approach captures all such elements within its five stages.
In this chapter the research methods are described, in sections that pertain to the 
remaining four stages of the historical research process. Each section, or stage, 
has sub-sections that elaborate on aspects of relevance to this thesis.
Forming research questions and hypotheses, and identification of a 
theoretical framework (Stage 2)
Research questions
From the background reading of the broader context, four research questions 
developed. The research questions that this thesis has aimed to addi ess are as
follows: •
• What is our understanding of the historical relationship between air and public 
health?
• How has the relationship between air and public health changed over time?
• What does this relationship tell us about developments in professional public 
health, in particular in England and Wales?
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• What docs the relationship between air and public health tell us about 
problems in contemporary public health theory and practice, and how these 
problems relate to current environmental issues?
In historical research the generation of specific hypotheses is not always 
necessary, or even appropriate. This contrasts with, say, medico-scientific 
research, in which formation of a hypothesis is the a starting-point and the norm.
In this thesis, it was felt that the research questions alone were a sufficient and apt 
way to direct the thesis.
i
Périodisation: historical time frame
The past can be divided up in different ways in historical research, not only to 
produce manageable chunks, but also to help organise thoughts. Jordanova gives 
examples of ways to compartmentalise the past in historical research, for instance 
by: rulers and dynasties (e.g. Viking, Napoleonic, Tudor); events and periods (e.g. 
after the birth of Christ, since the French Revolution, the First World War); 
descriptions of a time period (e.g. medieval, early modem); or types of 
government (e.g. Communist Russia).4
In deciding on the mode of périodisation, it is important that the mode is chosen in 
order to address the research goals, and that there is awareness of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the mode selected. Whichever form of périodisation is 
adopted, decisions still have to be made about the amount of time that the 
historical research covers — its scale or compass." In terms of scale, a distinction 
is usually made between two approaches. The first involves examining a 
particular idea or area in great depth over a specified (usually short) time period. 
This is so-called micro-history, which has received a growth of interest in recent 
years.4
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The second approach involves adopting a much longer time-span, which allows 
for taking a broader look at historical change.6 From an historical perspective 
tracing an idea or a theme over, say, two millennia is challenging. Not only is the 
time frame huge, but it encompasses vastly differing epochs, cultures and 
civilisations. Some areas are inevitably covered in less detail than others, and 
trends in themes can be difficult to identify and defend. Efforts to compare 
periods on such a large scale are inevitably open to criticism of failing to 
understand ideas, beliefs and events in relation to the context in which they 
appear.7
However, in medical and public health history there has been renewed interest in 
longer time-frame historical investigations.8 This is because of their advantage in 
terms of the ability to explore historical trends and flows that do not need to be 
temporally sharply circumscribed, and do not have to be demarcated by location, 
such as by country. It has been argued, for instance, that the fragmentation within 
social history of medicine and public health history in recent times can be 
attributed, in part, to the country-specific histories that have developed as a 
consequence of the continued emphasis on the social context as framing 
developments in medicine and public health.9 While the fragmentation has 
inevitably enriched our understandings of particular histories, it has possibly been 
at the expense of broader syntheses of different histories and better understanding 
of a more global picture of public health.
In this thesis, emergence of the four research questions shaped the périodisation. 
In terms of length of périodisation, this thesis adopted the second of the two 
approaches outlined earlier, that of a time-frame of over two-thousand years. This 
was deemed most appropriate to the project envisaged. In terms of the nature of 
the périodisation, this evolved with the decision to use case studies as a historical 
research tool. The use of historical case studies is discussed in the following 
section, but the case studies provided a means to frame the périodisation.
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As is described further below, the case studies are predominantly chronologically 
determined, but have elements of dynasty (ancient civilisations), events (around 
the origins of professional public health), and time period (modem). The first case 
study looks at air and health in early civilisations and the relationship with public 
health in nineteenth century England; the second case study looks at air pollution 
and public health in England between 1850 and 1950; the third case study uses a 
piece of air pollution research in relation to developments in epidemiology and 
public health, 1950 to 1990; and the fourth case study looks at climate change and 
public health, 1990 to the present.
Historical case studies
As was discussed in the previous chapter, developments in academic history since 
the 1960s have included incorporation of research tools and approaches of other 
disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology. In this thesis, the methodological 
approaches from two other disciplines are pertinent. The first of these is the use of 
case studies in historical research. The second is the inclusion of ethics in 
historical research, which was mentioned in the introduction and will be discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter.
Case studies may have originated clinically. Case reports have certainly been long 
used in the clinical setting to describe, present and study interesting or unusual 
clinical cases -  by doctors and other clinical staff. And a set of (clinical) case 
reports has been termed a (clinical) case series, when connections between cases 
are either being investigated or desciibed.
In contemporary qualitative research there is no consensus on precisely what 
constitutes a case study, but there is some agreement that it is a useful multi­
dimensional method. Bowling, for instance, defines a case study as a “research 
method which focuses on the circumstances, dynamics and complexity of a single 
case”, and a case series is a small number of cases. She continues that it is a
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“valuable method for the study of complex social settings”, but notes that it can
13also be used as a biographical research method.
Green and Thorogood, however, are less exact. They describe how a case study, 
for some, merely identifies the way in which the study is selected or the data 
reported (for instance the investigation of small number of naturally occurring 
cases, rather than an experiment), whereas for others a case study should be used 
when asking questions about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little control.14 Yin, for example, suggests that a case study 
usually has a phenomenological perspective, meaning that it is studying a 
phenomenon that is happening, such as a change in health services management 
structures.15
In his book The Art o f  Case Study Research16 Stake echoes the phenomenological 
perspective. He indicates that what is occurring is what is important and argues, in 
this respect, that the case could constitute different things and flexibility about 
boundaries is vital. For instance, in the example he gives of investigating 
schooling in Sweden, he proposes that a case (for the case study) could be a 
schoolchild, a teacher, an innovative teaching programme, or all the schools in 
Sweden.
The flexibility around what constitutes a case study is valuable in historical 
research because of the importance of the historical methods meeting the needs 
and goals of the project. Examples of where case studies have been used in 
historical research show that the case study may be defined variably: by quite a 
discrete time period and place (e.g. diaries kept by superintendents of an asylum 
in Philadelphia between 1814 and 1840)17; by subject and institution over a 
longer time period (e.g. medicinal plant research at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine over 100 years)18; or by using two case studies to compare 
differences in caring/nursing practices between the nineteenth century and the 
1970s.19
26
This thesis adopts a similarly flexible approach to what constitutes a historical 
case study. Each of the four case studies examined has a demarcated 
périodisation, as discussed earlier in this chapter. But the périodisation is different 
for each case study, with each representative of a relationship between air and 
public health. Together the four historical case studies could be seen as 
representing a historical case series on air and public health.
Theoretical framework(s)
It has been suggested that historical research combines science and literature. The 
scientific component relates to the gathering of (historical) data to support or 
refute a research hypothesis or question -  the gathering of evidence is addressed 
later in this chapter. The reference to literature acknowledges that there is an art to 
historical research, since there is no single underpinning theoretical framework,
and the analytical and interpretative components inevitably involve a degree of
20subjectivity.
Since historical research has absorbed some of the methodological approaches of 
other disciplines, it has also taken in the theoretical frameworks of those 
disciplines.21 Berridge, like Jordanova,22 highlights the potential value to 
historical research of being theoretically eclectic.2 It has also been suggested that, 
although it is important to be theoretically informed as a historian, it is not 
advisable to spend huge amounts of time on theoretical development at the 
expense of quality of the actual historical íesearch.
The primary research methodology in this thesis is historical, but the theoretical 
frameworks are mixed. The sub-sections below describe the frameworks in the 
context of inter-disciplinary investigation in historical research.
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Inter-disciplinary investigation in historical research 
There are different theories about the social world and how it works. The over­
arching theoretical approach of this thesis lies between large-scale, or macro, 
theory, which allows questions at a higher level of social organisation (e.g. the 
effects of globalisation on health), and middle-range theories that link general, 
abstract concepts, with grounded, observable behaviour. Middle-range theories 
are often rooted in particular disciplines, but a large-scale theoretic approach may 
require working across disciplines to avoid the implicit reductionism in uni- 
disciplinary work.14
Using different disciplinary approaches has become an established part of 
mainstream public health research, because of the added value and depth it can 
give. However, there are different kinds of so-called multi-disciplinary research. 
A traditional public health needs assessment, for example, may involve 
epidemiological investigation, comparative policy analysis and interviews with 
patients and stakeholders. Here the different approaches provide different 
information, and triangulation of the results informs the recommendations. A 
similar, recent public health example is a piece of research examining the 
relationships between green spaces and community health, which combined 
epidemiological analysis using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) with 
ethnography -  the combined methods helped understand concepts such as access 
to green space.23 Both of these multi-disciplinary public health examples involve 
investigation using different disciplinary approaches with the different methods 
working largely in parallel. This is sometimes, and perhaps most appropriately, 
called multiple methods research.
Inter-disciplinary research (sometimes called trans-disciplinary), however, 
involves integrating the different methodological approaches and working, 
literally, between the disciplines. As Green and Thorogood point out, the aim in 
such endeavours is to ‘'integrate the different theoretical and methodological 
insights from each discipline throughout the project, rather than at the point of 
combining the findings.”24
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Yach puts forward that community health research used to be more naturally 
integrated, but after the Second World several factors have led to disciplinary 
separation: the growing establishment of the disciplines of epidemiology, 
ethnography, and sociology; separate funding streams for different disciplines; 
and the dominance of the medical profession within public health, with its 
emphasis on quantitative methods.25 Like Yach, Inhom promotes the value of an 
integrated approach, and laments the opportunities lost from demarcating the 
disciplines. Although writing about integration of epidemiology and 
anthropology, she argues that intellectually the disciplines converge more than is 
understood or accepted, and that the divergences are more illusory than real.26
This thesis uses a flexible historical research strategy, working across theoretical 
frameworks of different disciplines, because different disciplines have different 
epistemological assumptions, and addressing the bigger questions requires being 
able to get above each particular discipline or worldview.27 The theoretical 
framework that this thesis draws significantly on is social constructionist, in that it 
asks questions throughout about how, and for what reasons, have the relationships 
between air and public health changed over time.28 But there is also a 
phenomenological component, especially in the third case study, in the sense that 
there is examination of a particular phenomenon (air pollution epidemiology). 
Ethics is also incorporated into the historical research (and its inter-disciplinary 
nature), so it is important to outline the background to this theoretical framework.
Philosophy and ethics as part o f historical research
Philosophy can be divided into different fields, and has classically been separated 
into epistemology, metaphysics, logic, and axiology. Axiology deals with values, 
and is itself divided into questions about what is beautiful (aesthetics) and 
questions about what is good or right (ethics, or moral philosophy). In academia 
further philosophical study areas have developed such as philosophy of education, 
philosophy of science, history of philosophy, and political philosophy.29 30
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Of the fields described above ethics is of special significance to this thesis, and 
within ethics there is a broad separation into three tiers (sometimes called orders). 
First is what might be considered to be ‘common sense’ ethics, which can be 
thought of as our moral intuition. This in itself is, naturally, a reflection of an 
individual’s learned environment, through for instance cultural beliefs and 
religion. The second tier is what has been termed ‘normative ethics’ and relates to 
the systematically developed moral theories, such as utilitarianism and 
Kantianism. The final tier is meta-ethics, which concerns the nature and existence 
of ethics, and is literally translated as ‘behind ethics’ or ‘about ethics’; concepts 
such as moral relativism fall into this category.
Philosophy can also be divided by its nature, and some authors make a distinction 
between critical (or analytical) and speculative philosophy. At the heart of all 
philosophy is conceptual clarity, but within analytical philosophy the emphasis is 
particularly on linguistic and logical analysis of symbols, terms and basic 
premises used in discourse. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, is less 
precise and addresses broader questions and how pieces fit together in the bigger 
picture. Clarity and consistency are still important, but problems need not be 
categorised and broken down. Speculation about the human condition, our 
existence, and what gives meaning to our lives, requires a more open palette and a 
wider perspective.
The philosophical and ethical methods employed in this thesis are a combination 
of the fields and techniques outlined above. Conceptual clarity plays a central 
part, so attention is paid through the thesis to the meanings and interpretations of 
terms such as ‘public health’, ‘environment’, and ‘environmental health’. The 
thesis in general, however, involves more speculative than analytical philosophy, 
exploring connections between history of philosophy, nonnative moral theories, 
and historical developments in the relationship between air and public health.
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Systematic location of source materials (Stage 3)
Resources
A distinction can be made in historical research between the sources (materials 
used in terms of data) and where or how these were obtained (locations / resource 
bases). A variety of resource bases / locations were used in order to gather the 
historical data. These included:
• Libraries: e.g. Wellcome History of Medicine Library London), British 
Library (London), National Society for Clean Air and Environmental 
Protection library (Brighton).
• Electronic resources (websites): e.g. journals available on electronic websites 
(e.g. British Medical Journal), and other web-based resources (e.g. History 
and Policy website).
• Institutions and archives: that may hold particular historical sources or 
journals, such as the Royal College of Physicians.
Types o f sources used and search methods
This thesis has extensively used primary historical sources, to look at exactly 
what was written and thought at the time. Primary sources have been categorised 
in different ways by different authors. The most common way of categorising is 
quantitative (e.g. original statistical data), qualitative (e.g. original documents) or 
oral history (undertaking interviews, for historical research of recent periods).33 
Another is symbolic (e.g. manuscripts) or non-symbolic (e.g. collections).21 In 
most historical research, as in this thesis, a combination is used.'
The primary sources used include: original journal articles; legal documents (e.g. 
different drafts of Bills to explore how they changed before being enacted); policy 
documents (e.g. from local government); documentation and statements from 
medical bodies and other establishments (e.g. Royal College of Physicians,
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Faculty of Public Health Medicine, Sanitary Inspectors Association); 
documentation, statements, leaflets and pamphlets from campaign and pressure 
groups, and charities (e.g. Coal Smoke Abatement Society); publications from 
conferences; and also newspapers and magazines.
Secondary sources have include articles and books written by others, such as 
academic historians and other scholars, as well as dictionaries.
Primary philosophical data used include original articles and books on the 
particular philosophical subject area (for example, analysis of original pieces by 
Darwin, Spencer, or contemporary environmental philosophers), and secondary 
material includes books that provide a commentary or overview of an area, for 
instance reflections on different philosophers’ contribution to ethics.
The search methods used to locate sources involved a combination of: electronic 
database searching; hand-searching of journals; snowballing (emerging leads as 
the study unfolded); tracking of referenced citations; use of personal contacts and 
guidance from peers; and serendipitous discovery.34
Cataloguing /  recording of data
Different methods were used to record and document historical data. This 
included notes made during reading, either on paper or directly onto computer. 
Card cataloguing was also used to group data into particular themes, and allowed 
for cross-referencing as the research was in progress.
Analysis/evaluation of evidence and information, forming generalisations and 
conclusions (Stage 4)
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In scientific research, there is often a clear point at which gathering of data ceases 
and quantitative analysis of that data begins, from which there is evaluation and 
the drawing of conclusions. However, in historical research (as with inter­
disciplinary research),13 there is no such distinctive point and the process is more 
fluid and iterative.
Throughout the researching period of this thesis, data was gathered and analysed 
in an ongoing manner. One aspect of analysis of historical data involves 
verification of authenticity (e.g. of manuscripts). Verification can be through 
external criticism (e.g. cross-checking of the data of an event, for instance when 
recorded in different sources) or internal criticism (e.g. checking credibility or 
reliability of information, for instance using different accounts or reports of an 
event): both types were employed in the thesis.35
Broader analysis, however, occurs as an integrated part of evaluation of the data. 
As evidence was marshalled, progressive assessment attempted to form a coherent 
discourse, always with a view to the aims and objectives outlined earlier.1 This 
process of assessment involved an interpretive analytical approach looking for 
correspondence and patterns,16 and the synthesising of themes and concepts.36 
Within each case study (and chapter) in this thesis, such analysis, evaluation and 
interpretation is contained within the written text, and a distinctive ‘analysis’ 
section of each chapter would be inappropriate.5 However, at the end of each 
chapter conclusions are drawn about the case study. And the final chapter of the 
thesis also brings together what conclusions can be drawn about the case series.
Note on data gathering and analysis for third case study 
The third case study in this thesis (chapter four) involves an analytical piece of 
epidemiological research, the quantitative risk assessment. This assessment 
required use of primary air quality data as well as a literature review: a summary 
of methods employed is provided in that chapter, as well as reference to a more 
detailed description.
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Writing the report, involving description and interpretation of findings 
(Stage 5)
Although the relationship between data gathering and analysis/interpretation in 
historical research may be fluid, a point is inevitably reached in when the search 
for more data ends, and the focus is on further interpretation, drawing 
conclusions, and writing the report. In this thesis it is very difficult to demarcate 
how long was spent on data gathering and analysis, as this happened over several 
years, as described in the previous chapter. Writing of the thesis took place (not 
full time) over a period lasting probably two to three years prior to submission.
Each case study, hence each chapter, was written up in turn. With evidence 
synthesised and conclusions drawn, the challenge was to create a coherent 
narrative for each case study.3 In this thesis this was aided by following a 
chronological pattern, both within each case study, and also in terms of the thesis 
as a whole (through the temporally sequential pattern of the chapters). Tire
building and articulation of an argument (or arguments) in such a manner has 
37been advocated.
The engaging in, and writing of, history in a chionological mannei i elates to an 
important debate within academic history about how we approach the study of the 
past. Different positions see history as either cyclical or a as a sequential process,3 
and this is reflected in different approaches to reasoning within academic history -  
the analogical mode (reasoning by analogy) or the piocessual mode (reasoning by 
sequence or process).38 30 This is looked at further in the conclusions of the thesis.
Efforts have been made to convey personal enthusiasm and interest in the subject, 
as well as its relevance. The importance of these aspects in writing academic 
history has been stated.20 Enthusiasm and interest in the subject matter are 
evident, as described in the previous chapter, and it is hoped that this has been
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conveyed in the text. Considerable attention has been given to the relevance of the 
research to contemporary public health theory and practice, and this is elaborated 
upon in the conclusions of this thesis.
Throughout the writing of the thesis there has been extensive re-reading and 
revision, as well as proof-reading (personal and external) of the final product.
Summary of methods used in each case study 
Case study 1
The first case study initially explores air and health in ancient civilisations, 
especially within Greek medicine and philosophy, and then examines connections 
and relationships with ideas about air and health in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain. This historical case study (history of medicine and history of public 
health) also involves inter-disciplinary elements (Greek philosophy, history of 
philosophy, Social Darwinism). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as 
described above, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
Case study 2
The second case study traces the changing relationship between air and public 
health from the mid-nineteenth century until about 1970, through examining 
developments in smoke pollution policy and scientific understanding of the effects 
of smoke on health. This historical case study (history of medicine and history of 
public health) also considers developments in health policy (smoke pollution 
policy, public health policy). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as 
described above, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
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Case study 3
This case study covers a period of three decades up to the present day, during 
which important shifts have occurred in the way air is conceptualised in 
epidemiology and public health. A piece of epidemiological research using a 
modern public health technique called quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is 
initially described. The findings of my QRA have already been published in the 
journal Public Health Medicine40 and, although it will be necessary to summarise 
these, the aim of this chapter is instead to use the QRA as a vehicle through which 
to investigate philosophical, ethical and policy considerations in contemporary 
public health theory and practice. This is a historical case study (history of 
epidemiology, public health and health policy) but has strong inter-disciplinary 
components (epidemiology, philosophy, ethics). Primary and secondary data 
sources were used for the non-epidemiological aspects, as described in chapter 
one, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
Case study 4
This fourth historical case study of the relationship between air and public health 
explores the approach to dealing with climate change. The case study begins with 
a description of the scientific basis of global warming and climate change. The 
approach to dealing with climate change is then used as an instrument to probe 
utilitarianism as the moral foundation of public health. This historical case study 
(history of medicine and public health, history of science, history of philosophy) 
again has strong inter-disciplinary components: basic science (of climate change) 
and philosophy (moral philosophy, political philosophy, and environmental 
philosophy). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as described in 
chapter one, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
An Appendix (p231) contains additional information on methods.
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C h a p t e r  2
CASE STUDY 1 : AIR AND HEALTH IN ANCIENT CIVILISATIONS TO 
THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
Overview of case study 1
The first case study initially explores air and health in ancient civilisations, 
especially within Greek medicine and philosophy, and then examines connections 
and relationships with ideas about air and health in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain. This historical case study (history of medicine and history of public 
health) also involves inter-disciplinary elements (Greek philosophy, history of 
philosophy, Social Darwinism). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as 
described in chapter one, and inter-disciplinary connections aie examined.
Introduction
The relationship between air and health is evident in the medical belief 
systems of several ancient civilisations. In the intioductoiy chapter of this 
thesis, connections between air and health were presented in thiee ancient 
civilisations: Egyptian, Chinese, and Judeo-Christian. Two related notions 
were described: the place of air in understanding the physiological functioning 
of the body; and the spiritual significance of air as a life-giver.
The overlapping nature of these two notions reflects the inseparable 
understanding of mind, body and spirit in those civilisations. In the first part of 
this first case study, these notions are explored in more detail in the best 
known of ancient medical systems, Greek medicine, as well as in Roman
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medicine. The second part of the chapter then examines the place of such ideas 
around the time of the emergence of professional public health in Britain.
Greek medicine
The first substantial medical texts were penned by the Greeks, and collectively 
known as the Hippocratic Corpus. These 62 books — and indeed those of rival 
natural philosophy based medical theories of the time -  represented, in the 
main, a departure from belief systems based on supernatural ideas of disease 
causation, such as expressions of the wrath of the gods.
Replacing this was the first rational medical theory, based on understanding 
humans as part of nature and illness as a natural phenomenon (naturalism), 
complemented by an ontological view of diseases as specific entities best 
understood through empirical observation. But while the physician s role was 
expected to be that of observer and treater, it was the domain of the natural 
philosopher to explain the place of mankind in the universe and how the 
functioning of the human body (microcosmos) reflected the workings of the 
all-encompassing macrocosmos.
A result of this division saw physicians trying to uncomfortably marry their 
observational findings with existing natural philosophical theory, 
metaphorically akin to square pegs in round holes. And, although Gieck 
medicine had a firm rational basis, also evident were strong traces of 
supematuralism, sometimes overlooked when Gieek medicine is held up today 
as the early bedrock of western scientific medicine.
Nevertheless, the extensive influence of Greek medicine for the following two 
millennia is unquestionable, making it important to explore closely the 
relationship between air and health in the Hellenistic period. Given the breadth 
of Greek medical writing, it is impossible to look at all authors and instead the
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chapter now focuses mainly on Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle, whose key 
works reflected much of the natural philosophical thought of the time.
Air as the natural environment, and its effects on health
Written mostly between 430 and 330 BC, the Hippocratic Corpus is composed of 
62 books covering various aspects of medical thought, including ideas about 
health, disease, prevention and cure. Originating out of the Hippocratic medical 
school on the island of Cos, the books were written in Ionian dialect by a number 
of different authors, and there is uncertainty over which, if any, were written by 
Hippocrates himself.1
Despite this, Hippocrates was almost certainly a physician of high standing 
and it is likely that he oversaw much of the writing. His reputation was wide, 
the king of Persia famously asking his wisdom in an unusual case of love­
sickness and, centuries later, the famous Roman physician Galen regaled 
Hippocrates' curing of an Athenian plague through bonfires lit to purify the
• 4air.
For the less noted Greek physician, local reputation as a successful healer was 
important, as income was dependent on demand. Although a few physicians 
were paid by the state and resided long-term in a city, most were itinerant, 
travelling from town to town in the hope of business. Within this peripatetic 
life lay a second related role of the physician, prediction of the health of a 
town based on its location and surroundings. This was useful not just in 
relation to anticipation of health problems that might affect the inhabitants, but 
also when physicians were called upon to assist in the siting of a new 
settlement.5
In contrast to internal causes of disease, air -  in the general sense of what 
comprises the atmosphere -  was considered a possible direct external cause of
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disease. In Breaths Hippocrates comments that “it has been said that all living 
things participate to a large extent in air. After this, it must be remarked that it 
is likely that diseases come about from no other source than this ...”6
This theme is elaborated further in The Nature o f Man. Although contradicting 
the quotation above in suggesting that air alone may not be responsible for all 
diseases (reflecting that different treatises were written by different authors), 
the passage reiterates how air may be responsible for illness, and also a way 
towards improvement of health:
“When an epidemic of one particular disease is established, it is 
evident that it is not the regimen but the air breathed which is 
responsible. Plainly, the air must be harmful because of some morbid 
secretion which it contains.... Care should be taken that the amount of 
air breathed should be as small as possible and as unfamiliar as 
possible.”7
However, probably the clearest indication of the importance placed on air as 
the external environment comes in the introductory section of Airs, Waters, 
and Places. Written in a style suggesting use perhaps both as a lecture and as a 
guidebook for physicians, this Hippocratic text asserts the overall relevance of 
the seasons, air temperature and winds:
“Whoever would study medicine aright must learn of the following 
subjects. First he must consider the effect of each of the seasons of the 
year and the differences between them. Secondly he must study the 
warm and cold winds, both those which are common to every country, 
and those peculiar to a particular locality. Lastly, the effect of water on 
the health must not be forgotten ...”8
Following from the general comments implicating air as an external cause of 
disease, more specific relationships between aspects of air and disease 
causation can be traced. For example, in Aphorisnis (one of the stiangest 
Hippocratic texts, composed of hundreds of individual pointeis about 
medicine) Hippocrates asserts that the “changes of the seasons are especially 
productive of disease, as are great fluctuations of heat 01 cold within the
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seasons.”9 And to predict the seasons, the physician needs to be both in the 
“business of the meteorologist” and must also “learn that astronomy plays a 
very important part in medicine since the changes in the seasons produce 
changes in diseases.”10
Finally, air is perhaps most vividly portrayed as an external factor affecting 
disease when represented by wind. A Hippocratic author suggests that when a 
district has cold prevailing winds from the quarter between north-west and 
north-east, and the water supply is hard and cold and usually brackish, the 
inhabitants will be “sturdy and lean, tend to constipation, their bowels being 
intractable, but their chests will move easily.”11 The most troublesome winds, 
however, are the north and south winds, cited as responsible for specific health 
problems:
“South winds cause deafness, misty vision, headache, sluggishness and 
a relaxed condition of the body... The north wind brings coughs, sore 
throats, constipation, retention of urine, accompanied by rigors, pains 
in the sides and breast.”12
Air as the supernatural environment, and its effects on health
It was important for a physician to be able to use astronomical skills to assess 
seasonality, and to combine this with understanding or prediction of climate, 
in order to foretell health concerns. But the Hippocratic texts did not represent 
a complete departure from unnatural explanations of health and disease.
Although the gods were generally no longer implicated, the physician was 
advised to take into consideration a supernatural element akin to present-day 
astrology. Sometimes this seemed to be mainly as an indication of seasonality, 
for instance in Epidemics when it is observed that at the time of Arcturus, if 
southerly rains continue until the equinox, then “under such circumstances,
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cases of paralysis started to appear during the winter and became common, 
causing an epidemic.”13 But on other occasions the link is less specific:
“Now let us consider the seasons and let us predict whether it is going 
to be a healthy or unhealthy year. It is most likely to be healthy if the 
signs observed at the rising and the setting of the stars occur normally, 
when there is rain in the autumn, when the winter is moderate being 
neither too mild nor excessively cold, and when rain falls seasonably in 
spring and late summer.”14
The confused and incomplete transition from unnatural to natural explanations 
is perhaps most clearly apparent in the book devoted to The Sacred Disease, 
known now as epilepsy. Here the author seems keen to invoke alternative 
explanation for the disease most traditionally attributed to divine origin, but 
cannot quite make the leap:
“This so-called 'sacred disease' is due to the same causes as all other 
diseases, to the things we see come and go, the cold and the sun too, 
the changing and inconsistent winds. These things are divine so that 
there is no need to regard this disease as any more divine than any 
other; all are alike divine and all human.”
Air and the causation o f specific diseases
Despite lack of consistency over the metaphysical basis of disease, causal 
factors were often cited as contributory to specific diseases, and epilepsy again 
provides a good example. Continuity of thought is evident if one looks firstly 
at what Plato said about epilepsy, and then looks back at what Hippocrates 
suggested two centuries earlier.
Plato's Timaeus is an unusual text, almost a stand-alone book, which has been 
lauded by some as providing important insight into Plato's cosmology as well 
as his views on health and disease,1617 but has also been criticised by others as 
confusing, inconsistent and poorly conceived.
The text itself takes the form of a dialogue between four characters, one of 
whom, Socrates, is expecting a reciprocal lecture to his own, The Republic, 
given the previous day. After a brief introductory section, the character of 
Timaeus provides Socrates with a lengthy monologue and, although it is 
mentioned that the other characters will speak later, they never do, suggesting 
an unfinished piece.19
What we are left with is a fascinating, albeit difficult to follow, polemic on the
nature of the universe (cosmos or macrocosmos, made of a World Soul and
World Body), modelled by the divine artisan (Demiurge) from the cosmic
paradigm (or Ideal) called The Living Animal. Given that the Demiurge is
good, his product must be good in itself — ordered, intelligent, beautiful, and in
perfect balance or harmony. It has been claimed that Plato s form of holism
20lies at the roots of modem ecological thinking.
Naturally, in a text concerned with the cosmological order, the place of 
mankind is integral. Plato saw Earth and the natural woild as part of the 
cosmos, with each human being portrayed as a microcosmos, constituted by 
the same principles that govern the cosmos. Harmony and balance are the 
natural state and allow health, while imbalance and disorder result in illness 
and disease. It is worth mentioning here the link with ethics, for Plato 
similarly felt that microcosmic imbalance caused emotional pertuibation, 
resulting in loss of moral propriety, or the inability to make good judgements —
j
the inability to lead a good life.“
So, drawing on previous ideas about humors and elements, Plato invoked aii — 
or imperfections in the nature or distribution of air — as causal of disease. For 
example, a third kind of serum (the first two are blood and another derived 
from black and acid bile) involves air and is a product of the dissolution fiom 
new and tender flesh, the decomposition of tender flesh intermixed with air 
described as ‘white phlegm’. And this may be responsible for skin problems:
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“White phlegm, also is dangerous when it is blocked inside because of 
the air in its bubbles; but when it has air-vents outside the body it is 
milder, although it marks the body with spots by breeding white scabs 
and tethers and the maladies akin thereto.”22
More specifically, Plato goes on to suggest that when the flow of air through 
the lungs is blocked, white phlegm, in combination with bile, may cause 
“countless diseases of a painful kind” and rotting of those body parts 
“deprived of respiration”.23 However,.the most direct causal relationship is 
once again suggested in connection with the sacred disease. Following a 
necessary passage explaining the route of inspired air (first to the brain, then 
most to the stomach and some to the lungs and blood-vessels) Plato asserts 
that air must be continually moving and, most vividly, Plato links air, white 
phlegm, and vessel blockage with the striking symptoms of an epileptic fit:
“Therefore, when the blood-vessels are shut up from this supply of air 
by the accumulation of phlegm and thus cannot afford it passage, the 
patient loses his voice and wits. The hands become powerless and 
move convulsively for the blood can no longer maintain its customary 
flow.”24
Air aspneuma
The doctrine of pneumatism has a long ancestry, and appears in various forms. 
According to Phillips, the medical sect of pneumatists, philosophically aligned 
with the Stoics, was founded around the middle of the first century BC, but the 
general notion of pneuma can be historically traced further back and was more 
non-specifically affiliated with the developing tradition of science.4
In Coan medicine, for example, the concept of pneuma, or vital air 
developed under the influence of natural philosophers such as Diogenes of 
Apollonia, and is well documented in the Hippocratic Corpus. The Sacred 
Disease represents air as responsible for consciousness or intelligence and, as
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discussed in the previous section, epileptic seizures were thought to result 
from blockage of air (or ‘pneumato’) in vessels within the body.
In the Timaeus Plato similarly described pneuma as causing diseases such as 
tetanus, as well as pulmonary complaints, and pleurisy; but his student 
Aristotle equated air, and breathing, more firmly with the spiritual notion of 
soul. In On Breath Aristotle theorises that breath, maintained and increased by 
nutriment, is the purest of all substances.
Aristotle wonders whether breath (divided into innate breath and inspired 
breath) is different to external air, but suggests that respiration has its motive 
principle from the inward parts” although he is unsure whether we ought to 
call this principle a power of the soul, the soul, or some other combination of 
bodies ...”25 However, he clearly links air with spirit or soul, although he 
speculates over its relative contribution:
“But if the soul resides in this air, the air is at any rate a neutial 
substance. Surely, if it becomes animate, or becomes soul, it suffers 
some change or alteration ... air is not the whole of soul but is 
something which contributes to this potentiality...
Some time later the pneumatic school incorporated and developed these ideas 
into a concept of pneuma, or spirit, which in both the universe and man bound 
everything together, any alteration causing illness. Pneuma was seen as a fifth 
element which flowed through the arteries, sustaining vitality. And, in the 
early centuries after Christ Galen, who is looked at later in this chapter, drew 
on the idea of pneuma as the life breath of the cosmos.
Air and the balance required for health
As mentioned in previous sections, later Greek medicine held balance within 
the body as key to health, disturbance of this balance resulting in disease. The
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causes of perturbations of equilibrium were explained in rational and natural 
terms, moving away from previous beliefs about the supernatural basis of 
illness.
There were, however, a number of different theories regarding what exactly 
was supposed to be in balance -  elements, humors, a combination of these, or 
something else. But within all these categories air had an integral place, either 
as an element in itself, as part of a humor, or as the external natural 
environment.
As Lund describes, the older philosophers of the Ionic school had regarded one 
single element as forming the substance of things, but the Pythagorean and 
Sicilian schools of medicine based a system on all four elements (earth, air, fire 
and water), and from this arose the doctrine of mixture or 'crasis' in the body.28 
The variety of ideas based on such a system is again well represented by 
Hippocrates and Plato.
Hippocratic thought is perhaps the most complex. I n Nature o f Man, the author 
refutes monism, and instead introduces an elaborate theory correlating the four 
elements (earth, air, fire, water) with the four basic humors (black bile, blood, 
yellow bile, phlegm) and the four temperaments (melancholy, sanguine, choleric, 
phlegmatic), and further linking these with the four seasons, the four stages of 
man (infancy, youth, adulthood, old age), as well as the four primary qualities of 
hot, cold, dry and wet. Diseases were explained as a consequence of specific 
alterations of ratios within this finely tuned matrix. Health, on the other hand, was 
preserved when appropriate proportions were maintained.
' Three humours are also depicted in Ayurvedic writings o f ancient India, vava (ait), pitta (bile), 
and kapha (phlegm).
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The diversity, and also inconsistency, of thought is well illustrated in the 
Timaeus. First of all, like Hippocrates, Plato believes in a universe created by 
God, made up of four elements in important relation to one another:
in the midst between fire and earth God set water and air, and 
having bestowed upon them so far as possible a like ration towards 
another -  air being to water as fire to air, and water being to earth as 
air to water, -  he joined together and constructed a Heaven visible and 
tangible.”29
Later on, however, Plato mentions an unnamed fifth element, and refers to 
them all as compounds. By doing so, Plato alludes to combination rather than 
purity, a departure reinforced by suggesting there are different kinds of air 
including “the most translucent kind which is called by the name of aether, 
and the most opaque which is mist and darkness”,30 as well as another form 
without a name. Nevertheless, the consistent belief in the balance of the 
elements required for health remains unwavering:
“The origin of disease is plain, of course, to everybody. For seeing that 
there are four elements of which the body is compacted, -  earth, fire, 
water, and air, -  when, contrary to nature, there occurs either an excess 
or deficiency of these elements, or a transference thereof from their 
native region to an alien region; or again, seeing that fire and the rest 
have each more than one variety, every time that the body admits an 
inappropriate variety, then these and all similar occurrences bring 
about internal disorders and disease.”31
What is clear from the first half of this chapter is that air had a central place in 
the medical belief systems of many early civilisations. Even in the natural 
philosophy of the Greeks the conceptions of air reflect that health, disease and 
healing were understood as part of a bigger picture -  humanity and the cosmos 
-  and in terms of balance and harmony. This holistic, and often spiritual, way 
of thinking was to have an impact for many centuries to come.
Roman medicine
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Although there were other important Roman contemporaries, the physician 
Galen stands out significantly for his influence in the history of medicine. His 
ideas built broadly on Hippocratic writings,'So retaining the central place of 
air, but Galen synthesised Greek beliefs with his own insights in a way that 
proved long-lasting. A self-assured individual, Galen was happy to play to the 
crowds, and this arrogance and showmanship helped perpetuate his reputation.
Galen was actually Greek, bom to a wealthy family in Pergamon in Asia 
Minor (now Turkey) around AD 129. He had an extensive education and 
learned medicine from Alexandrian teachers, including visits to Egypt where 
he gained insights about treatments in India and Africa. He only arrived in 
Rome in AD 162, but soon gained a reputation and became physician to the 
powerful.3
Galen wrote prodigiously, possibly 35 books, although few originals survived. 
Broadly speaking, Galen took the Hippocratic framewoik of health as balance, 
disease as imbalance, incorporated Platonic speculations on the macrocosm, 
and added a mixture of his own philosophical ideas and anatomical findings. 
As a physician, he treated people with concoctions of heibal and vegetable 
remedies (combined with heavy doses of confidence), causing some to label 
him as the first polypharmacist. Galen removed the Hippocratic emphasis on 
empiricism, on collating understanding of disease tlnough observation of the 
ill, and focused instead on theorising and experimentation.
Because Galenic medicine drew so heavily on what went befoie, the 
significance of air remained, and can be found in three aieas that have alieady 
been looked at in more detail earlier this chapter First, Galen held on to the 
Greek notion of balance of the four humours (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, 
and blood), which were in turn representations of the four elements -  earth, 
air, fire, and water. Next, Galen augmented pneumatism with his own ideas 
about circulation and anatomy. He believed that air, taken in thiough the 
lungs, combined in the heart with blood to generate pneuma, or vital spirit, the
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life breath of the cosmos. Pneuma was also modified in the liver (which 
formed blood from food) to create a natural spirit, which supported vegetative 
functions of growth and nutrition. From the heart blood flowed to all organs, 
including the brain where a third alteration of pneuma resulted in animal spirit, 
distributed through the nerves to sustain movement and sensation, and without 
which animal life did not exist. Galen’s system fitted in with Plato’s divisions 
of the soul into the vegetative, animal and rational.33
Last, Galen held on to the view that diseases were carried or transmitted by 
contaminated, polluted air -  or miasma. This he defended in part on 
observational grounds, having witnessed occupational ailments, for instance 
slaves in copper mines who were obliged to make themselves masks from 
animal bladders as protection against the pungent, harmful atmosphere.
It was Galen, through his prolific output and social stature, who cleverly 
articulated Greek medical ideas, and the Roman empire that fostered their 
dissemination. But the legacy proved so enduring because Galenic medicine 
captured, in pneuma, the ingredient that allowed acceptance by (rising) 
Christianity, a vital spirit that could be considered close to the religious 
perception of soul. The Roman empire eventually collapsed, Europe 
descended into the Middle Ages, and it was not until emergence from the 
medieval period that Renaissance interest in science saw Galenic and Greek 
medical beliefs challenged. But new theoretical ideas did not really begin to 
appear until advances in anatomical and physiological knowledge of the 
Enlightenment. And by the middle of the nineteenth century the place held by 
air in western medical theory was changing.2
Air and health in nineteenth-century Britain
In his wide-ranging review of the history of public health, the historian George 
Rosen has suggested that, not only did Hippocrates set the tone for 2000 years
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of medical thought, but the works of the Greek physician also provided the 
epidemiological reference upon which modem scientific medicine would be 
based.34 Although the hagiography and historiography contained in Rosen's 
book now appear somewhat out-of-date, there is value in his kind of overview, 
an effort which has perhaps not been superseded in public health history since 
its first publication in 1958.35 The links that Rosen draws between Greek 
medicine and the origins of public health provide a grounding framework for 
practitioners today. The place of the environment, and air in particular, in 
Hippocratic thought about disease causation was firmly echoed in the mid­
nineteenth century.
The remainder of this case study explores the place of air in nineteenth- 
century medical thought in Britain. This leap of almost two millennia is not 
intended to diminish what happened in medicine in the intervening time, but is 
used to highlight significant developments in the relationship between air and 
health around this important time in public health history. In particular air -  
objectified as a putative vehicle of disease -  became the focus of debates 
about miasmatism and contagionism. And linked to this theoretical debate air, 
foul and dirty, became the object of environmental reform, which was itself at 
the heart of early public health efforts.
Miasmatism and contagionism
According to Rosen, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were 
two conflicting conceptual explanations of epidemic disease causation: 
contagion or epidemic constitution. Ideas about contagion drew strongly on 
the works of the sixteenth century Italian Girolmo Fracastoro, in particular his 
seminal book of 1546, On Contagion. Contagions Diseases and their 
Treatment.“  In this Fracastoro argued that epidemic diseases were caused by 
transmissible and self-propagating minute infective agents, and these seeds, or 
seminaria, were specific for individual diseases. Such particles were
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speculation until technologically revealed by the microscope, and first 
reported to the Royal Society in 1676 by the linen draper Antony van 
Leeuwenhoek, who had observed wriggling creatures in soil, water and human 
excrement.37
In contrast epidemic constitution, the alternative explanation of disease 
causation, held that epidemics were caused by development of a state (or 
constitution) of the atmosphere, resulting from a constellation of weather 
conditions and local circumstances. This explanation drew strongly on 
Hippocratic ideas that local atmospheric conditions were at the root of 
diseases capable of spreading as long as the particular conditions lasted.
Certain diseases were understood in relation to the broad environment and air 
was understood to be the mediator.
The seventeenth-century English clinician Thomas Sydenham, who first 
described the term ‘epidemic constitution’, divided febrile diseases into 
‘epidemic distempers’ (e.g. smallpox) produced by atmospheric changes, and 
‘intercurrent diseases’ (e.g. scarlet fever) which, although able to arise 
independent of the atmospheric state, were affected by it, but were also 
dependent on susceptibility of the body.
The influential Sydenham believed that the atmospheric change was due to a 
‘miasma’ arising from the earth and Rosen argues that for most of the 
nineteenth century three theoretical positions on disease causation can be 
distinguished: miasmatic theory (epidemic outbreaks were caused by a state of 
the local atmosphere created by poor sanitary conditions); contagion (minute 
particles were the sole cause of infectious and epidemic diseases); and limited 
or contingent contagionism (infections were caused by contagion, but only 
arose if other elements existed such as appropriate atmospheric conditions).38
In contrast to Rosen’s classical perspective on beliefs about disease causation 
in the nineteenth century, the historian Christopher Hamlin has postulated that
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the terms contagion and miasm belonged to a larger and more complex system 
of causation. The distinction between contagion (the vehicle of person-to- 
person disease transmission, only received from a previous human host) and 
miasm (pathogenic emanations dispersed into the atmosphere in which disease 
could spontaneously generate) was not always accepted. Sometimes the terms 
were used synonymously, sometimes not; sometimes they were used to answer 
different questions.39
Hamlin argues convincingly that, although the terms implied disease 
specificity, they were in fact vaguely and variously used and might be among 
many malignant forces felt to harm bodily constitution. What was clear, 
however, was that with both contagion and miasm disease reached victims 
through the air. Although distance from the source differed with each term, air 
was the medium of disease.
So, two thousand years after the Hippocratic texts were written, the theory of 
miasmatism apparently remained part of at least two broad, competing, 
understandings of disease causation. The etymological roots of such an 
important word are revealing. Stemming from the Greek Mia- word group — 
whose basic meaning is that of defilement or impairment of a thing's form or 
integrity -  miasma essentially refers to pollution or impurity.
The impurity, however, could relate to something physical or moral and in 
Greek times the two were often interwoven. Parker, for instance, suggests that 
in classical antiquity the word miasma could equally have been used to refer to 
a form of communicable religious danger, the gods seeming irrelevant, or a 
dangerous dirtiness that individuals rub off one another like a physical taint.40
i
This multiplicity of meaning remained highly significant in the nineteenth 
century. The polluted air felt to be, in one way or another, causally related to 
infectious diseases, was held by some to result from the immoral behaviour of 
the poor. In miasma, physical and moral pollution were bound together
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linguistically and metaphysically and, as described in the next section, the 
debate about infectious disease causation was shaped by the developing theory 
of evolution by natural selection with its emphasis on the environment. And, 
later, the extension of this theory into the realm of moral evolution occurred 
simultaneously with the establishment of professional public health in Britain.
Air and the beginnings ofprofessional public health
A somewhat traditional notion of public health purports Chadwick as the founder, 
and places the origins in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, as 
Dorothy Porter points out, public health -  defined by her as collective action in 
relation to the health of populations -  had been going on for centuries, but only 
really acquired a professional and institutional foundation in the middle of the 
nineteenth century.41
Taking this distinction on board, air was at the heart of the traditional notion of 
the birth of (professional and institutional) public health in Britain in two inter­
related ways. First, the debate about disease causation was central because it 
underpinned efforts made to improve conditions and thereby reduce diseases, 
which formed the mainstay of early public health efforts. And second, the place of 
the environment -  of which air was a crucial component -  in directing human 
progress was being explored. Inextricably linked to these was the issue of 
responsibilities: individual responsibility for creation of the conditions in which 
one lives; and State responsibility for improving the living and working 
conditions of its citizens.
The barrister Edwin Chadwick was first notable as the architect and enforcer of 
the unpopular new Poor Law of 1834, a law designed to make the conditions 
under which public relief could be guaranteed so unpleasant that most would 
refuse to request it. Believing that easy charity contributed to, or even created,
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indigence, the law sought to focus on prevention, which was felt to be cheaper 
than relief.42
Chadwick has been described as an inductive social scientist, who built up data on 
mortality, diet and the environment to test generalisations that diseases caused by 
environmental filth engendered destitution. These investigations led to publication 
of his famous 1842 Report on the Sanitary Conditions o f the Working Classes, in 
which Chadwick argued that insanitary conditions led to social, biological and 
psychological problems and, by inference, good sanitation should lead to a happy, 
healthy proletariat.43
Like others, Chadwick believed that local atmospheric conditions were 
responsible for certain infectious diseases affecting communities. Processes such 
as putrefaction at ground level, combined with poor urban sanitation and drainage, 
created a residue of filth that contaminated the air, and these local atmospheric 
states caused disease. Believing cause and cure to be linked Chadwick labelled 
“atmospheric impurity, occasioned by means within the control of legislation, as 
the main cause of the range of endemic and contagious diseases among the
„ 4 4
community, and as aggravating most other diseases.
As well as identifying the single main cause of ill health, Chadwick specified that 
control of insanitary conditions was within the State s remit and jurisdiction. The 
Public Health Act of 1848, which followed from Chadwick’s Report, put this 
control in motion by providing local boards of health with legislative powers and 
money to improve local sewage and sanitation, which would in turn impiove 
atmospheric conditions. Although often invoked as mat king the birth of public 
health in Britain, this somewhat compromising bill, which failed to cover smoke 
prevention or insanitary burial, did not really get teeth until updated as the 1875 
Public Health Act, which finally curbed much of what the previous bill had 
pronounced as permissive.
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Yet underscoring both of these bills lay the reasons for the desired improvement 
in living and atmospheric conditions. Chadwick may have engendered the notion 
that people’s health was a matter of social concern, but this position was grounded 
in the perceived need to have a healthy workforce in a time of rapid 
industrialisation and economic development. There certainly was, as Hamlin has 
described,45 a utopianism to the early public health efforts of Chadwick, but this 
was founded on the utilitarian requirements of an expanding Empire. As is well- 
known, Chadwick was Jeremy Bentham’s secretary and follower in earlier years."
Where air fitted in was in bringing together the need for healthy workers with the 
scientific explanation of ill-health. If insanitary environmental conditions caused 
atmospheric impurity, and atmospheric impurity was responsible for disease, then 
improving the health of the poor should result from better environmental 
conditions. However, though framed in terms of social justice and welfare, the 
movement was not driven by the same passion and egalitarianism which 
motivated others such as Engels, at a similar time, to carefully observe and 
document the association between working conditions and disease.46
Instead, the movement made sense politically and economically, and fitted into 
the growing belief in the scientific explanation of human progress driven by the 
environment. If the environment directed evolution in the animal kingdom, then it 
made sense that the environment could induce debility in human beings. And if 
the character of the poor, considered morally inferior by some, could not be 
trusted to improve conditions, then the State needed to act.
Here, however, the explanation provided by environmental determinism seemed 
to be at odds with the action advocated by believers in social evolution. Therefore, 
to understand better how the place of air in the scientific debate about infectious 
disease causation fitted in with public health action recommended to improve the
" Bentham, one of the founding figures o f utilitarianism, is discussed further in chapter five.
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air, it is essential to look more closely at the inextricably linked debate going on 
about the place of the environment in directing human progress.
Air, the environment and evolution
Although Charles Darwin did not publish The Origin o f Species by Means o f 
Natural Selection until 1859,47 it is well established that he had developed the 
main tenets of his theory at least two decades earlier in his transmutation 
notebooks, as well as in a 35-page Sketch of 1842 and a longer Essay of two years 
later.48 49 It was not, however, until 1858, prompted by a letter from Alfred 
Wallace Russell'" and urged by his close friends Charles Lyell and Thomas 
Huxley, that Darwin openly revealed his ideas by reading a joint paper with 
Wallace to the Linnaen Society.50 The following year his classic work was 
published.
A number of reasons for Darwin’s almost two decade long delay have been put 
forward including Darwin’s psychological state,51 52 scientific concerns53 54, and 
explanations that the changing religious climate became more accepting of 
evolutionary ideas.55 56 57 58 Of significance to this chapter is that, during the 
whole period around ‘Darwin’s delay’ and the emergence of public health in 
Britain, there was a growing debate about mankind s place in nature, a debate 
which allowed for the articulation and acceptance of Chadwick’s beliefs about 
disease causation and the remedial action required. Although fuelled by scientific 
developments, the debate, of which Darwin was one of many central figures, was 
largely socio-political and was manipulated for a variety of purposes.
Before looking at these purposes, it is worth recapping the relevant basic tenets of 
evolutionary theory. Building on the ideas of the earlier writers, Darwin’s theory 
of evolution by natural selection described the environment as being the space
Hi In this letter Wallace outlined a theory similar to Darwin’s own.
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that directed development of a species. The environment was understood in a 
broad physical sense including geography, climate and predation. Individual 
members of a species best adapted to the environment were most likely to survive 
and procreate. This concept o f ‘relative adaptation’, combined with competition 
between individuals for scarce resources, resulted in survival of the fittest 
members. In turn, this was most likely to lead to flourishing and peipetuation of 
the species, that was considered the evolutionary purpose.
Apart from the biological and scientific importance of these new ideas, 
evolutionary theory held huge social significance. Although the theory was 
formulated mainly from research on the non-organic and organic non-human 
worlds, Darwin was interested in universality from early on. And, although he 
refrained from discussing humans at length until much later, in the summary of 
Origin o f Species Darwin gave an early indication that the operation of natural 
law could be extended to all organic beings, presumably including mankind:
“In the survival of favoured individuals and races, during the constantly- 
recurrent Struggle for Existence, we see a powerful and ever-acting form 
of Selection. The struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high 
geometrical ratio of increase which is common to all organic beings.”59
If mankind was included, the question faced was to which human characteristics 
would such laws apply, and to what ends? On a simple, physical level, extension 
to humans could explain different physical characteristics of individuals within 
different races, determined by human evolutionary adaptation to different 
surroundings. Darwin himself noticed this early on, commenting on the physical 
attributes of native islanders on his sea-faring journey. Taken further it was not 
difficult to see how, within a given race of humans, the strongest individuals 
might be most likely to survive, whether in the harsh undeveloped surroundings of 
distant islands or elsewhere.60
However, evolutionary theory held the greatest impact when applied to human 
beings at a level higher than the individual. Although individuals undoubtedly
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competed with each other, if evolution acted within human societies at the group 
or race level, then success or failure of groups or races could be explained, and 
more importantly legitimated, as being in the best -  and natural -  interests of the 
species, mankind. Although Darwin, late in his life, did indeed defend Imperialist 
success as evidence that natural selection had done much for the progress of 
civilisation through elimination of the lower races, such beliefs were widespread 
much earlier that century.61
One of the foremost proponents of such views was Herbert Spencer, a philosopher 
regarded as one of the founders of sociology, best known for his 10 volume 
System o f Synthetic Philosophy, a work spanning 40 years beginning with the 
1862 First Principles.62 Within this work Spencer attempted to show how his 
Principle of Evolution is exemplified throughout organic and inorganic nature, 
including the individual, social and moral life of humanity. Spencer argued that 
the evolutionary direction of flow of events is from simple to complex, incoherent 
to coherent, undifferentiated to differentiated, homogenous to heterogeneous, 
uniform to multi form.
Spencer’s deterministic theory was based upon a complete belief in universal and 
inevitable development to perfection, which included mankind and morality. 
Society passes through necessary stages, of which the industrial was simply the 
present, en route to the social state which -  corresponding to the transition from 
egoism to altruism -  Spencer called the “end-product of history.”63 At this point 
the ideal man, exhibiting perfect morality, would live in the ultimate co-operative 
society where no evil existed.
Although competition between societies was natural and for an ultimate reason, 
Spencer felt that nations acting with malevolent foice would not flourish long­
term. He did not believe in the existence of Bentham's transcendental unitary 
human nature, instead supporting a sort of moral and political relativism, all 
explained as part of the path to perfect adaptation. But he disagreed vehemently 
with any State intervention, since it was interference with the natural process,
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believing there “cannot be more good done than of letting social progress go on 
unhindered.”64
Spencer’s ideas -  influential from the Athenium to the United States65 -  held great 
appeal to industrialists, part of the rising professional middle class who wanted to 
reap the benefits of their own work. With unlimited competition considered 
natural, and State interference unwarranted, Spencer provided the perfect 
justification for both the behaviour of the capitalist and laissez-faire opposition to 
State-induced reform. Several decades earlier Adam Smith has also espoused free 
trade and an open market, as well as subtly connecting how the hidden hand of 
economics shapes political arrangements, our values, and ultimately how people 
behave.66
Evolutionary ideas, interestingly, did not only appeal to the right-wing.67 In The 
Politics o f Evolution, the historian Adrian Desmond shows how in the 1820s and 
1830s the evolutionary ideas of earlier writers such as Lamarck were used to 
argue for a levelling of nature and redistribution of privilege. A little later, 
focussing on socialists and their connection to Darwin, Ilimmelfaib quotes Karl 
Marx suggesting in 1861 after reading Origin o f Species, that the book provides 
“a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history.”69 Marx valued the 
book as he felt it moved away from studies which tended to exclude history and 
its processes. Engels, however, heralded not Darwin, but Marx as the foremost 
social evolutionist:
“Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx
discovered the law of evolution in human histoiy.
Nevertheless, for those with political leanings towaids both extiernes, as strong as 
the biological arguments upholding the legitimacy of human social evolution 
were, the concept was necessarily tied in with developing ideas about moral 
evolution. For industrialists and expansionists in particular there was a problem 
since, although evolutionary theory placed humans squarely within the same laws 
of nature as other species, surely humans remained different by virtue of cognition
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and morality. And some felt that, despite scientific support, it still did not seem 
right to behave so aggressively and unsympathetically towards other humans.
This problem could be circumvented if one accepted mind as matter, with human 
mental characteristics subject to the same evolutionary laws as physical 
characteristics. It was then possible to postulate a hierarchy of social morality 
grounded in degree of social development. Evolutionary forces shaped moral 
progress with the most superior or successful races having the highest degree of 
morality. Darwin was himself a believer in philosophical materialism and the 
inheritability of acquired psychological traits. By 1871 he had developed ideas 
that complex social instincts in animals, resulting from natural selection acting on 
simple instincts, provided the foundation for evolution of the most noble of all 
the attributes of man”,71 morality:
“... any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, 
would inevitably acquire a moral sense of conscience, as soon as its 
intellectual powers had become as well developed, or neatly as well 
developed as in man.”
Progression to morality within nature continued within the groups and races of 
mankind. Near the beginning of Descent o f Man Darwin set out a scale in which 
‘civilised man’ appears at the top, then natives, followed by barbarians, savages 
and apes, lending additional support to the morally questionable aggressiveness 
required for colonial expansion.73 And closer to home the “careless, squalid, 
unaspiring Irishman ... who multiplies like rabbits”74 exemplified how it became 
possible to cast the worse off groups in society as being in that position by virtue 
of their morally inferior behaviour. So the environment weeded out not only the 
most unfit physically, but also the most unfit morally. And in this way groups 
such as the poor and destitute could be blamed, at least in part, for their situation.
In this milieu of inter-woven scientific and social thought, the beliefs of Chadwick 
and others that the environment -  and air in particular -  determined health and 
disease, life and death, made sense. The idea that adverse environmental
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conditions were causally responsible for disease which might weed out those 
exposed to such conditions, the unfit, was commensurate with the ideas of human 
social evolution. By virtue of their morally inferior behaviour the unfit were, at 
least in part, responsible for the conditions which caused their ill health.
It was therefore not surprising to find comments such as those in a British 
Medical Journal editorial of 1870, connecting morality and social position, and 
placing partial blame for their own welfare with those who suffered most directly 
from the bad air and poor sanitation:
“To members of the medical profession it must be well known, how 
intimately overcrowding, dirt, and low moral condition, are connected. 
Medical officers of health, and indeed all who are engaged in the treatment 
and prevention of disease, meet with great hindrance through the 
ignorance or carelessness of those with whom they have to deal. They may 
succeed in enlightening people as to the evil of this or that habit.. .”75
Of course, the sanitary reform advocated by Chadwick and his followers -  support 
of the poor via improvement to environmental conditions -  seemed to be working 
against the forces of nature. Increasing the chances of survival of the weakest 
members of the race would appear to run counter to the dictates of biological 
determinism. But it was here that the early public health efforts could be defended 
from a higher level of social and moral progress. The reforms served to improve 
the overall condition of the working nation, which was essential to economic 
growth and further colonial development. In the long-term the human species 
would be the beneficiary of the continued expansion and domination of the 
English race, believed to represent the finest physical and moral characteristics of 
the species.
Further evidence was provided by upholders of scientific racism (part of the 
doctrine of biological determinismlv), who tried to demonstrate scientifically the
iv Stephen Jay Gould describes biological determinism as the doctrine stating that shared 
behavioural norms, and the social and economic differences between human groups -  primarily 
races, classes and sexes -  arise from inherited, inborn distinctions, and that society, in this sense 
is an accurate reflection of biology.60
63
inborn inferiority of some races relative to others.76 Observed racial differences in 
body shape, brain size and brain complexity, provided empirical justification 
for actions explained by evolutionary superiority, and laid the foundations for the 
most extreme versions of Social Darwinism to follow -  eugenics (defended as 
giving nature a helping hand) and National Socialism.60
Michel Foucault ties together the apparent ideological conflict between those
supporting and those opposing support of the poor through environmental
improvement with his concept o f ‘biopower’ -  the controlled insertion of bodies
into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomenon of
‘population’ to economic processes.79 During industrialisation the workforce
needs to be carefully managed, and biopower, indispensable to capitalism,
involved redefining the poor according to their economic usefulness, placing for
80example the ‘healthy poor’ into the circuit of production.
This digression into the evolutionary debate is not intended to paint a purely 
calculating and bleak picture of the origins of public health in nineteenth century 
Britain. As pointed out earlier there was a certain degree of utopianism, and a feel 
for social justice in the ideals of those involved. But these ideals were allowed to 
take root in practice because understanding the environment as a substantial 
explanation of human wellbeing fitted in with corresponding biological theories 
of the environment as the determinant of human social and moral progress, as 
well as the economic and political dictates of the time.
Conclusions
This case study has explored air and health over two millennia. In ancient 
civilisations -  Egyptian, Chinese, and Judeo-Christian -  air was a spiritual 
essence in the conceptualisation of human health and disease, a provider and 
sustainer of life. This theme continued in Greek medicine, within which the 
conception of air and health had both natural and supernatural dimensions, and
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was associated with a holistic conception of health and disease, linked to 
balance and harmony with nature and the universe.
These conceptions were largely lost with the advent of scientific medicine in 
the west. Air became the object of scientific deliberation in nineteenth-century 
Britain, and its role in disease causation became linked to wider questions 
about human evolution and progress, as well as the economic and political 
requirements of the period.
So the nature of the relationship between air and health and the place of air in 
medical thought had changed dramatically. From being an essential, 
inseparable part of holistic understanding of human health and disease, air had 
become the medium around which a scientific debate focused, a debate which 
itself was framed within a larger debate about the environment and human . 
progress.
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C h a p t e r  3
CASE STUDY 2 :  H ISTO RICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AIR POLLUTION AND  
PUBLIC HEALTH IN E N G L A N D , 1 8 0 0  -  1 9 7 0
For reference, a tabulated historical overview of smoke and air pollution 
legislation in England is provided at the end of the chapter [Table 2.1, p i 12],
Overview of case study 2
The second case study traces the changing relationship between air and public 
health from the mid-nineteenth century until about 1970, through examining 
developments in smoke pollution policy and scientific understanding of the effects 
of smoke on health. This historical case study (history of medicine and history of 
public health) also considers developments in health policy (smoke pollution 
policy, public health policy). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as 
described in chapter one, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
Background
The first raw material used for heat was wood, the burning of which creates dense 
smoke and particles which are irritants to the respiratory tract. On a world-wide 
scale today, the ill health resulting from the indoor use of wood-burning stoves in 
low income countries remains a more significant global public health problem 
than outdoor air pollution, despite the greater attention the latter receives.1 2 3
Possibly the earliest concerns about the effects of coal smoke are evident in an 
Ordinance of 1273 which prohibited the use of coal in London as being
70
prejudicial to health. By the end of the thirteenth century an appreciable quantity 
of coal was being used in London, resulting in smoke objectionable to noble lords 
coming to the metropolis to attend Parliament. Their complaint to Edward I 
resulted in the king issuing a royal proclamation in 1306 forbidding the use of 
coal by artificers, who were to return to charcoal. One offender was apparently 
executed.4 Queen Elizabeth I forbade the use of coal when Parliament was in 
session, complaining that smoke from breweries in the vicinity of her palace 
caused her grievous annoyance.5
By the seventeenth century, concern about the pall of coal smoke over cities, 
particularly London, had increased, with wealthier individuals and families 
already choosing to reside on the fringes of the capital. In 1648 Londoners 
petitioned Parliament to prohibit the importation into London of coal from 
Newcastle.6
A decade later the diarist John Evelyn published a famous tract titled Fumifugium, 
or the Smoake of London Dissipated, which he dedicated to Charles II.7 In this 
vivid piece Evelyn drew a dramatic picture of London darkened and eclipsed by a 
hellish and dismal cloud of sea coal, belched forth from the sooty jaws of the 
tunnels of brewers, dyers, lime burners, salt, and soap boilers. And, presaging 
early twentieth century smoke control advocates’ focus on aesthetics and 
cleanliness, Evelyn powerfully depicted the dirtiness of “this horrid Smoake 
which obscures our Churches, and makes our Palaces look old, which fouls our 
Clothes, and corrupts the Waters ... diffuses and spreads a Yellownesse upon our 
choycest Pictures and Hangings ... and kills our Bees and Flowers [author’s 
italics] ...”8
Evelyn’s tract is also important because it highlighted the perceived adverse 
health effects of prolonged exposure to foul air, and also illustrated a simple 
method (supported by statistics) -  to be used often from the nineteenth century 
onwards- of demonstrating these effects. This involved showing that town 
dwellers, in this case Londoners, experienced more of certain health complaints
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than others, with the underlying belief that smoke was the cause of this 
discrepancy:
that hex Inhabitants breathe nothing but an impure and thick Mist, 
accompanied with a fuliginous and filthy vapour,... corrupting the Lungs, 
and disordering the entire habit of their Bodies; so that Catharrs, 
Phthisicks, Coughs and Consumptions rage more in this one City than in 
the whole Earth besides [author’s italics].”9
Medical opinion was not particularly supportive of this perspective. Although 
concurring with smoke being an infernal nuisance, the Royal College of 
Physicians (RCP) was displeased with Evelyn, regarding smoke as protective 
against infections. The king, however, responded to the tract by proposing an Act 
of Parliament to have the troublesome factories removed many miles from 
London -  to Greenwich and other areas down the river -  but the Bill was 
dropped.10
More than a century later, in 1772, a new edition of Fumifugium was published, in 
which the editor laments the increase in smoke, invoking magistrates to take steps 
to check the evil, and urging investigation into production of a smokeless fuel.
But nothing was done for 50 years, by which time the conversion of England from 
an agricultural to an industrial community had been substantial, as was the spread 
of smoke.
‘As far as practicable’: air pollution policy and public health in the 
nineteenth century
The industrialisation and urbanisation of the eighteenth century expanded almost 
exponentially during the nineteenth. These two elements compounded the smoke 
problem: growth of industry -  itself creating increasing amounts of smoke -  
attracted people to the cities, and more people needed more coal for domestic 
heating.
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Strong concern was evident from 1818, when a parliamentary committee was 
appointed to see what could be done in relation to smoke, in particular how far 
steam engines and furnaces could be constructed in a manner less prejudicial to 
public health and comfort.6 The committee confidently noted the “hope that the 
nuisance so universally and justly complained of may at least be considerably 
diminished, if not altogether removed.”11 But these were wishes without solutions, 
and no further action was taken.
The middle of the nineteenth century witnessed the growing concerns with 
environmental and sanitary conditions outlined in the previous chapter.
Chadwick’s influential 1842 Report o f an Inquiry into the Sanitary Conditions of 
the Labouring Population of Great Britain has been mentioned already, and the 
following year a Royal Commission for Inquiry into the State o f Large Towns and 
Populous Districts spelt out the terrible conditions in urban areas including, 
poverty, overcrowding, congestion, crime and poor health. It was around this time 
that the conception of air in medicine really began to shift towards polluted air 
and its effects on health. And, as the century progressed, the shift became more 
and more apparent.
In the same year as the afore-mentioned Royal Commission, a Select Committee 
examined the smoke problem and recommended introduction of legislation to 
control nuisances from furnaces and steam engines, and expressed the hope that 
black smoke, including that from private dwellings, might eventually be entirely 
prevented.6 Just two years later another Select Committee reported that any Bill to 
control smoke should be restricted to furnaces producing steam, and should not 
extend to fireplaces of common houses. As a result of this, in 1845 an updated 
Railways Clauses Consolidation Act contained a clause requiring railway 
locomotives to consume, “as far as practicable”, their own smoke. And two years 
later a regulation applying to factory furnaces, with consumption requirements 
analogous to those applying to railways, was inserted into the Town Improvement 
Clauses Act, 1847, once again with the same qualifying phrase.10
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It was around this period that municipalities began to grant authority to town 
councils to appoint a Medical Officer of Health (MOH), a physician with 
responsibility to examine the health of the local population, oversee provision of 
certain medical services and provide medical advice to the local authorities. For 
example, the Liverpool Sanitary Act of 1846, the first comprehensive sanitary 
measure passed in England, enabled the town council to appoint a MOH, and also 
a Borough Engineer and Inspector of Nuisances.
In 1848 the City of London appointed John Simon as MOH and, following the 
Metropolis Management Act, 1851, appointment of MOsH for various London 
districts became compulsory. By 1856 there were 48, and the same year the 
Metropolitan Association of Medical Officers of Health was formed. Other large 
municipalities made similar appointments -  Leeds (1866), Manchester (1868), 
Birmingham (1872), Newcastle (1873) -  until the Public Health Act, 1875 made it 
mandatory for all districts to have a MOH.12 Two years earlier, with the number 
of MOsH outside London increasing, the Metropolitan Association of Medical 
Officers of Health expanded nationally to become the Society of Medical Officers 
of Health.
The MOH, working closely with the local population, saw at close hand the abject 
living and working conditions of the urban environment, and their effects on 
health. Furthermore, the work remit of the MOH placed him in a unique position 
to investigate and research the relationship locally between environmental 
conditions and health, and to act as a professional voice for improvement. As is 
shown later in this chapter, with regard to smoke pollution the MOl 1 was to 
embrace this dual role -  as advocate and local researcher -  and for decades to 
come a number of these figures spoke up passionately about the smoke evil, 
investigated links with health, and assisted pressure groups and campaigners. But, 
crucially, the lingering problem was what could actually be done about smoke? 
Whereas sewage and other sanitation issues could be more readily addressed, 
smoke was far harder, primarily because of its association with desired economic 
expansion.
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One approach was to try and monitor more strictly the enforcement of legislation 
that already existed and create further powers if necessary. In 1853 the General 
Board of Health (GBH)1 led an inquiry into inventions for the prevention of 
smoke, and recorded that a 9-hour observation of a cotton mill in Manchester 
showed smoke emission for 8 hours and 52 minutes. The inquiry recommended 
employment of police constables to make observations, and qualified officers to 
superintend them and to advise manufacturers.4
In consequence of this report Lord Palmerston's Smoke Acts of 1853 and 1856, 
applying to London only, empowered the police to enforce provisions against 
smoke from furnaces used in steam raising, as well as smoke from other furnaces 
employed in factories, public baths, and furnaces used in the working of steam 
vessels on the Thames. Sanitary authorities in other parts of England and Wales 
were similarly empowered to take action in cases of smoke nuisances within the 
Sanitary Act, 1866. But this power was never exercised in London, where the 
police continued to try to enforce the Smoke Acts until passing of the Public 
Health (London) Act of 1891,13 The Sanitary Act was repealed by the Public 
Health Act, 1875, within which legislation regarding smoke pollution was to be 
situated for the next 50 years.
The difficulties of enforcement of smoke legislation were multi-fold. First was the 
question of manpower. Both police officers and local authority officials were 
faced with time constraints and had to balance enforcement of the smoke laws 
with many other competing concerns. Next was the issue of skills, with the 
enforcers provided with training insufficient to monitor the enforcement of 
somewhat confusing legislation. Third was the matter of penalties, which were 
often too small to act as a significant deterrent -  a theme that continued with
' The General Board of Health (GBH) was a central agency, established after the Public Health 
Act, 1848, with the role of guiding and aiding local authorities, and empowered to set up local 
Boards of Health. Chadwick was a member of the GBH, and John Simon was appointed medical 
officer to the Board. In 1858 medical functions of the GBH, including public health, were 
transferred to the Privy Council, where they remained until 1871.
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subsequent legislation during the next century and is discussed in more depth later 
in this chapter. And finally, another recurring theme is that the legislation, 
dishearteningly for enforcers, focused mainly on tackling the problem after it had 
arisen, instead of specifying means of reducing smoke production before plumes 
were thrown out on a huge scale into the skies.
Despite commercial and industrial opposition to efforts to legislate against smoke 
pollution, there was support for reform from campaigners and, importantly, from 
the medical profession. Just a year after enactment of the second Smoke Act, the 
journal of the British Medical Association, the British Medical Journal (BMJ), 
reported a parliamentary question about whether the Government would actually 
enforce the 1856 Act, which received the response that there had been 54 
convictions in the previous six months with more expected.14
Measuring the health effects of polluted air: statistics and research
Around this period was the emergence of journal discussion and research around 
the putative association of atmospheric pollution and poor health. Replacing 
earlier attempts at association which had been largely anecdotal or theoretically 
framed, new statistical approaches were being developed, often using data on the 
number of deaths from certain diseases in each registration county, collected and 
published by the Registrar-General from 1848 onwards. For example, using this 
mortality data along with local documents and population figures from the 1851 
census, Bakewell examined mortality ratios from “fever” in different districts. He 
suggested poverty (percentage of paupers) was most responsible for fever deaths, 
although probable amount of ventilation (average number of inhabitants in each 
house) was also important and, in a comment on causation, concluded that fever 
was due to “food deficient in quantity and quality, especially as associated with 
filth and foul air ...",5
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Bakewell’s article of 1858 illustrates from an early date what has proven to be an 
intractable difficulty for epidemiologists: how to prove a causal association 
between an environmental factor -  such as atmospheric pollution -  and health, 
when operating within a scientific (later biomedical) model of health. Connected 
to this point, the article also shows how air within western medicine was starting 
to be conceptually fragmented in order to accommodate the new epidemiology: if 
it was not possible to measure air pollution directly, then a proxy indicator, in this 
case overcrowding as a measure of ventilation, could be used instead. And, in 
time, the possibility would arise of reducing air to smaller polluting components.
Although the 1850s were early days for epidemiology, the theoretical space was 
unfolding for medico-scientific investigation of the association between air and 
health, regardless of one’s position on contagionism or miasmatism. At the end of 
that decade the Epidemiological Society held that some epidemic and endemic 
diseases have their origin (irrespective of specific poison) in atmospheric 
variations and, in their classification of disease, the third and last class included 
diseases originating in meteorological variations but not transmissible.16 
Atmospheric and climatic conditions, in combination with polluted air, were 
believed to cause disease whether mediated by specific agents or not.
Urban areas were most heavily affected by the awful atmospheric conditions 
although, in comparison with previous centuries, town living had substantially 
improved in terms of health. The average life expectancy of a Londoner in the 
sixteenth century was 20, whereas in 1858 one could expect to live to the age of 
37. But for the new medical scientists, and also the sanitary reformers, these 
figures were still unpalatable, life expectancy being much lower in the least 
healthy parts of towns. In a leading article of the Public Health section of the 
BMJ, the anonymous author refers to the large number of redundant deaths caused 
principally by “foul air ..., water and deficient light -  the three spectres that are to 
be found in the cupboards of most poor men living in large towns.”17
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One of the difficulties facing MOsH was their position on the role of ventilation in 
combating the foul urban air. In some ways it was a losing battle. On the one hand 
it seemed that opening the windows should be advocated, the air indoors being 
heavily polluted with domestic smoke and other emanations resulting from over­
crowding. And, generally, ventilation of the home as well as public buildings such 
as schoolrooms was encouraged.18 But, on the other hand, the outdoor air was 
often so bad that uncertainty existed over whether bringing it indoors was 
advisable.
Of course home ventilation would be more desirable if ventilation of the towns 
could be improved. Writing in 1870 Oliver argues that the "influence of the 
atmosphere on the general health and mortality of the inhabitants of towns, is 
beyond suspicion", and he promotes efforts made to purify the atmosphere of 
towns by encouraging street-ventilation, and the application of legislative 
enactments to obtain the complete combustion of fuel, opening of streets and 
alleys to allow ventilation of towns, and the formation of parks.19 There was talk 
about the benefits of living by the sea, and the healthy influence of sea-winds that 
followed river tracts into towns close to the coast.
Attempts were being made to epidemiologically correlate meteorological aspects 
of the atmosphere with measured morbidity, just as in the cities investigators 
would begin to turn towards correlating distinct elements of polluted air with ill 
health or death. But before correlation could be drawn, quantification of polluted 
air was needed, and in 1890 in the B}AJ one of the first accounts appeared 
discussing measurement of the amount of particles in air. The unauthored piece 
describes a communication made by John Aitken to the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh about an experiment in which air was tested for the amount of dust 
particles per cubic centimetre. It fails, however, to elaborate on how the air was 
tested or the particles counted.
The researchers found that the number of particles in the air -  felt to affect the 
brilliance and transparency of the atmosphere -  varied depending on wind
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direction. For example in Cannes the number spread from 1,500 when the wind 
was blowing from the mountain to 140,000 when blowing from the town. 
Importantly, particle numbers were shown to differ widely between urban and 
rural air, attributed largely to human activity:
“Observations made in Scotland and elsewhere indicated how extraordinary 
was the pollution in the air due to human agency. In regions clear of human 
habitations, the number of particles fell as low as 200, while in and around 
villages the particles amounted to thousands, and in towns to hundreds of 
thousands.”“0
Progress, however, in mitigating the smoke problem in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century was desperately slow. One reason was that smoke pollution 
was not viewed negatively by all. Some manufacturers and local residents felt 
comforted that “the greater the smoke the greater the considered prosperity.”21 In 
a similar vein, an article playfully entitled ‘Cherishing the smoke demon’ 
comments that although Londoners like to groan “they cling on to smoke as a 
privilege of property.”22
In the main, though, failure to improve the polluted atmosphere was due to lack of 
political and economic will, despite the emerging scientific evidence of illness 
being associated not only with outdoor air, but also with air inside factories. For 
example, microscopic analysis had revealed small, rough jagged pieces of iron in 
the air of an iron factory, filaments of linen and cotton in shirt factory air, and 
Scottish mills were branded as “human slaughter-houses” because of the spongy, 
spiky dust found in their air.23
As worrying as air quality inside factories was, those exposed represented (just a 
proportion of) the workforce, and a much bigger problem remained the pollution 
by coal smoke which affected urban communities on a huge scale. In fact, the 
extent of the problem seemed to be escalating. The legislative response, however, 
remained woefully inadequate.
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The Public Health Act, 1875: landmark and deficiencies
The Public Health Act, 1875, organised public health administration on a nation­
wide basis. It divided the country into urban and rural sanitary districts subject to 
supervision of the Local Government Board (LGB), which had replaced the Privy 
Council in 1871. Existing local authorities fitted into the new pattern as far as 
possible, and borough councils became local health authorities. And, as 
mentioned earlier, it became mandatory for all districts to have a MOH.
Although the Act may have been a landmark in the development of public health 
in England and Wales, it skirted carefully around the smoke problem. Provisions 
made within the new legislation to counter smoke were essentially two-fold. First, 
the Act provided that any fireplace or furnace in trade premises must, so far as 
practicable, consume its own smoke. And, second, it enabled action to be taken -  
by an individual or local authority -  against those responsible for factory 
chimneys emitting black smoke in sufficient quantity to be a nuisance.6
A closer look at Section 91 of the Act shows the following listed as summarily 
punishable‘nuisances’:
(a) factories, workshops, and workplaces “not ventilated in such a manner 
as to render harmless as far as practicable [my italics] any gases, vapours, 
dust or other impurities generated in the course of the work carried on 
therein that are a nuisance or injurious to health”;
(b) fireplaces and furnaces which do not “as far as practicable [my italics] 
consume the smoke arising from the combustible used therein” and are 
“used for working engines by steam or in any mill, factory, dyehouse, 
brewery, bakehouse, or gaswork, or in any manufacturing or trade process 
whatsoever”;
(c) “any chimney (not being the chimney of a private dwelling house) 
sending forth black smoke in such a quantity as to be a nuisance.”24
80
The main problem with this Act was that every punishable offence had a broad 
caveat. Factories were required to ventilate their premises and use steam-raising 
equipment that consumed its own smoke, but only ‘as far as practicable’. Writing 
in 1949 Jervis argues that ‘best practicable means’ became the loophole for 
routine legal defence, and did not require demonstration that much was actually 
being done to alleviate the smoke output. A growing range of new equipment was 
becoming available but it was expensive and, with uncertainty over how well it 
would work, was generally considered not worth the investment. Fines were 
cheaper.25
For prosecutors, ‘blackness’ and ‘nuisance’ became the standards that needed to 
be proved. This was difficult since often the smoke was arguably grey; and 
because divergent opinions existed in local authorities as to what constituted a 
nuisance. For instance, at the turn of the century Popplewell pointed out that in 
Bolton a fine could be imposed for three minutes in a half-hour (or six in an hour) 
of dense, black smoke from a chimney, whereas in Oldham 12 minutes in an hour 
were allowed. He also felt the fines were completely inadequate.11
Perhaps most significant, however, was that the Act did not apply to private 
homes, known to be substantial contributors to smoke production. Although 
heating alternatives were limited at that time, there was soon to be an expansion in 
options, but the 1875 Act set the tone for decades to come in not applying the 
legislation domestically. Moreover, no definition o f‘private dwelling-house’ was 
provided in the Act, allowing further leeway for interpretation.
The Act also did not apply to the capital, and similar provisions were not 
conferred until the Public Health (London) Act, 1891. An attempt had been made 
four years earlier to tackle London’s smoke from private houses and other 
premises not included in the 1853 and 1856 Smoke Acts, when the Smoke 
Abatement (Metropolis) Bill was introduced to the House of Lords. But it had 
failed to become law.13
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Organised campaigning, however, was beginning on a much wider scale. In 1881, 
due to the extent of the smoke problem in London, the Kyrle Society and the 
National Health Society acted to form the Smoke Abatement Committee (SAC), a 
body aiming for reduction of smoke from all sources but especially private 
dwelling-houses. The SAC organised what the historian Harold Platt has called a 
propitious event in urban environmental reform, the Smoke Abatement Exposition 
of 1881-1882. Attracting over 115,000 visitors in London, and 31,000 in 
Manchester, the convention was a “dazzling showcase for an international array of 
heating, lighting, cooking, and power hardware.”26
Nevertheless, the picture at the end of the century was still rather bleak, in spite of 
the establishment in London of another pressure group, the Coal Smoke 
Abatement Society (CSAS) in 1899. To the frustration of many, alternative 
appliances for improved coal burning had been invented, and were duly being 
tested by organisations such as the Smoke Abatement Institution and the 
Association for Testing Smoke Preventing Appliances. Reports of the testing were 
available, but very little change in practice was actually occurring.27
Visibility, sunshine, and dirt: air pollution and policy 1900-1939
The first four decades of the twentieth century were an illuminating and formative 
period in the history of smoke pollution and policy. During that time, as this 
section of the case study will show, the campaign against smoke pollution grew 
stronger, groups becoming more organised through affiliations and collaborations. 
But the face of the campaign needed to change. As the germ theory of disease 
took hold of scientific thought, medical interest in chronic diseases of 
environmental origin waned, especially given the lack of obvious microbiological 
aetiology. So the campaigners turned elsewhere, towards aesthetics, as well as 
back to nature, in the guise of greenery.
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At the turn of the century, however, it seemed little had changed. Popplewell, a 
consulting engineer and earlier author of Steam Engines and The Strength and 
Testing of Materials, captured the feeling of the time in his 1901 publication The 
Prevention of Smoke Combined with the Economical Combustion of Fuel. Here he 
complains that over the previous 80 years various Acts have passed but “in spite 
of all of this, the evil has been growing worse year by year, the law having to a 
great extent failed to effect any real improvement.”28 He paints a picture of 
blackened vegetation and lungs, the health of plants and humans alike suffering 
from smoke deposits. And, lastly, he puts forward his concern about the loss of 
urban sunshine.
The formation of smoke, and accompanying loss of sunlight, was a developing 
area of shared interest for both meteorologists and anti-smoke campaigners. First 
invented around 1850, the ‘sunshine recorder’" was soon in general use and in 
1880 the Weekly Weather Report of the Meteorological Office included, for the 
first time, results from 16 stations around the UK. By 1910 there were 131 
stations, 66 of which had consistent readings for 30 years, and Brodie, a Fellow of 
the Royal Meteorological Society (RMS), presented results for these stations in 
the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society.29
For many places in north Britain, Brodie showed the mean duration of sunshine, 
over the 30 years between 1880 and 1910, to be less than one hour per day in 
December; and, for the month of December 1890 (the darkest month in the 30- 
year period), the sunshine record at Westminster was completely blank. The 
situation in large manufacturing towns was worst, especially in winter when rays 
were weak and domestic coal use high. Interestingly, however, Brodie points out 
that, over the three decades, the sunshine in London (stations at Kew,
Westminster and Bunhill Row), although awful, had improved slightly. The mean
" The sunshine recorder was originally a wooden bowl with a lens (first filled with water, then 
solid glass), the sun's rays charring the inside of the howl, and charring was compared between 
bowls exposed for the same period. It was first used in 1855 and in 1879 Sir George Stokes 
replaced the bowl with a metal frame with grooves into which a strip of cardboard was inserted 
which received the rays and could be replaced daily.29
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percentage of possible light had increased from 26% to 31% over a five-year 
rolling period from 1881-85 to 1906-1910; and, during the winter months, had 
increased from 7 to 14 % at Westminster. The author suggests this change might 
be due to “regulations affecting factories, to the improvements in the construction 
of domestic grates, and to the largely increased use of gas for cooking and heating 
•purposes.”30 A colleague of Brodie’s, JE Clark, referred to the lack of sunlight 
during daytime phenomenon as ‘day darkness’.31 32
For the cities, which were most affected, there was a circular element to the 
problem. When it was cold, domestic coal fires were needed for warmth, which 
produced huge amounts of smoke. The smoke, as well as affecting health, kept out 
the sun’s rays, creating darkness requiring the generation of electricity for 
artificial lighting. And generation of electricity resulted in further release of 
smoke into the atmosphere, exacerbating the problem. The Public Health 
(Amendment) Act, 1907 addressed an element of the problem by enabling local 
authorities to make by-laws regarding the construction of chimney shafts for 
furnaces of steam engines and certain factories. But the legislation still only 
related to black smoke.33
Campaigns, exhibitions and committees
Owing to frustration with ineffectual legislation, officials began to work more 
closely with campaigners. A number of local authorities attended the 1909 Smoke 
Abatement Exhibition, held in Sheffield under the auspices of the Sheffield 
Federated Health Association, after which it was decided to create a National 
Smoke Abatement Committee (NSAC).13 Around the country other towns were 
similarly keen to address the smoke problem, or at least show that they were 
trying to do so. The 1911 Smoke Abatement Exhibition in Manchester was 
reported in the BMJ as designed to show the need for a cleaner atmosphere in 
Manchester and Salford, and to exhibit appliances that could reduce the amount of 
smoke emitted from chimneys. Smoke was calculated to cost Greater Manchester
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£1,000,000 a year -  without taking into account damage to fabrics and its effect 
on health -  with household fires responsible for 60% of the output. Promoting 
alternative fuel use, the piece goes on to suggest that “if gas and electricity were 
sold at even a slight loss so as to induce people to use them instead of coal tires 
the gain in health and in other ways would be ample compensation."34
Just a year later the CSAS held another large display of possible solutions to the 
coal-burning problem -  the International Smoke Abatement Exhibition -  at the 
Agricultural Hall in Islington, London. At this meeting a Committee for the 
Investigation of Atmospheric Pollution (CIAP) was formed which, though 
representing yet another ‘expert group’ set up to look at the problem, was notable 
for being a collaborative venture of the CSAS and the Meteorological Office, 
signalling new relations in the quest for cleaner skies.
The committee -  which later became part of the Department for Scientific and 
Industrial Research and in 1956 was a committee of the Fuel Research Board -  
collaborated widely with local authorities and played an important part in 
establishing the daily recording of air pollution around the country. The degree of 
air pollution was measured as impurities suspended in the air -  deposits which 
subside or are carried down by rain into gauges, and the photoelectric intensity of 
light reaching the ground (i.e. ultra-violet radiation).10
Some authorities had independently started monitoring before the CIAP was set 
up, notably in Glasgow on the suggestion of the Glasgow Health Authorities, and 
in other large towns in Scotland.35 While public health committees in individual 
authorities were usually responsible for carrying out the monitoring, the CIAP 
initiative stood out for its systematic co-ordination of monitoring of smoke output 
on a reasonably wide scale. This organised monitoring of air pollution indicators 
would prove of particular value because it allowed assessment of trends and 
changes over time.
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The kind of collaboration that the CIAP programme generated had been fostered 
for some time by one of the committee’s parent organisations, the CSAS. As well 
as being Honorary Treasurer of the new central committee HA Des Voeux was 
also an ardent campaigner for the CSAS, arguing in that organisation’s 1912 
publication More Sunshine for London36 that darkness and dirt are close friends of 
disease, darkness favouring the growth of germs that sunshine kills.
With sunshine and clean air the precursors of good health, Des Voeux stressed 
that it was the desire of the CSAS to “arouse public opinion to the need of 
reducing materially the constant fouling of London’s air with soot and sulphur 
from the crude combustion of coal.”37 Yet despite the rousing words of such 
campaigners, the economic advantage of switching combustion machinery was 
not evident to industrialists or factory owners, and less polluting alternatives were 
beyond the means of most who lived in private homes in the cities. And incentives 
for change -  both privately and in industry -  were weak, and existing legislation 
was toothless in promoting or demanding change.
Such legal failings were emphasised by the Public Control Committee in a 1911 
report recommending various alterations to the law, the main points repeating 
those made when the laws were passed: a) not restricting smoke nuisance to black 
smoke as per the 1875 Public Health Act (1891 for London); b) expanding the 
definition of a chimney to any opening through which smoke is emitted from a 
building where manufacturing goes on or furnaces are used in operations carried 
out under statutory power, including any Government workshop or factory; and c) 
extension of the power of sanitary authorities to take proceedings regarding 
nuisance outside of their area.38 This last point stands out in reflecting growing 
recognition that pollution travels, and legislation needed expansion to allow local 
authorities to address smoke nuisance arising outside their immediate jurisdiction.
But the Government was not keen to radically change policy, a move that would 
be economically disadvantageous, in the short term at least. A Smoke Abatement 
Bill introduced by a private member to the House of Commons in 1913 did not
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proceed, and it was only when Lord Newton introduced a Smoke Abatement Bill 
to the House of Lords the following year that the Government felt obliged to take 
the matter more seriously.
Backed up by the Corporations of many large boroughs expressing the need for 
tougher legislation directly to the LGB, Lord Newton’s Bill was withdrawn before 
a second reading upon assurance that the President of the Board would appoint, as 
soon as possible, a Departmental Committee with all interests represented that 
would examine carefully the existing law and its administration, and make 
proposals for consideration to Parliament.11 That year, however, the country went 
to war and, although the President of the LGB, Sir Herbert Samuel, made 
appointments as promised, the work was suspended and the Committee was not 
reconstituted until 1920.
The inter-war years
Lord Newton’s Departmental Committee did eventually publish its investigative 
report in 1921 (Newton Report) following an interim version a year earlier. After 
over 50 meetings, interviewing 150 witnesses, and visits to many towns in 
England, Wales and Germany the inquiry blamed the prevalence of smoke 
pollution in this country on the indiscriminate and wasteful use of raw coal for all 
purposes, whether industrial or domestic, and to lax administration of the law by 
the responsible authorities.13
The report was especially severe on domestic pollution, calculating that about 2.5 
million tonnes of soot from domestic fireplaces pollute the atmosphere annually 
(compared with 500,000 tonnes from industrial chimneys), a practice described as 
dirty, wasteful, and unscientific. On the grounds of economy, loss of sunlight and 
damage to public health, the report recommended that this domestic practice 
should be restricted as much as possible. But the committee fell disappointingly 
short of proposing significant legislative advance, advocating instead that
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Government should encourage further research into domestic heating, that gas and 
electricity providers should be encouraged to cheapen supply, and the practice of 
municipal authorities over-charging on gas and electricity in order to allocate 
profits to relief of rates be discontinued.
In spite of knowledge that smokeless heating agents could almost completely 
eliminate domestic smoke production, the report weakly concluded that “after full 
consideration, we do not consider it practicable at present to propose legislation 
dealing with smoke from private dwelling-houses.”39 On industrial smoke the 
report was similarly lacking teeth, advocating only that the Minister of Health’s 
powers be extended (to act on a defaulting authority, and to fix emission standards 
from time to time), that duty to enforce be transferred to larger authorities, and 
that fines be increased. Paradoxically, the report suggested the ‘best practicable 
means’ imposed on manufacturers should also take account of cost, adding a 
further string to the defence bow.
According to the Chairman of the Smoke Abatement League of Great Britain, JW 
Graham, existing legislation in that area was, without any further caveats, already 
a dead letter. This, he suggested, was because fines were insufficient to act as a 
deterrent, and health committees and magistrates were often connected with the 
offenders socially or by family ties.40
Developments in researching the health effects of air pollution
At the end of the Committee’s 1924 report the authors describe an attempt made 
to correlate atmospheric pollution with mortality in London by plotting the 
amount of suspended impurity in the air (daily impurity and six-day average) 
against number of deaths. They failed to find a definite relationship between 
pollution and mortality, although a relationship between death rate and minimum 
temperature “appeared to be fairly definite”. The report concludes that a 
relationship between atmospheric impurity and deaths would likely only be seen
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over very long periods, but maintains that it is probable that “the incidence of 
respiratory diseases and of fogs would show a definite relationship, although ... 
the low temperatures usually prevailing during foggy weather would be a 
complicating factor.”41 These findings reiterate the already ongoing difficulties of 
demonstrating epidemiologically a causal relationship between an environmental 
factor, such as atmospheric pollution or a proxy for it, and a health outcome such 
as mortality.
An inability to drum up medical interest compounded the problem. Whereas 
atmospheric pollution occupied the minds and time of public health workers, 
MOsH, smoke inspectors, campaigners, meteorologists and the public, the 
medical profession was increasingly occupied elsewhere. The germ theory of 
disease was widely accepted by this time, and interest in chronic diseases with 
environmental components was declining along with miasmatism. As the historian 
and health policy analyst Daniel Fox points out, in both the UK and the United 
States medical attention -  along with health care and research funding -  shifted 
heavily in the first half of the twentieth century away from chronic diseases and 
towards acute infectious diseases and the technological developments that 
accompanied this rapidly expanding area of knowledge.42
An opening paper in a 1923 edition of the BMJ captures this change in orientation 
of the profession. While it had been accepted the previous century that insanitary 
conditions caused foul-smelling air which was responsible for disease, from the 
turn of the century attention was directed towards identifying the element(s) of 
foul air that might be responsible. But, as the article tells, attempts to isolate 
micro-organisms in the foulest air, sewer and drain air, were proving fruitless.43
With medical interest diverted, and correlational analyses limited, researchers 
continued to consider the epidemiology of adverse events. This kind of descriptive 
epidemiology drew on bouts of particularly bad environmental conditions, 
notoriously episodes of smog, to demonstrate the corresponding short-term health
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effects. Although some of the same scientific problems still applied, the figures 
often spoke for themselves.
The opposite pole of the adverse event occurred when the 1921 coal strike 
presented a natural experiment in observing the effects of a dramatic reduction in 
smoke output. Advocates of alternative, low carbonisation fuels grasped the 
opportunity to point out that the death rate from respiratory disease in Glasgow 
during the twelve week period of the strike was half that of the year before.44 
Organised groups of women joined the voices heralding the healthy by-products 
of the strike, Lady Melville commenting in her pamphlet published by the 
Women’s Printing Society Choose Ye: Darkness or Light! that “probably for the 
first time since coal was generally used, we are enjoying, owing to the coal 
shortage, a pure atmosphere.” 45
The 1926 Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act
A combination of the Newton Report, the CIAP observational data, ceaseless 
campaigning, and a cross-sectoral deputation'" to the Minister of Health 
contributed collectively to the eventual legislative change.46 Several Smoke 
Abatement Bills were, in fact, discussed by Parliament between 1922 and 1924. 
And, given the tone of the Newton Report, it was perhaps not surprising that the 
1926 Public Health (Smoke Abatement) Act47 was, in the minds of many, 
dreadfully inadequate.
Despite the broad support for significant change, the Act was a watered down 
hotchpotch of earlier ideas. Even the Newton Report recommendation, included in 
a 1924 Bill, that heating and cooking arrangements in new private dwelling
Primarily concerned with the ef fects of smoke on child health the deputation consisted of 
representatives from the British Medical Association, Society of Medical Officers of Health, 
National Association for the Prevention of Infant Mortality, National League for Health, Maternity 
and Child Welfare, National Health Society, and the National Housing and Town Planning 
Association.
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houses be subject to any constructional by-laws, was rejected by the Minister of 
Health from the final Act “principally on the grounds that it would be unwise, in 
view of the national shortage of dwellings, to take any step, which might tend to 
hinder their erection or which might make them more costly."48
In other areas the Act, which also applied to London, made some advances: (i) it 
was no longer necessary to prove the smoke was black when emitted in such 
quantities as to be a nuisance; (ii) the definition of smoke was extended to include 
soot, ash, grit and gritty particles; (iii) it became the duty of local authorities “to 
enforce the provisions of any Act in force within their own district requiring 
fireplaces and furnaces to consume their own smoke",49 and required them to 
inspect their districts and enforce the nuisance provisions generally, reinforced by 
granting the Minister of Health power to nominate a county council to take over 
the task in an authority defaulting on its responsibility; and (iv) the by-law based 
powers of urban authorities were extended to include “the provision in new 
buildings, other than private dwelling-houses, of such arrangements for heating 
and cooking as are calculated to prevent or reduce the emission of smoke.”50
But, in significant areas the Act was a disappointment. It failed to deal with 
domestic smoke at all, and Section 1(3) still allowed the same loophole for the 
industrial offender -  in any proceedings against a smoke other than black -  
through the ‘best practicable means’ defence:
“... it shall be a defence for the person charged to show that he has used 
the best practicable means [my italics] for preventing the nuisance, having 
regard to the cost and to local conditions and circumstances, and for the 
purposes of this subsection, the expression best practicable means [my 
italics] has reference not only to the provision and efficient maintenance of 
adequate and proper plant for preventing the creation and emission of 
smoke, but also to the manner in which such plant is used.”51
Two additional, albeit less significant, points of the new Act rankled with anti­
smoke campaigners.25 First, although fines were increased they still fell well short 
of their expectations. For example, the maximum penalty that could be imposed
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on persons against whom an abatement order was made went up from £5 under 
the 1875 Act to £50 -  a ten-fold rise but too low to act as a deterrent, and far less 
than the cost of replacement combustion machinery. And, second, more industrial 
processes were added to those excluded from the law: reheating, annealing, 
hardening, forging, converting and carburising iron, as well as any other process 
specified by the Minister of Health in a provisional order. ‘ So the new law was 
deemed to be largely ineffectual, an instrument to procrastinate the introduction of 
policy that would create real change.
Other effects o f smoke pollution
In 1929 the National Smoke Abatement Society (NSAS) was formed by a merger 
of the Coal Smoke Abatement Society and the Smoke Abatement League.53 
Through the 1930s the NSAS, along with other campaigners working to reduce 
smoke pollution, drew on speculative or presumptive health effects, and 
increasingly the effects of smoke pollution on other aspects of human, animal and 
vegetable life. Linked to this, what scientific research there was continued efforts 
to break down smoke-polluted air into constituent components -  essentially 
particles, gases and elements emitted from the imperfect combustion of raw 
bituminous coal -  to which these adverse effects could putatively be attributed.54
55 56
With regard to humans, the Medical Research Council set up in 1935 a Committee 
on Pulmonary Disease, which looked initially at the methods for estimating the 
dust content in air samples. Although focusing mainly on diseases affecting 
industrial workers, of relevance to general smoke pollution was that the 
committee found that 80 to 90% of particles inhaled by stonemasons -  of whom 
silicosis was reported to cause more than 300 deaths per year -  were less than two 
micrometers in diameter, and recommended that stonemasons wear respirators on 
calm days and preferably worked the stone wet.57
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Elsewhere, speculative evidence was building; carbon monoxide from domestic 
smoke in living rooms had been labelled as causing morning headaches, shortness 
of breath and lassitude, as well as predisposing to pulmonary tuberculosis;58 
polluted air, through its impact on grass, was blamed for poor quality cow’s milk, 
which in turn was postulated by the National Baby Week Council to affect child 
health: and the lungs of city-dwellers were shown to be pathologically similar to 
those of coal-miners,lv with Taylor suggesting smoke as the cause and adverse 
mortality as the outcome. He supported his case by showing that the 1928 infant 
mortality rate* v for rural districts in England was far lower than that for county 
boroughs (55.5 Vs 74.4), and the infant mortality rate due to pneumonia and 
bronchitis showed a similar difference (8.8 Vs 16.27).59 Lack of the sun’s ultra­
violet light was also felt to cause rickets and Taylor, among others, believed the 
gloom to have serious psychological sequelae and a strongly negative impact on 
quality of life.60
However, the oft-quoted and widely presumed health effects failed to advance 
policy. So attempts were made to cost out the damage done by smoke, especially 
to buildings and household contents such as curtains. In 1920 the Manchester 
Public Health Committee had calculated the extra cost incurred in cleaning 
materials (soap, starch, fuel) as 7.5d per week for lower rental households, higher 
costs in higher rental households, with a conservative total estimate of £242,705 
per annum.60 By 1929 soot deposits were calculated to cost the nation £80 million 
per year,44 and The Times reported in 1939 that the newly formed London 
Advisory Council for Smoke Abatement had calculated that, in addition to the 
centre of London receiving half the winter sunshine of nearby Kew, the annual 
240 tons of soot deposited in each square mile cost the London County Council 
approximately £4m per year. 61
lv This was coined 'townsman’s lung’.
v The infant mortality rate, an important public health indicator, is the number of deaths under one 
year of age per one thousand live births.
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But while costs of cleaning could always be viewed as unfortunate yet absorbable 
by-products of economic progress, there was some concern about the effects of 
poor visibility on flying. Work was being carried out by the Meteorological Office 
Air Ministry on the conditions and mechanisms of bad visibility,62 and the 
Aviation Services Division of the same office showed that poor visibility 
increased markedly around aerodromes situated near large cities and industrial 
centres such as Croydon, Castle.Bromwich (near Birmingham), Manchester, and 
Alexandra Park where visibility was less than 2000 yards one day out of two.63
As the second world war approached little had really changed in air pollution 
policy. A realisation of the rising contribution made by motor vehicles to 
pollution and ill health55 had led to new legislation on the construction and 
equipment in motor vehicles,64 but the 1936 Public Health Act failed to do more 
than re-enact existing smoke legislation without any real material change.65 
Industries continued to pollute without much of a legal reason not to, and 
domestic coal use carried on unrestricted, change being determined purely by 
affordability and personal inclination. Some smokeless housing estates were 
beginning to appear, but many new buildings were still being built to 
accommodate coal.66 67
Disaster, reductionism and personal responsibility: air pollution policy and 
public health, 1939-1970
Post-war decline and resurgence
Production demands during the second world war meant an inevitable increase in 
smoke pollution during that period. Industrial requirements continued after the 
war as a nation attempted to rebuild itself, bolstered by the community spirit that 
fostered regeneration needs over less immediate issues such as cleaner skies. But 
it did not take long for atmospheric concerns to regain momentum after the war.
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In 1946 the awaited Report of the Fuel and Power Advisory Council Domestic 
Fuel Policy (also known as the Simon Report) was published,, .which brought back 
to the forefront the urgent need for attention to the smoke problem. Stressing that 
the moulding of public opinion was essential, the report recommended that any 
new town should be smokeless, and advocated by-laws necessitating prior 
•approval (through certification) of new fuel-burning plants as well as their 
efficient maintenance. The report also encouraged production of improved heating 
appliances (including domestic), as well as the introduction of minimum standards 
for such appliances, and advocated the need for adequate supplies of smokeless 
fuels at reasonable prices.68 69
Following from this report, the second half of the 1940s saw the creation of new 
sets of powers -  in the form of local legislation -  to tackle pollution in a variety of 
ways. These powers are especially significant, because of the historical tendency 
to emphasise the 1952 ‘great smog’ in London as the catalyst of substantial 
change, the turning-point in the battle against smoke pollution. Although that 
episode was undoubtedly important (as were the legal changes it engendered), 
what had been initiated beforehand is often overlooked in favour of stressing a 
dramatic incident* especially one with such a critical health component.
Local authorities in industrial parts of the country began to press forward after the 
war by creating by-laws. Sometimes, prior legislation was needed to allow for 
new by-laws. For example, the City of London Act, 1946 extended provisions 
under the 1936 Public Health Act to make by-laws requiring that heating 
arrangements in new buildings, or substantial heating alterations in existing 
buildings, must include calculations that ”... prevent or reduce to a minimum the 
emission of visible smoke.”70
The by-laws often had several components and attempted to grapple with 
pollution from different angles. Stringent local regulations, for example, were 
placed on the production of industrial smoke. An act passed in Birmingham in
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1948 stipulated that no person shall install in any building ... any furnace for 
steam raising or for any manufacturing or trade purpose unless such furnace is so 
far as practicable [my italics] capable of being operated continuously without 
emitting smoke.”71 Similar measures were enforced elsewhere, sometimes 
alongside new efforts to overcome the problem of (the distribution of) industrial 
smoke by stipulation of the minimum height of industrial chimneys.
This particular preventive initiative captures another enduring problem around 
measuring, and understanding, the health effects of air pollution -  it is the nature 
of inhaled (ground level) air that is most significant from the clinical 
epidemiological perspective, rather than smoke output in a region, or even 
atmospheric concentrations (neither of which may truly reflect what an individual 
actually breathes in). Nevertheless, it makes intuitive sense that getting the dirty 
smoke away from humans, higher into the skies, will likely be beneficial and, as 
an example, a by-law was drawn up in Dudley in 1947 which specified that every 
chimney erected in the borough ”... be raised to such height measured from the 
level of the centre of the street nearest thereto as the Corporation shall reasonably 
require having regard to the use of such chimney the position of houses or other 
buildings near...”72 Similar regulations about chimney height were enacted in 
other towns.
Of all the new by-laws the most significant class, however, contained those that 
involved the creation of areas in which smoke production was prohibited. 
Although often held up as the much vaunted outcome of the 1952 great smog and 
ensuing Clean Air Act, such areas were already being set up in a number of cities 
around the country. For example, the Manchester Corporation Act of 1946 stated 
that “no smoke shall be emitted from any premises in the central area ...”, 
demarcating that zone as “bounded by the following highways or streets that is to 
say St. Mary’s Gate Market Street, Piccadilly, Portland Street, Oxford Street, 
Peter Street and Deansgate.” The by-law continued that smoke included soot ash, 
grit and gritty particles, and the occupier of emitting premises would be liable to
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“a penalty not exceeding ten pounds and to a daily penalty not exceeding five 
pounds.”73 A similar smokeless zone was established in Crewe in 1949.74
The post-war period has additional pertinence as in 1948 the National Health 
Service (NHS) was established, with important implications for public health. 
These are looked at further in the next chapter, but it is worth noting here that 
public health was moved to local authorities, losing its role in the management of 
municipal hospitals (which essentially became State-run NHS hospitals), and 
being somewhat marginalised with the provision of community clinics.vl Although 
involvement in environmental health matters continued, these changes heralded 
the start of what some have considered the decline of public health, or at least the 
diminishing of its status.
Still, in 1951, air pollution did not seem high on the government’s agenda. When 
the matter was raised in Parliament of whether enough was being done around 
smoke pollution, loss of sunshine and use of smokeless fuels, a respondent for the 
Ministry of Local Government and Planning commented that the Public Health 
Act, 1936 provided legal machinery, that smokeless zones were appearing, and 
that there should be less domestic pollution on newly built housing estates.75 But 
all was about to change.
The straw that broke the camel's back - the great smog of 1952
There is no doubt that the awful smog* v" that occurred in London in the winter of 
1952 was memorable for those that experienced it, and was important for its
vl The running of community clinics was intended to come under the remit of newly created general 
practitioners, but in practice this only happened to a small degree.
v" A smog typically refers to an episode of particularly heavy ‘smoke and fog’. Under certain 
atmospheric conditions known as a temperature inversion (a motionless shallow ground-level layer 
of cold air with warmer air above), fog, smoke, or smog cannot rise above the boundary or ceiling 
between the air masses and becomes trapped and concentrated. Smoke production from fires lit for 
heat, and from coal burning for additional electric lighting, compounds matters further.
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deleterious effects on human (and also animal) morbidity and mortality as well as 
causing huge physical damage. Yet its central policy significance was probably 
more as the spark for change. After all, noteworthy legal changes were already in 
process as described earlier, and the price of alternative, smokeless, fuels had 
already begun to fall. And it was certainly not a stand-alone event.
There had been a number of documented severe fogs or smogs in the previous 
decades in British cities and overseas. For example, 60 people died in an episode 
in the Meuse Valley in Belgium in 1930, and at Donora, Pennsylvania, 20 people 
died and 7000 were ill during a fog in 1948.76 And there had been at least four 
previous notable London fogs or smogs. In 1873 a 3-day episode in December 
was associated with a 1.4-fold increase in mortality in the week of the fog 
compared to deaths in the previous week (mortality ratio of 1.4); a 4-day episode 
in 1880 had a mortality ratio of 1.5; and a 3-day episode in 1892 had a ratio of 
1.3. And only four years before the great smog a record (in duration) 6-day 
episode affected London and much of the country and was associated with a 
mortality ratio of 1.3.77
The 1952 episode caused by far the largest increase in deaths, a mortality ratio of 
2.6, but the misery of the experience has perhaps also contributed to its 
longstanding prominence. Although many journal articles provide statistics of the 
effects of the smog, one of the most evocative descriptions of the happening itself 
was printed in the Readers Digest in 1953, a condensed piece from an article that 
appeared in La Croix du Paris earlier that same year:
“On the afternoon of Thursday, December 4, 1952 there was 
nothing to indicate that this would be the Fog of the Century -  that it 
would kill about 4,000 people, cause property damage of many thousands 
of pounds and bring the activities of the great metropolis almost to a halt.
By Friday morning a heavy, wet blanket had closed down. You 
could just see your own feet... As you groped along the pavement, 
blurred faces without bodies floated past you. Sounds were curiously 
muffled: motor-car horns, grinding brakes, the alarming cries of 
pedestrians trying to avoid the traffic and one another. This was a real 
“pea-souper”, a “London particular” ...
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At London airport a few planes made instrument landings. One 
pilot, after landing, got lost trying to taxi to the terminal. After an hour a 
search party went out to look for him. But it too got lost. Soon all air 
traffic was suspended.
As the day went on, the fog changed colour. In the early morning it 
had been a dirty white. When a million chimneys began to pour coal 
smoke into the air it became light brown, dark brown, black. By afternoon 
all London was coughing.
On Saturday morning thousands of Londoners began to be 
frightened. They were those people, mostly over 50, who had a tendency 
to bronchitis or asthma. In a long black fog such people are in acute 
distress. Their lungs bum, their hearts labour, they gasp for breath. They 
feel as if they are choking to death -  and sometimes they do.
By Saturday noon all the doctors were on the run. But there wasn't 
much to suggest -  except to try to get to an oxygen tent. All hospitals were 
overworked ...
Police patrolled the docks in life jackets because people who 
couldn't see the ground walked into the water; a policeman at the Albert 
Docks pulled out eight. But too often the victims, though their cries were 
heard, couldn’t be found ...
On Sunday morning the fog was thicker than ever. At times 
visibility got down to 11 inches: literally you couldn't see your hand held 
out in front of your face ...
It was cold that day. On the outskirts of town men and women, lost 
in the murk, sat down -  and later were found dead of exposure ...
Towards noon on Monday the fog lifted a little, then came down 
again. Then it rose a little more. Finally it was gone.
Londoners rubbed the soot out of their eyes and saw a city covered 
with dirt. Every piece of furniture had a slimy, black film. Curtains were 
so encrusted with soot that when they were cleaned they went to pieces. 
Blonde women became brunettes. It was weeks before the hairdressers and 
laundries and cleaners caught up with their work.”78
The great smog was clearly an awful event. Statistical analyses attempted to 
quantify the mortality, and sometimes the morbidity, attributable to the episode. 
The Chief Medical Statistician WPD Logan reported in the Lancet that there were 
at least 4000 deaths during the two weeks following the start of the episode. 
Deaths assigned to bronchitis and pneumonia increased 8-fold and 3-fold 
respectively in one week, and the overall mortality ratio of 2.6 showed most 
additional death to be in the older age groups, although some was in the very 
young: a ratio of 2.7 in those aged 75 and over; of 2.8 in those aged 45-64 and 65-
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74; of 1.8 in babies under 4 weeks old; and of 2.2 in infants aged 4 weeks to one
79year.
The speed of increase of deaths was astounding, rising markedly on the first day 
of the smog, December 5th, peaking on December 7th and 8th. Most deaths, as 
per previous episodes, were assigned to bronchitis and pneumonia, but increases 
were also seen in lung cancer, coronary disease, myocardial degeneration, and 
other respiratory diseases. The BMJ reported that the total deaths were more than 
double that of the two weeks before the smog, and more than treble that for the 
corresponding period in 1951.80 These deaths were felt to be additional, rather 
than simply brought forward.81 Emergency hospital admissions for general acute 
cases rose in parallel over the period.82 In addition to the damage to human health 
there were substantial material costs from accidents and tilth, as well as economic 
costs such as production losses. And in addition to these were the costs of injury 
to livestock, other animals, plants and vegetation.
What the great smog appeared to be was something akin to the straw that broke 
the camel's back. Episodes of severe smog were not uncommon, but people seem 
to have finally had enough, and were genuinely scared by the event. This was 
accompanied by an apparent disbelief that nothing could really be done to 
attenuate the pollution problem, especially given the public’s awareness of the 
growing availability of alternative fuels to coal; all this in the waning, but still 
present, post-war spirit of a fresh start and the opportunity to collectively rebuild.
The Clean Air Acts, politics and policy
Pressed by campaigners and the vociferous public response to the great smog, the 
government reacted in not atypical fashion by setting up a committee, under the 
chairmanship of Sir Hugh Beaver, to examine the national problem of smoke 
pollution -  origins, causes, health and other impacts -  and to make 
recommendations and provide policy options. The setting up of an expert
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committee to look at smoke pollution has been a regular political strategy for 
hundreds of years and Harold MacMillan (then Minister of Housing and Local 
Government) was, initially at least, derisory and dismissive of the problems 
associated with smoke pollution.
MacMillan believed such problems to be both a matter outside the scope of 
governmental responsibility (domestic pollution was about personal behaviour) 
and also an inevitable consequence of economic development, which was 
essentially desired and in the overall public interest. In a memorandum to the 
government in late 1953 McMillan wrote:
“Today everybody expects the government to solve every problem. It is a 
symptom of the Welfare State ... For some reason or another 'smog' has 
captured the imagination of the press and the people ... Ridiculous as it 
appears at first sight I would suggest that we form a committee. We cannot do 
very much, but we can seem to be very busy -  and that is half the battle 
nowadays.”83
The Beaver Committee, as it became known, was perhaps different to its 
predecessors. The chairman was a highly respected individual, which gave the 
committee crucial credibility and, along with the other committee members, 
worked tirelessly in gathering information. But, perhaps critically, Sir Hugh 
Beaver was also passionate about the subject.
Set up in the summer of 1953 the Beaver Committee met frequently and took 
expert depositions. As well as looking at the historical, meteorological, 
epidemiological and economic evidence, the committee made trips overseas to 
compare and contrast the experiences of other countries. In 1954 the committee 
published its findings, which came to be known as the Beaver report. The report 
was honest and tough on the problem of smoke pollution, documenting 
methodically the causes and consequences, and urging the need for intervention 
and change. The findings were broad, for instance including an estimation that 
cleaning and depreciation of buildings (other than houses) cost about £20million
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per annum, extra painting and decorating £30million, and corrosion of metals 
£25million.
The committee made a number of recommendations [Table 2.2, pi 13]. The most 
significant of these were: (i) prohibition of the emission of dark smoke (defined as 
darker than shade 2 on the Ringlemann Chart (i.e. 40% black), including for the 
first time domestic fireplaces; (ii) local authorities to be empowered to make 
orders to establish smokeless zones and smoke-control areas; (iii) obligatory 
arrangements to arrest dust and grit for certain industrial plant; (iv) the Alkali 
Inspectorate to be responsible for industrial premises with special technical 
difficulties around pollution control; (v) financial assistance for conversion to 
smokeless fuel use; (vi) domestic heating appliances in new premises to be of 
approved types; and (vii) the establishment of the Clean Air Council to co­
ordinate and encourage research, and review progress made in implementing any 
legislation.84
The groundswell of public opinion meant the findings of the report had to be 
taken seriously. This was reinforced when a private member’s Bill, introduced by 
Gerald Nabarro MP, was withdrawn after debate clarified that the Beaver 
committee’s findings had the general support of the House of Commons, and a
85comprehensive government measure was promised.
The first draft of this measure appeared in July 1955 as the Clean Air Bill. 
However, the Bill had an extended parliamentary stay, with numerous drafts and 
alterations along its chequered path to legislation.86 By the time the Bill was 
enacted as the Clean Air Act, some important elements had been either removed 
or significantly tailored. The main differences were:
• that smokeless zones were abandoned in favour of the less stringent concept of 
smoke control areas, in which emission of chimney smoke would constitute an 
offence, and smokeless fuels must be burnt unless fuels capable of emitting 
smoke could be burnt smokelessly;
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• that there was no provision in the Act requiring domestic heating appliances in 
new buildings to be of approved types;
• that the Act would not apply to industrial premises covered by the Alkali 
Inspectorate;
• omission of the Beaver committee’s recommendation that the Government 
Loan Scheme for fuel-saving projects be extended to include projects 
specifically directed to secure the reduction of air pollution;
• omission of the Beaver committee’s recommendation that purchase tax on gas 
and electric heaters be abolished;
• that in planned smoke control areas any owner or occupier incurring 
expenditure on adaptation or replacement of fireplace or chimney would be 
entitled to repayment of 70% of the cost by the local authority (who could 
themselves recover 40% of the total cost from the Exchequer and could also 
repay the whole or part of the remainder). The owner was therefore left with 
paying up to a maximum of 30% of the cost.87
Finally passed in 1956 the Clean Air Act still promised much, but it would take 
time to deliver.88 As has been outlined above the main contentions were that, 
although offering improvement in industrial smoke output, the Act still left 
domestic pollution both unchecked and in the hands of local authorities and those 
who elected them -  individual citizens. Given that the domestic chimney was felt 
to contribute almost half of atmospheric pollution, many lamented this abrogation 
of responsibility; and there was no specific attention paid to increasing availability 
of smokeless fuels at a reasonable price.
Smoke control areas were a very watered down version of smokeless zones. It was 
likely that the impact of legislation that was clearly prohibitive, would be 
significantly less than the impact of legislation that promised to do the best it 
could. Only chimney emissions were under the new remit, and burning of garden 
fires and industrial waste in the open were both allowed.84 Penalties would be
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fines (maximum of £10 a day), incurred at the discretion of the local authority. A 
memorandum on the subject clarified the matter:90
The Act was, perhaps, a reflection of the huge swing that would gain pace in the 
1960s towards personal responsibility, for both lifestyle choices (such as around 
sexual freedom with development of the contraceptive pill) and also for matters 
related to health. In the smoke pollution domain, the onus moved squarely onto 
individuals to make the domestic changes recommended in the Clean Air Act, 
although the changes became easier with support of local authority grants and the 
falling prices of smokeless fuels. This will be revisited in the next section.
Progress was slow but steady through the late 1950s as specific elements of the 
Clean Air Act began to be implemented and the general ramifications filtered 
through. A questionnaire review of local authorities undertaken by the National 
Society for Clean Airvl" in I960 showed that prevention of smoke from industrial 
processes was improving with the better fuel efficiency and new techniques, that 
industrial contraventions were being reported, and that many plans for chimney 
heights had been submitted. In that year there were 157 smoke control areas in 
operation, with another 587 orders confirmed or submitted, compared with the 44 
smokeless zones that existed in 1956.91
The government issued circulars in 1962 asking local authorities to speed up their 
smoke-control programmes, and reiterated that arrangements had been put in 
place to substitute smokeless fuel or cash payments for coal, to alleviate the 
monetary concerns of those receiving coal at concessionary rates from the 
National Coal Board.92 93 And that same year a White Paper on cleaner air, Smoke 
Control, was produced. Some local authorities, however, still did not envisage 
completing their smoke control programmes until the mid-1970s. Vl
Vl" In 1957 the National Smoke Abatement Society voted to become a company, without share 
capital, with the new name of the National Society for Clean Air.
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The Clean Air Act 1968 extended the 1956 Act, making it an offence to emit dark 
smoke from industrial or trade premises (emission of dark smoke from chimneys 
was covered in the earlier Act), and amended the requirement for certain kinds of 
industrial furnace to be fitted with grit and dust arrestment plant approved by the 
local authority.94 By 1970 London had not had a smog in eight years, and many 
suspected would not have another one.
Economics, smoke and smokeless fuels
Although the great smog might have galvanised policy change, it only worked 
because the changes it engendered took place in the context of already levelling 
coal consumption and smoke production, and the increasing availability of 
alternative fuels. It was a blip on the improvement curve, really propelled forward 
in the 1960s by issues of economics and personal behaviour.
As shown in the accompanying table, coal production rose dramatically with 
increasing population size and changing industrial patterns from around 1700 
onwards [Table 2.3, pi 14]. Coal output (coal produced for national use and for 
export) rose from 10-15million tons/annum in England in 1800 to 287m 
tons/annum in 1913, before falling somewhat with the advent of the first world 
war. By the outbreak of the second world war 180m tons/annum were being 
consumed nationally, 28% of which were for domestic (home) use. In 1953, after 
the great smog but prior to the Clean Air Act, total coal consumption had levelled 
off to just over 200m tons/annum, the domestic contribution of w hich had fallen 
to around 36m tons/annum (18%). It was not really until the mid-1960s that total 
consumption began to fall more substantially, with the domestic contribution 
falling proportionally at slightly greater speed than the industrial component.
Of particular importance to atmospheric pollution, however, is the smoke 
produced from the coal consumed. And here the proportional contribution from 
domestic smoke is key. As Table 2.3 shows, although domestic coal consumption
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through the 1940s, 50s and 60s made up only 15-20% of the total coal consumed, 
this domestic use consistently contributed 45-65% of total atmospheric smoke 
pollution. By the late 1960s this proportion had risen, despite a fall in total smoke 
production. The enduring apparent mismatch arose because of the type and quality 
of the coal used (for instance, whether it was cleaned first), and the nature of the 
coal-burning apparatus -  the domestic fire.
So domestic fires were highly significant to the Beaver Committee's estimated 
£250million of damage caused by smoke pollution -  felt to be a conservative 
approximation.95 But the sources and availability of home energy had been 
changing. Domestic oil and gas use increased 50% between 1938 and 1956, with 
the rise in solid smokeless fuels only slightly less. Domestic electricity use in that 
period, however, went up almost four-fold. Between 1956 and the mid-1960s, 
domestic smokeless fuel consumption rose a further 50%, oil consumption a 
further 150%, and electricity use doubled again.96 97
The government was keeping a careful eye on the situation, the main concern 
being that demand for alternative fuels to coal might outstrip supply, with costs 
checked by an open competitive market. A 1960 report from the Committee on 
Solid and Smokeless Fuels reported that sales of specially reactive fuels for 
unimproved open grates (basic domestic fires) increased from 735,000 tons in 
1958 to 910,000 in 1959, and were set to top lm tons in 1960. For improved open 
grates the committee was confident that the gas industry could make available the 
additional required gas coke.
A circular in 1963 pointed to evidence that householders were increasingly 
changing to gas, electricity and oil, largely because "... recent price trends and the 
development of new appliances have resulted in these fuels becoming increasingly 
competitive in running costs with the solid open fire fuels.”99 This picture of 
transition was reflected in the White Paper Domestic Fuel Supplies and the Clean 
Air Policy, supplemented by concern that further rising demand might, by 1970, 
result in a shortfall of supply.100 But this shortfall did not arise, as producers
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responded by widening consumer choice with more varieties of solid smokeless 
fuels, as well as further availability of gas coke, gas, oil and electricity.101 The 
Consumer Advisory Council helped people make their choices.102
Epidemiology, health and personal behaviour
Significant social changes occurred during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, 
changes profoundly inter-linked with the issues of smoke production and smoke 
pollution. These included, in particular, the growing emphasis on personal 
responsibility around issues of lifestyle and health, and in health care the 
continued orientation towards chronic diseases, especially cancer. While these 
two came together around the personal preventive orientation of health promotion, 
the changes also set the tone for later developments towards the end of the century 
that emphasised the importance of health services in improving health (rather than 
say environmental or economic improvement), and individuals’ rights in relation 
to provision of those services.
During the 1950s, as Doll and others demonstrated the causal association between 
tobacco use and lung cancer103 l04, epidemiological research also progressed in 
demonstrating the association between atmospheric pollution and other forms of 
chronic lung disease. In a classic article of 1959,105 reprinted in 1997,l0ft Fairbain 
and Reid investigated whether there was an association between morbidity and 
smoke pollution. What made their study innovative was the use of sickness 
absence records of an occupational cohort, the British Civil Service, as the 
measure of morbidity (in addition to the usual mortality data) and the use of a Fog 
Index”1 as an indicator of exposure. They found total sickness to be significantly 
associated with fog and population density, and bronchitis wastage' to be *
“ The Fog Index measured visibility, as a proxy for atmospheric pollutant concentrations.
* The bronchitis wastage score took account of total sickness rates of postmen, place of work, 
deaths, retirements, and population of postmen in an area.
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significantly associated with fog. Bronchitis mortality was also highly 
significantly associated with fog in both sexes.
The international nature of the problem interested the World Health Organization 
(WHO), whose Expert Committee on Environmental Sanitation produced a 
summary account of air pollution in 1958 as part of its technical report series.
This stated that, despite much epidemiological work, current knowledge on 
specific pollutants remained insufficient to establish standards.107 Under the 
auspices of the WHO just a few years later, EC Halliday produced a historical 
review in 1961 that stated, somewhat heavily, that at the turn of the twentieth 
century almost everything known six decades later about the causes of smoke and 
their elimination had been said, but still hardly anything had been done. He 
lamented the repetition of experiments and observations, and the huge waste of 
research effort.108
Perhaps surprised by Halliday’s lambaste, the WHO produced a less controversial 
summary document in 1962, Epidemiology of Air Pollution, and a further report in 
1964,109 both of which acknowledged the evidence that air pollution causes health 
problems, but reminded of the lack of knowledge of which elements in polluted 
air -  apart from smoke and sulphur dioxide -  were responsible.110 The situation 
was not dramatically different at the middle1" or end of that decade, with a report 
of a special committee of the Royal College of Physicians of London highlighting 
the known correlation between levels of certain pollutants in air and mortality 
from bronchitis, but having nothing especially new to add.112
The measurement of atmospheric pollution through monitoring networks co­
ordinated by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research'1 had fostered
“ In 1927 the Advisory Committee on Atmospheric Pollution transferred from the Meteorological 
Office to the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). In 1945, the Atmospheric 
Pollution Research Committee was reconstituted as a Committee of the Fuel Research Board of 
the DSIR. Work on atmospheric pollution at the DSIR, including the monitoring networks, 
involved close co-operation with the Meteorological Office, Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. Ministry of Fuel and Power, Ministry of Health, Medical Research Council, and of 
course the local authorities.
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development of such epidemiological work. And monitoring also showed that 
atmospheric pollution levels were generally falling.113
Scientific understanding grew, however, in a climate of changing stress on 
personal responsibility. The 1960s in particular saw a shift from 
environmentalism to an emphasis on personal prevention in relation to health. If 
smoking was responsible for cancer, it was up to the individual to stop, and efforts 
could be made to facilitate that proeess. It was also, paradoxically, a person’s right 
to participate in activities deleterious to one's own health should the individual so 
desire -  as the following decade more strongly affirmed.
Similarly, if smoke pollution was bad for health, the individual should do what 
she can to keep healthy and to avoid harming others. This of course meant people 
needed to be made aware, and health workers needed to be more involved. It was 
therefore no surprise to find the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Dr C 
Hill, stressing in 1962 that there were plenty of good reasons for cleaning up the 
air, including 30,000 chronic bronchitis deaths a year and 20 million working days 
lost, but speeding up improvements meant individuals needed to be better 
informed and localities needed to start acting appropriately:
“We can and must get rid of the filthy smoke blanket which shrouds our 
big towns ... That means the local authorities must make smoke control 
orders under the Clean Air Act, and that the man in the street... must stop 
sending smoke up his castle chimney. Success in cleaning ... will not be 
achieved without the co-operation and support of the householders ... and 
... housewives ... but they will not give their support unless they know 
that smoke is bad for them, and that smoke control will bring them better 
health, cleaner towns, cleaner homes, and less drudgery.”114
So the general practitioner was called upon to foster enlightened public opinion by 
explaining the ill-effects on health of atmospheric pollution, and by dispelling 
misconceived ideas about various forms of domestic heating.115 And in 1965 the 
British Medical Association produced a ‘Family Doctor Special' called Clean 
Air, '16 which covered the health effects of pollution, and what can be done about 
it in the home -  fuel options, grants, ventilation, insulation and safety. The public
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could only be enlightened if the general practitioner was armed and equipped with 
all the relevant information.
Conclusions
The relationship between air and public health in this case study looks rather 
different to that presented in the previous chapter. The harmonious orientation of 
mankind and nature, with its holistic and sometimes spiritual dimension, 
disappeared with the earlier civilisations. As the industrial revolution progressed, 
polluted air was associated with infectious diseases according to miasmatic 
theory. But advances in medical science in the late nineteenth century, and 
acceptance of the germ theory of disease, led to a de-emphasis of the place of the 
environment in relation to health. Air became associated with ‘seeing’ the more 
direct ill-health effects as those visible in the atmosphere as smoke pollution.
Smoke pollution came to symbolise concerns about the atmosphere, but 
alleviation of smoke pollution was not politically palatable while industrial 
development was paramount. Legislation to reduce air pollution levels and 
attenuate the adverse effects on health has generally either failed to appear or 
failed to deliver. The story of procrastination and undelivered promises has 
continued despite the relentless campaigning of pressure groups and, in the first 
half of the twentieth century, by public health professionals.
Developments in air pollution policy have mainly been dictated by economics and 
politics. Reducing pollution costs money and requires lifestyle changes generally 
felt to be politically unpalatable. Eventually, a mixture of concerns about 
visibility, aesthetics and washing, falling prices of alternative fuels to coal, market 
competition, and a public tired of choking smogs and willing to take more 
responsibility, combined to turn the tide.
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At the mid-1970s the epidemiological understanding of the effects of air pollution 
on human health had progressed, albeit to a limited degree. Infants, children, the 
elderly, certain occupational groups and those with pre-existing respiratory or 
cardio-vascular disease had been shown to be most susceptible to air pollutants, 
particularly in acute pollution episodes. But this had been observed for a long 
time.
The extent to which polluted air causes long-temi ill health, however, remained 
more difficult to quantify and more poorly understood. To grapple with this, 
polluted air has been gradually re-conceptualised as its constituent air pollutant 
components, and air pollution epidemiology has correspondingly tended towards 
reductionism in exposure and outcome measurement.
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Tabic 2.1 Overview of smoke and air pollution legislation in England, 1273-1968
Date Legislation Details
1273 Ordinance Ordinance prohibiting use of coal in London as being 
prejudicial to health.
1306 Royal Proclamation Issued by Edward l forbidding the use of coal by artificers, 
who were to return to charcoal.
1388 English Sanitary Act First English Sanitary Act, dealt with offal and slaughter­
houses, and prohibited casting of animal filth and refuse into 
rivers or ditches, and corrupting of the air.
1467 Local law Law passed in Yorkshire forbidding the building of any 
more kilns because of the stink and badness of the air, and 
detriment to fruit trees.
1845 Railways Clauses Consolidation 
Act
Required railway locomotives to consume, as far as 
practicable, their own smoke.
1847 Town Improvement Clauses Act Required factory furnaces to consume, as far as practicable, 
their own smoke.
1853 Smoke Nuisance Abatement 
(Metropolis) Act
Empowered Home Office to appoint an inspector, working 
in consultation with metropolitan police, to abate nuisance 
from the smoke of furnaces in the metropolis and from 
steam vessels above London Bridge.
1863 Alkali, etc. Works Regulation Act Empowered appointment of inspectors to inspect air 
pollution from certain factories.
1875 Public Health Act Legislated that any fireplace or furnace in trade premises 
must as far as practicable consume its own smoke, and 
enabled action to be taken against those responsible for 
factory chimneys emitting black smoke in sufficient quantity 
to be a nuisance. The Act did not cover private dwelling- 
houses and did not apply to London.
1891 Public Health (London) Act Conferred similar provisions against smoke nuisance to 
London as contained within 1875 Act.
1907 Public Health (Amendment Act) Empowered local authorities to make by-laws regarding 
construction of chimney shafts for furnaces of steam engines 
and certain factories.
1926 Public Health (Smoke Abatement) 
Act
No longer necessary to prove smoke was black when 
emitted in sufficient quantity to be a nuisance; extended 
definition of smoke to include soot, ash. grit and gritty 
particles; enabled local authorities to make by-laws to 
control emission of smoke.
1956 Clean Air Act Control of smoke emissions from factories; introduction of 
smoke control areas.
1968 Clean Air Act Revised the Clean Air Act 1956, and extended it to 
prohibiting emission of dark smoke from industrial and trade 
premises.
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Table 2.2 The Beaver Report, Clean Air Bill and Clean Air Act: comparison of main areas
Beaver Report(1953) Clean Air Bill (1955) Clean Air Act (1956)
□ Emission of dark smoke: prohibited from any 
chimney including domestic fireplaces (si).
□ Smokeless zones: local authorities empowered 
to make orders, subject to confirmation by 
appropriate Minister.
□ Industrial dust and grit: obligatory plant for 
arresting dust and grit on certain installations 
(s6); measurement of grit emission (s7); grit 
emission should be minimised (s5).
□ Special industrial premises: where special 
technical difficulties Alkali Inspectorate 
responsible for ensuring best practicable 
means for pollution prevention (s i7).
□ Domestic heating appliances: installed in new 
premises should be of approved types.
□ Grants: assistance by local authorities and 
Exchequer for updating appliances.
□ Railways and pit-heaps: laws need updating; 
local authorities to enforce.
□ Annual report: on smoke abatement required 
by local authorities to appropriate Minister.
□ Penalties: for smoke offences increased.
□ Clean Air Council: set up, chaired by Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, or in
' Scotland by the Secretary of State.
□ Emission of dark smoke: an offence from any 
chimney, except as permitted by regulations.
□ Smoke control areas: local authorities enabled 
to establish smoke control areas, the new title 
for the old smokeless zones.
□ Industrial grit and dust: new furnaces to be 
smokeless; local authorities to approve plans 
and specifications to indicate compliance with 
this provision.
□ Special industrial premises: the Act will not 
apply to premises controlled under the Alkali 
etc. Works Regulation Act, 1906; proceedings 
cannot be brought without consent of Minister.
□ Grants: for adaptation of fireplaces in private 
dwellings in planned smoke-control areas.
□ Smoke nuisances: other than from a private 
dwelling or dark smoke from other building, 
may be dealt with under the Public Health 
Acts if a nuisance to local inhabitants.
□ Building by-laws: in future may be required 
with regard to heating and cooking to prevent 
as far as practicable the emission of smoke.
□ Research and publicity: gives local authorities 
powers to promote or assist research, and 
engage in education and publicity.
Significant differences:
• Smoke control areas not smokeless zones.
• Domestic heating appliances in new premises 
w'ere not obliged to be of approved type.
• The Act would not apply to special premises 
under the Alkali etc. Works Regulation Act,
1906, and proceedings could not be brought 
without ministerial consent.
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Table 2.3 Trends in coal use, smoke production, and pollutants in England
Coal output jOl / 
OR consumption [CJ
Smoke production
Year
Total 
(million 
tons / 
annum)
Domestic 
million 
tons / 
annum 
(% of 
total)
Industry 
million tons 
/ annum 
(% of total)
Total 
(million 
tons / 
annum)
Domestic 
million 
tons / 
annum 
(% of 
total)
Industry 
million 
tons / 
annum 
(% of 
total)
1700 3 [01
1800 10-15 [01
1900
1913
1925
220 [O] 
160-70 [C] 
287 [O] 
230 [01
1936-38 180 [C] 51 (28%) 129* (72%) 2.3 1.2 (52%) 1.1 *(48%)
1948 190 [C] 37(19%) 153* (81%) 2.0 0.9 (45%) 1.1 *(55%)
1952
1953
224 [C] 
205 [C]
36.8(16%)
36.8(18%)
187.2*(84%)
168.2*(82%)
2.3
2.1
1.3 (57%) 
0.9 (43%)
1.0*(43%)
1.2*(57%)
1958
1959
200 [C] 
221 [Cl
36.0(18%)
33.6(15%)
164 *(82%) 
187.4*(85%)
1.7
1.9
1.1 (65%)
1.2 (63%)
0.6*(35%)
0.7*(37%)
1964
1967
184.7 [C]
161.7 [Cl
27.9(15%)
23.0(14%)
156.8*(85%)
138.7*(86%) 0.87 0.75 (86%) 0.12*04%)
* As well as industrial works this includes railways, collieries, gas works, coke ovens, and 
electric power stations
Sources
Parker A. Cities without smoke. JRoy SocArts 1950;December:l-17.
Parker A. Smoke Abatement. Sanitary Inspectors Association Annual Conference Brochure 
1950;Paper No.6:2.
Political and Economic Planning (PEP). The menace of air pollution. London: Chiswick Press 
(for PEP), 1954 (Vol.XX(369): 189-215).
Sawford AC. Clean air. The Medical Press 1957;June26:581 -586.
Marsh A. Air pollution (Progress Review No. 48). J Inst Fuel 1960;December:609-615. 
Craxford SR. Air pollution -  past, present and future. Inst Petroleum Rev 1961; 15(173): 134. 
Parker A. Air pollution. Chemistry and Industry 1966;Junc25:1129-1131.
Sharp PG. Towards cleaner air -  a sun’ey of air pollution. Brighton: National Society for 
Clean Air, 1968.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY 3 :  Q U A N TITA TIV E RISK ASSESSM ENT EPIDMEIOLOGICAL  
RESEARCH -  PHILOSOPHY, POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Overview of case study 3
This case study covers a period of three decades up to the present day, during 
which important shifts have occurred in the way air is conceptualised in 
epidemiology and public health. A piece of epidemiological research using a 
modem public health technique called quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is 
initially described. The findings of my QRA have already been published in the 
journal Public Health Medicine1 and, although it will be necessary to summarise 
these, the aim of this chapter is instead to use the QRA as a vehicle through which 
to investigate historical, philosophical, and policy considerations in contemporary 
public health theory and practice.
This is a historical case study (history of epidemiology, public health and health 
policy) but has strong inter-disciplinary components (epidemiology, philosophy, 
ethics). Primary and secondary data sources were used for the non- 
epidemiological aspects, as described in chapter one, and inter-disciplinary 
connections are examined.
Background: developments in national and international environmental 
policy, 1970-1988
As the epidemic shift from acute infectious diseases to chronic diseases in high 
income populations became established by the second half of the twentieth 
century,2 awareness of the damaging aspects of western lifestyles mounted.
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Concerns about the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on the 
environment grew from around the 1960s,3 accompanied by a rethinking of 
humankind’s relationship with the natural world,4 and alongside sometimes 
radical reappraisals of the role and limitations of scientific medicine.5 6 7
In the international policy arena the changing social climate was first reflected at 
the 1972 United Nations (UN) Environment Conference. World Health 
Organization (WHO) interest in air pollution impacts and monitoring continued,8 9 
then in 1987 the UN published Our Common Future, prepared by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, a document that identified 
several trends in environmental deterioration and also discussed in detail for the 
first time the now widely used term ‘sustainable development’.10 In 1992 WHO 
held a Commission on Health and the Environment, the same year as the 
landmark Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At Rio the signing o f‘Agenda 
21’ was significant in stating clearly the need for integration of environmental, 
economic and social planning at national and international levels.
Within this changing atmosphere it was not surprising to see a reorientation of 
ideas towards how the physical environment, including air, might affect human 
well-being. Increase in attention given to environmental health in the UK was 
evident in the 1992 White Paper Health of the Nation, which stressed a “growing 
acceptance of responsibility for the quality of the environment” as well as “an 
understanding that the efforts of individuals are as important to the creation of a 
healthy environment as the actions of the Government.”" In 1994 the 
Government's Sustainable Development strategy made clear its commitment to 
environmental protection.17
In 1996 the Government (Department of the Environment) published the 
significant United Kingdom National Environmental Health Action Plan 
(NEHAP). This document defined environmental health as “those aspects of 
human health, including quality of life, that are determined by physical, 
biological, social and psychosocial factors in the environment” and refers to the
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theory and practice of assessing, correcting, controlling and preventing those 
factors in the environment that can potentially affect adversely the health of 
present and future generations.”13
One section of the NE1IAP deals specifically with air quality, and informs the 
reader of the imminent UK National Air Quality Strategy (NAQS), which duly 
arrived in 1997 in part fulfilment of Part IV of the 1995 Environment Act: Local 
Air Quality Management (LAQM).14 The NAQS sets out a comprehensive 
approach to maintaining and improving the quality of ambient outdoor air in the 
United Kingdom. It sets “health-based air quality standards, air quality objectives 
which it is intended should be achieved by the end of 2005, and the process by 
which those objectives will be achieved”.15 Although the NAQS acknowledges the 
importance of national policies in improving air quality, it places significant 
responsibilities with local authorities and promises resources to assist.
So, within these national and international contexts, an opportunity existed to 
undertake a unique piece of practical, service-based public health work, using a 
modem epidemiological method.
Quantitative risk assessment
The quantitative risk assessment (background methodology, data gathering, 
process and calculations) will be presented here in outline only, focusing on what 
is salient to this case study of the thesis. Further details are available in the 
published journal article’ or in the report Air Pollution and Health in Barking and 
Havering Health Authority, which is held at the faculty of Public Health library.
Background methodology: time-series studies in epidemiology
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QRA was developed initially in relation to environmental cancer risks. It is an 
applied procedure that uses literature-derived dose-specific risk estimates to 
predict the health impact of some specified (usually population-based) distribution 
of exposure to an identifiable factor.1 *'’ In air pollution QRA the risk estimates are 
predominantly derived from time-series studies so, before looking at the QRA 
itself, it is necessary to look at the preceding step.
The time-series analysis -  or study -  is a fairly new epidemiological method 
designed to assess associations between health indicators such as mortality and 
levels of air pollution that are not perceived as severe, but fall within existing air 
quality standards or guidelines.171819 In other words, time-series studies can look 
at the health effects of mild diurnal fluctuations in air pollution, rather than 
focusing on the effects of acute severe episodes such as smogs.
More specifically, time-series studies examine the relationship between an 
exposure variable -  air pollutant(s) -  and an outcome variable such as deaths over 
the same time units (usually days) for a period of usually one or more years.20 21 
The end-product of a time-series analysis is a regression coefficient of the 
association of one variable with the other. For example, Schwartz found -  over an 
11-year period in Steubenville, Ohio -  that an increase in total daily particulates 
of 100ug/m3 was significantly associated with a 4% increase in mortality on the 
succeeding day.22
There have now been many such studies performed in various geographical 
locations, looking at different air pollutants and different health outcomes. 
Importantly, it is the pool of these study results that informs quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA)23 and a literature review of these studies was undertaken.1 The 
review found that the four major outdoor air pollutants -  particulate matter, 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and ozone -  are associated with adverse health
1 The literature review involved a search strategy including on-line databases, publications from
specialist centres and Government departments, hand searching oflnde.x Medicus and other key
journals, and guidance towards articles from my academic supervisor.
123
outcomes. Increasing levels of the pollutants are associated with an increase in 
deaths (from all causes) and an increase in respiratory hospital admissions.
Quantitative risk assessment: the method
There have been several descriptions of methods for air pollution quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA).241 chose to follow, as closely as possible, those described in 
the 1998 publication by the Department of Health Committee on the Medical 
Effects of Air Pollution (COMEAP) entitled Quantification of the Effects o f Air 
Pollution on Health in the United Kingdom There are four essential components 
to QRA:26
1. Identification of a health hazard. I focused on two health outcomes -  deaths 
(all-cause) and respiratory hospital admissions.
2. Definition of dose-response relationship. The same exposure-response (risk) 
coefficients were used as those worked out by COMEAP.
3. Estimation of the population's profile o f exposure to the health hazard. I used 
data from local air pollution monitors when possible, and the nearest available 
monitor otherwise.
4. Estimation of aggregate additional health risk attributable to that exposure 
profile. I calculated the number of theoretically preventable deaths and 
respiratory hospital admissions caused by air pollution, as well as the total of 
those attributable to air pollution.
Quantitative risk assessment: the location and data collected
Barking and Havering Health Authority (BIIHA) is situated at the north-east
comer of the London region, bordered by the River Thames to the south and
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enclosed in an arc from east to west by the health authorities of South-Essex, 
North Essex, Redbridge and Waltham Forest, and East London and the City."
BHHA comprises two local authorities: London Borough of Barking &
Dagenham (LBBD) and London Borough of Havering (LBH). Located in the 
south-west part of the health authority the urban and more deprived LBBD is 
geographically smaller than LBI1, has less people, more industry and lower car 
ownership.
Through liaison with Environmental Health Officers data on air pollutant levels 
were obtained from records of monitoring equipment owned by the two boroughs. 
When this was unavailable data from the nearest London monitoring station were 
used instead. The two health outcomes used in the air pollution QRA were all­
cause mortality and respiratory hospital admissions, and data for these were 
obtained from the Public Health Common Data Set and the Hospital Episode 
Statistics (HES) respectively.
Quantitative risk assessment: the process and final results 
The stages involved in the QRA process (annualization values; calculation; 
attributable vs. preventable health outcomes; sensitivity analyses) are described in 
the academic article, with accompanying tables.
Piecing together all the calculations performed provided one final table for the 
whole health authority, showing deaths and respiratory hospital admissions 
attributable to air pollution and preventable. Although there were difficulties with 
data collection in most years, the final estimates produced by the QR.4 showed 
that in BHHA in ¡997 there were approximately ISO deaths and 226 respiratory 
hospital admissions attributable to air pollution, and theoretically preventable,
" In the restructuring of the NHS in 2001 Burking and Huvering Health Authority was dissolved, 
and Burking Primary Care Trust (PCT) and Havering PCT were created.
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Overall, the results of the QRA suggest that existing levels of air pollution have 
significant effects on mortality and morbidity at the local level.27 In BHHA -  a 
district with about 385,000 residents -  the 180 preventable deaths in 1997 
attributable to air pollution made up just over 4% of the total 4,404 deaths for that 
year. This compares with 44 deaths from breast cancer and 30 deaths from 
diabetes mellitus in BHHA in 1996.28 The impact of air pollution will be mostly 
on individuals with existing chronic respiratory disease, and is likely to be greater 
in LBBD than in LBH, (inner city; higher population density; higher deprivation; 
higher concentration of industry; higher smoking rates; higher death rates; and 
respiratory hospital admission rates) although this disparity was not strikingly 
evident due to the limitations of available local pollutant data.
Scientific considerations: technical and methodological limitations
Having described the process of the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 
undertaken locally, the main part of this case study will explore the meaning and 
implications of this piece of work and the science that underpins it. The scientific 
(methodological) issues will summarised only, to allow for discussion of the 
historical, philosophical and policy issues represented in -  or reflected by -  the 
work, and the meaning of these for epidemiological theory and public health 
practice. The division is used to facilitate discussion, and is not meant to suggest 
the categories are mutually exclusive or extricable.
The earliest scientific problems along the QRA pathway relate to exposure 
measurement, and are technical. Despite advances, there remains inconsistency in 
equipment used and monitoring sites chosen, both of which limit the validity of 
data obtained.
Next are methodological concerns. Ambient levels of pollutants are actually only 
proxy measures of true population exposure; the annualization procedure is really
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a default option in the absence of more accurate exposure data. Other 
methodological limitations relate more directly to interpretation of the data. Many 
of the deaths attributed to air pollution under the algorithm used in this analysis 
are likely to entail only minor bringing forward in time rather than being “new” 
deaths (i.e. otherwise unexpected). This effect has been termed ‘harvesting’.29 It 
is also difficult to separate out the effects of air pollutants. In using single 
pollutant models there may be double-counting of deaths causing over-estimation 
of effect. Along similar lines, it is hard to discern whether hospital admissions are 
repeat events on the same individual or on different people, although this does not 
necessarily diminish the significance of the event
In contrast to concerns about over-estimation, it could be argued that the impact of 
air pollution on health is likely to be under-estimated by the QRA because time- 
series analyses tell us only about the acute effects of increased pollutant levels and 
tell us nothing about the long-term effects of air pollution on the incidence of 
chronic diseases.30 31 Additionally, the QRA undertaken in BHHA looked only at 
two health outcomes, whereas the true impact of air pollution is likely to be 
substantially higher. For instance, very recent evidence highlights the effects of air 
pollution on individuals with cardiovascular disease.32
Epidemiological theory
Having looked firstly at how and why QRA is done, then the methodological 
limitations of the procedure, it is now necessary to take a step back and examine 
critically what QRA tells us about the larger picture of epidemiological theory and 
public health philosophy and practice. Once again, this section is sub-divided for 
convenience and obvious links exist between the sub-sections.
Historical developments in epidemiology
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The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) presented in this chapter has two 
fundamental components: the time-series epidemiological studies that determine 
the risk coefficients; and application of these coefficients to enumerate in a given 
population the impact of the air pollutants. While technological and 
methodological problems have been looked at in the previous section, to better 
understand QRA it is necessary to explore how the constituent components fit into 
the broader picture of developments in epidemiological theory, and changes in the 
relationship between this theory and public health practice.
Epidemiology is difficult to define, in part because what is considered to be 
modem epidemiology differs markedly from earlier conceptions. The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles places the first appearance of 
the word in 1873 and describes epidemiology succinctly as “ that branch of 
medical science which treats of epidemics”.33 However, a well-known classroom 
epidemiology textbook of today chooses to draw on a “useful and comprehensive” 
1970 definition of epidemiology as “the study of the distribution and determinants 
of disease frequency”, to which the phrase “in human populations” is added.34 
And, tellingly, a 1994 edition of the highly regarded Essential Public Health 
Medicine'" vaguely limits its definition of epidemiology to “one of the population 
sciences basic to public health”.35
What these three varying definitions reveal is both the developmental transitions 
through which epidemiology has passed, and the confusion over what constitutes 
epidemiological theory today. As exemplified in the previous chapter, when 
epidemiology was borne in the late nineteenth century, it was largely a descriptive 
enterprise. Drawing on demography, and using basic statistics, medical scientists 
described differences in disease patterns between population groups. The 
incidence of diseases in communities could be compared classically by area, but 
also by parameters such as age, sex and occupation.
This successful book, co-written by (lie present Chief Medical Officer for the United Kingdom 
(Prof. Liam Donaldson), has been considered the key textbook for those training in public health 
tor over a decade. The name has recently been changed to Essential Public Health.
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Based on observed differences in diseases between communities, medical 
scientists speculated on disease aetiologies. So, for instance, noticing differences 
between urban and rural communities in rates of respiratory diseases, such as 
pneumonia, led to the belief that smoke pollution might be responsible. This was 
reinforced by statistics suggesting rates increased in cities after episodes of smog. 
In charting broad historical developments in epidemiology Susser and Susser have 
labelled this period ‘the era of sanitary statistics’, with its paradigm of miasma 
and an analytical approach of demonstrating clustering of morbidity and 
mortality.36 Like others, as discussed in the previous case study, they link this 
epidemiological era to the preventive approach (at a population level) of public 
health of that time, characterised by efforts to better health through improving 
drainage, sanitation and sewage disposal.
Towards the end of the 19th century germ theory became the dominant paradigm. 
As the Henle-Koch postulates'v were accepted, the scientific community began to 
search for single agents responsible for specific diseases.37 This era of infectious 
disease epidemiology, that lasted well into the twentieth century, focused on 
laboratory culture from disease sites, experimental transmission of diseases and 
reproduction of lesions. Prevention of illness centred on interruption of disease 
transmission through vaccines, isolation of cases, and later antibiotics.36
The transition between these two eras, from sanitary statistics to infectious 
diseases, marked an important turning-point in epidemiology, one that forms the 
roots of some of the problems in current epidemiological thought. Whereas 
originally epidemiology was interested in examining the fundamental social and 
biological factors that could explain population patterns of disease, a reorientation 
occurred towards investigating specific factors associated with particular diseases. 
And, in tandem, there was a conceptual shift from thinking about what makes
lv Henle-Koch postulates were criteria for assessing the causal relationship of organism to lesion. 
Robert Koch confirmed conditions put forward some years earlier by Jacob Ilenle, and acceptance 
of these marked the birth of medical bacteriology.
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populations ill to what makes individuals ill.38 Within public health a biomedical 
model of disease was gradually replacing a broadly social model of community ill 
health.
For western medicine models of human disease aetiology had a certain linear 
progression in the second half of the twentieth century. As the impact of chronic 
diseases began to overshadow that of acute infectious disease in western 
countries, models incorporated the relevance of the host and the environment -  in 
addition to the agent -  in disease causation, and later introduced the importance of 
bio-psychosocial factors. But this backdrop created a state of uncertainty for a 
population science, and in the 1950s and 1960s epidemiology found itself at 
something of a crossroads.
One reaction to these developments was-‘social medicine’, defined by its first 
professor, John Ryle, in the 1940s as a holistic socio-biology of health and 
disease, grounded in holistic epistemology and a deep rejection of mechanistic 
positivism.39 But epidemiology went in a different direction, one that followed the 
reductionist leanings of western medicine. From the 1960s onwards epidemiology 
has increasingly focused on simply examining the relationship, or association, 
between an ‘exposure’ and an ‘outcome’. Variously termed ‘risk factor 
epidemiology’, ‘analytical epidemiology’ or ‘modem epidemiology’v all refer to 
the same academic practice of using epidemiological methods to measure putative 
associations between ever more specific risk factors to which groups may be 
exposed, and health outcomes in those groups.40
And here it is possible to begin to see how the time-series studies that inform the 
QRA fit in. Each study is basically an investigation of the relationship between 
the local atmospheric concentration of specific air pollutants (the exposure) and
v Although these terms all refer to the same methodological practice, semantically they can be 
separated: risk factor epidemiology specifies the notion of risk; analytical epidemiology 
differentiates from descriptive epidemiology; and modem epidemiology is -  not surprisingly -  the 
most recent, but also reflects that contemporary epidemiology is this methodological endeavour.
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the amount of death or hospital admission for respiratory disease in that locality 
(the outcome). For the exposure, the pollutant researched has historically been a 
progressively more reduced version of that previously examined. For instance, 
originally smoke was investigated, then this became black smoke, then total 
suspended particulates, then particulates less than 10 microns in diameter, and the 
latest research indicates that particulates less than 2.5 microns in diameter are 
those most relevant. To these other specific pollutants -  nitrogen dioxide, sulphur 
dioxide, and ozone -  have gradually been added. And the public health response 
to these studies, such as the National Air Quality Strategy Standards and 
Objectives (UK), specifies desired levels of these pollutants in the atmosphere.
This present period has been coined the era of chronic disease epidemiology, with 
its paradigm ‘the black box’. Sometimes simply referred to as ‘black box 
epidemiology’, the phrase represents a belief in the discipline that what goes on 
inside the box is of secondary importance to associations found between the 
factors either side of the box, as illustrated below:41
Exposure (e.g. environmental carcinogen, air pollutant)
BLACK BOX
Outcome (e.g. cancer, respiratory disease)
Black box epidemiological research is really just risk factor epidemiology with an 
emphasis on searching for environmental causes of disease, bom out of a belief in 
the 1980s that perhaps 80% of cancers might be caused by environmental 
factors.42 Each study analysis in risk factor or black box epidemiology provides a 
statistical summary, the relative risk (RR) of exposure to outcome. Given that 
most epidemiological studies measure exposure and outcome on individuals (e.g.
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do you smoke, and do you have coronary heart disease?) the RR informs of risk to 
the individual, and tallies with the individual preventive approach of much 
modem public health work, for instance through advocating lifestyle change.
The time-series studies informing the QRA, however, measure exposure and 
outcome repeatedly over time at the population level and the end-product, the risk 
coefficient, tells something about the risk to a population of any given level of 
exposure to a pollutant. The low hierarchical place of these ‘correlational studies’ 
for advocates of evidence based medicine is looked at later in this chapter, but 
first it is important to explore some of the conceptual limitations of black box 
epidemiology and, by extension, of time-series studies and the QRA.
Limitations of modern epidemiology
The major criticism of risk factor or black box epidemiology, and that from which 
other criticisms stem, is that there is little in the way of theory underpinning it.
For at least 30 years there has been a huge effort in improving methodological 
technique, through more and more sophisticated ways of minimising the 
possibility that an association found could be explained by errors in data 
collection or by chance. Technological advances have enabled complex statistical 
modelling and multi-variate analyses to facilitate this process, and risk factor 
epidemiology has become a technical exercise obsessed with refining its methods. 
One commentator reviewed 21 American textbooks and anthologies of 
epidemiology published between 1970 and the early 1990s, and found discussion 
of epidemiological theory, and history, to be almost non-existent.31
A corollary of the focus on method has been the distancing of epidemiology from 
activities in the real world that result in improvement to public health.43 An editor 
of th q American Journal of Public Health expresses his fears over the separation 
as follows:
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“In the absence of a central concern with subject matter, the satisfactions 
of technical command are held within narrow bounds; in the absence of 
broader purpose, an arsenal of methods might not necessarily be directed 
to the benefit of the public health.”44
The times-series studies, and the QRA itself, certainly reflect this devotion to 
methodological precision. Most time-series studies involve large datasets, and use 
complex modelling and statistical analysis to find the ‘purest’ possible association 
between an atmospheric pollutant and a health outcome. Therefore, the effects of 
aspects of the environment that might ‘interfere’ with the association are adjusted 
for, such as temperature, climate, seasonality, influenza outbreaks, and smoking. 
The questionable meaning of controlling out these factors (when in the reality of 
population exposure they exist) will be returned to later, but now serves to reflect 
the preoccupation with method.
Attention to method can be partly explained by the ongoing search for risk factors 
of ever-diminishing importance. The associations between major risk factors, such 
as smoking, and disease could ‘hardly be missed’, but with most of these now 
found researchers have been obliged over the last two or three decades to focus on 
much smaller associations. These of course require more sophisticated methods to 
elucidate, and often one study revealing a positive association between a risk 
factor and health outcome will be countered by another showing a negative 
association between the same factors. Hence the huge numbers of air pollution 
time-series studies repeatedly examining the same or very similar associations. 
There is a limit, some believe, to the status of black box epidemiology posed by 
the number of erroneous scare stories that arise, and the public toleration of 
these.45
Yet, in spite of all the methodological improvement, technological advances and 
the repeated studies, risk factor epidemiology ofien appears not particularly 
helpful. This is in part, as mentioned earlier, due to its distancing from public
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health practice but, connected to this, risk factor epidemiology actually tells us 
very little about what makes populations ill.
Modem epidemiological research is underscored by biomedical model(s) of what 
makes individuals sick. Exposures have centred on factors pertaining to 
individuals, especially lifestyle choices (smoking, alcohol, caffeine, exercise), and 
outcomes have tended towards that which can be clinically detected, or has a 
clinical orientation (blood test results, cancer, hospital admissions). And what 
goes on inside the black box, although of less importance than associations 
detected, will nevertheless require a pathological basis for medico-scientific 
acceptance.
Fundamentally, however, what makes individuals sick is not the same as what 
makes populations sick.46 It is insufficient, and inappropriate, to hold that the 
population experience of illness simply reflects the sum of individual experiences. 
Although time-series studies do measure exposure and outcome at the population 
level, their design strips away relevant aspects of those population experiences, 
thereby failing to provide substantial integrated explanations for any association 
revealed. In doing their best to separate populations from their context, they tell us 
little about the social, political and economic factors that crucially shape 
population experience.47
In addressing this, Loomis and Wing discuss whether black box epidemiology is 
today’s miasma theory and molecular biology is the contemporary equivalent of 
germ theory. While black box epidemiology, with its search for environmental 
determinants, has redirected attention to an environmental theory of disease -  and 
away from starting with clinical endpoints44 -  they lament that it has increasingly 
taken on the logic and research methods focused on identifying single aetiological 
agents and quantification of their independent effects. Both black box 
epidemiology and molecular biology are misguided:
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“The modem incarnations of these theories are centred on agents of 
disease that are differently conceptualized, but similarly alienated from the 
ecological framework from which they exist. Neither approach effectively 
addresses the interdependence of multiple agents or how human 
populations become exposed and susceptible to them. This failure derives 
from a view of populations as mere aggregations of individuals (i.e. 
vehicles for quantifying exposure-disease associations) rather than as 
organized groups with relational properties that cannot be deduced by 
measurements on individuals.”48
Time-series studies divorce the association between exposure and outcome from 
the context in which a population experiences the association in two related ways. 
Firstly, the statistical controlling for confounding factors, as mentioned before, 
removes the effects of factors such as temperature and influenza epidemics. The 
danger is that “attempting to eliminate the influence of all other causes of diseases 
-  in an attempt to control confounding -  strips away the essential historical and 
social context, as well as the multiple moderating influence that constitute true 
causation.”49
Secondly, deliberately excluding social, political and economic factors from the 
research framework suggests that these factors are irrelevant to a population’s 
experience of atmospheric pollution and the consequences of that exposure. For 
the time-series air pollution studies the following would therefore not be 
considered: region/population of high poverty/low social class with 
correspondingly high smoking rates; region where historically housing provided 
by the State has been built on cheap land close to industries; low affordability of 
transport to get to hospital with an exacerbation of chronic respiratory disease.
It makes little sense for a science supposedly interested in what makes populations 
ill to remove populations in the scientific analyses from the deep-rooted factors 
that make them ill. But as well as making little sense, such research makes a 
significant commitment to reductionistic biomedical models of disease:
“... because control over measurement and extraneous factors is hindered 
when investigations are embedded in complex social and historical 
situations, this combination of influences supports the movement of the
discipline away from engagement with issues of social theory, population 
biology and human ecology, and towards a more fundamental commitment 
to biomedical approaches.”50
Also, as Wing continues, there is an agenda that makes a political statement about 
the underlying reasons why populations are ill, and the actions that could be taken 
to improve their health:
“The choice is not between objective science and a science that is 
contaminated by social and political values. Risk factor epidemiology does 
not achieve objectivity by systematically examining exposure-disease 
associations separated from contexts of military, energy, or agriculture 
policy, and issues of economic inequalities and democracy. Rather, it 
makes a political commitment to the status quo by excluding these issues 
from public health consideration.”51
So, for QRA, the verdict seems quite damning. What appears to be a reasonable, 
and scientific, way to assess the impact of atmospheric pollution on a local 
population may simply reflect the misguided approach of contemporary 
epidemiology. The time-series studies on which the QRA process is based have 
deep conceptual flaws, despite ever-improving methodological precision.
Putting the context back into epidemiology
Attempts at philosophical discussion of epidemiological theory have been limited. 
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s there was quite extensive debate -  mainly 
in the American academic journals -  on the philosophical dimensions of scientific 
enquiry in epidemiology. But this was almost entirely restricted to consideration 
of causal inference in epidemiology, and the differences between inductive and 
hypothetico-deductive methods of building knowledge within the discipline.5- 53 
54Although some articles lamented the general lack of philosophical debate, what 
emerged remained strongly within the positivist tradition -  for instance sometimes 
lengthy discussion of what Karl Popper's ideas might offer epidemiology55 56 57 s# 5,) 
-  with only occasional passing reference to alternative views on how science 
progresses and the social construction of knowledge.
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What has slowly appeared in the 1990s, however, is a growing awareness and 
belief that epidemiology needs to be able to understand populations, their health 
and disease, as entities embedded in a complex matrix of environmental, social, 
economic and political processes.60 61 62 Perhaps the best known attempt to put 
context back into epidemiology is Krieger’s social production of disease model, 
that “alludes to understanding that patterns of health and disease among persons in 
these groups requires viewing these patterns as the consequence of the social 
relationships between the specified groups, with these relationships expressed 
through people’s everyday living and working conditions, including daily 
interactions with others [author’s italics].”63 Krieger is concerned that the model 
excludes human history and origins, thereby discouraging epidemiologists from 
considering why population patterns of health and disease exist and persist or 
change over time.
She puts forward instead an ‘ecosocial framework’, with its image of the 
continually-constructed scaffolding of society. Here different population 
epidemiological profiles reflect interlinked and diverse patterns of exposure and 
susceptibility created by the dynamic connectedness of human existence. She 
presents a model specifying questions about social structure, cultural norms, 
ecological milieu, politics, economics, and biology, and directs epidemiologists to 
think about individuals in the context of their everyday lives, as shaped by their 
intertwined histories as members of a particular society, and as biological 
creatures who grow, develop, interact, and age. The ecosocial framework has an 
evolutionary and sociological dimension, and focuses on broader determinants of 
health that can only be changed through more widespread social action.
Evidence based medicine and evidence based policy
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Having looked at developments in epidemiological theory, it now follows to 
critically examine some parallel developments in the health policy arena, and how 
these relate to the QRA.
The time-series epidemiological studies that underpin the QRA aim to increase 
knowledge about the relationship between an atmospheric pollutant and an aspect 
of health or health service use. More specifically, the objective of each study is to 
acquire evidence for or against the hypothesis of that study, for instance that 
increase in the level of a pollutant studied is associated with increase in an adverse 
health outcome or greater health service use.vi But what is ‘evidence’, what 
constitutes good evidence, and why?
To appreciate the place of time-series studies and QRA in contemporary medicine 
and health policy, it is necessary to explore aspects of these questions. Some of 
the issues discussed in this section are closely connected to elements of the 
previous section, and these links will be highlighted.
What is evidence based medicine?
Evidence based medicine has flourished over the last decade or so.M 65 But despite 
the exposure evidence based medicine has received, there is still some uncertainty 
about what evidence based medicine really means.
In 1991, the practice of evidence based medicine was described as involving the 
following five stage process: (a) formulate for a chosen clinical problem an 
answerable question, for instance about patient diagnosis, prognosis, therapy or 
the organisation of services; (b) search the medical literature and other sources for 
information pertaining to that question i.e. find all available evidence; (c) Vl
Vl The ‘null hypothesis’ would be that increase in the level o f a pollutant studied is not associated 
with increase in an adverse health outcome or greater health service use.
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critically appraise the validity and usefulness of the evidence identified; (d) apply 
the results by managing the patient accordingly; and (e) evaluate that practice.'’'’67
As straightforward as this process may sound, five years later an editorial in the 
British Medical Journal attempted to clear up continuing confusion. First- 
authored by a chief proponent, David Sackett, evidence based medicine was 
defined as "the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current ’best’ evidence 
in making decisions about the care of individual patients”.68
Both the five-stage process and the definition predicate that evidence based 
medicine is an endeavour to ensure that clinical practice is based on the best 
available evidence. Underlying this effort is the recognition that a lot of 
contemporary medical practice (and health policy) is not based on reliable 
evidence. And this is an important leap, because it is now over thirty years since 
Archie Cochrane pointed out that the effectiveness of many medical interventions 
had not been properly evaluated.69 70
Evidence based medicine has placed Cochrane's agenda firmly in the general 
medical and public domain. It acknowledges that lack of professional consensus 
about evidence of effectiveness exists for many clinical scenarios and that 
extensive variation in clinical practice occurs. However, though patients benefit 
from proven interventions -  and are less likely to be subjected to treatments 
whose benefit has not been properly evaluated -  the driving force behind evidence 
based medicine has undoubtedly been economic.
Now well into Reiman's 'era of accountability'71 policy makers want to know what 
actually works, and evidence based medicine provides the framework necessary to 
limit spending and enhance efficiency. As well as the journals, workshops, and 
research programmes, the UK Government has set up and funded centres of 
excellence in Reviews and Dissemination at York, Health Technology • 
Assessment at Southampton, and centres for evidence based pharmacotherapy, 
nursing, medicine, mental health and dentistry. Politicians have placed ‘clinical
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effectiveness’ and the related ‘clinical governance’ at the forefront of current 
health policy.72 73 74
Limitations of evidence based medicine
With the above outline in mind it is now possible to look at some of the 
philosophical and ethical limitations of evidence based medicine. The aim is not 
to describe each in detail, but instead to illustrate the implications and constraints 
posed by each for air pollution epidemiology.
Hierarchy of evidence
Within evidence based medicine there exists an ordering of scientific research 
studies. To satisfy the advocates of evidence based medicine a health care 
intervention needs substantial research proof of its effectiveness, normally 
repeated in a variety of settings and conditions.
The research study design at the top of the hierarchy is the randomised controlled 
trial (RCT), perceived as the design most likely to deliver objective, value-free, 
evidence, through its random allocation of patients to treatment (or placebo) 
groups. The RCT has been labelled the ‘gold standard’ of research studies.
Next in the hierarchy comes observational research studies -  cohort studies'"' or 
case-control studiesvm -  then cross-sectional (or prevalence) studies, and lastly 
cross-sectional aggregate data studies. Variations on this hierarchy exist, some
v" A cohort study follows a group, or cohort, of individuals, and compares the incidence of disease 
in those members of the cohort exposed to a risk factor with the incidence in those unexposed. 
Cohort studies are usually time and resource intensive. They are observational since no specific 
intervention is applied.
v'" A case-control study finds individuals with a disease (the cases) and compares their exposure to 
a risk factor with a comparison group of individuals who do not have the disease (the controls). 
Case-control studies are usually quicker and cheaper than cohort studies, and are also 
observational.
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lists adding qualitative research or peer opinion towards the bottom of the list. For 
instance, the United States Preventive Services Taskforce rates the value of 
evidence from RCTs as “grade I”, non-RCTs as “grade 11“ and from opinions of 
respected authorities as “grade III“.75 The idea, however, remains the same, and 
most orderings are basically variations on the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 4.1 
(P160).
For air pollution epidemiology, the most striking aspect of this list is the place 
occupied by time-series studies close to the bottom of the hierarchy, meaning they 
fall into the category of studies valued least by scientific consensus. Time-series 
studies are a particular kind of cross-sectional study, so-named because data is 
collected repeatedly over a specified time period. But, crucially, the data is 
aggregated. It is data collected at the (aggregated) population level, and not the 
individual level. So, for example, in the time-series studies discussed earlier in the 
chapter, air pollution exposure levels are those measured in a certain region, and 
there is a level of presumption that individuals are actually exposed to those 
levels. In reality, of course, some individuals may be working outdoors by the 
roadside while others stay at home. Statistical methods can help by adjusting, for 
example, for population density and mobility patterns, but the fact remains that 
atmospheric pollutant levels are a substitute for more accurate measures of 
individual exposure.
The same issue exists for the outcome measures. Mortality and hospital admission 
rates are aggregated at the population level. This means that time-series studies 
correlate population level exposures with population level outcomes, with no way 
of being sure that those individuals actually exposed to high pollutant levels are 
those either dying or being admitted to hospital. These studies have also been 
called ecological studies,'* supposedly to reilect their population level and 
environmental bent. This is an inappropriate label since the studies share little
“ They are also sometimes referred to as correlational studies, as they correlate aggregated data at 
the population level.
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with ecology.76 But it is also an unfortunate label, as it has associated ecology with 
‘ecological fallacy’, a phrase now commonly, and pejoratively, used to indicate 
the dangers of drawing inappropriate conclusions about individuals from 
population-based studies.
“In fact, they may be among the most difficult study designs from which 
to obtain valid results pertaining to individual level risks for disease. 
Mainly this is because we cannot be sure that the individuals who are 
exposed are the same ones who contract the disease. The cross-sectional 
aggregate data reflect only an aggregated level of exposure and disease for 
the group (e.g. averages), whereas a very different relationship may exist 
between individual exposure and disease. For this reason, we cannot 
necessarily extrapolate results of cross-sectional aggregate data studies 
directly to individual risks (i.e., the ecologie fallacy).”77
It is because cross-sectional aggregated data studies -  such as time-series analyses 
-  do not measure exposures and outcomes on individuals that they are considered 
the studies of least scientific value, and so placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
The results they provide, the evidence they yield, is continually open to the most 
obvious, toughest, criticism, and so can be most readily rejected by policy-makers
And it is here that an important distinction must be made. Rejection because of 
scientific methodological concerns is one thing, but difficulties in accepting the 
evidence from time-series studies is shaped by the very nature of contemporary 
medicine and medical research. As discussed in the previous section, the dominant 
model in western medicine and epidemiology remains biomedical, centred on the 
individual, focused on risk factors close to the individual, and geared towards 
individual level interventions. Research study designs have been determined by 
this thinking, those favoured being those orientated around individuals and 
objectivity. And the current drive towards evidence based medicine and clinical 
effectiveness firmly reinforces the biomedical model, perpetuates the valuing of 
the individual above communities, and thereby diminishes the importance of the 
natural environment and human connectedness with it.
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The epidemiological research obsession with these downstream, proximate, 
factors has been coined ‘prisoners of the proximate’.78 While epidemiology stays 
confined to this cell, time-series and other similar environmental health related 
studies will remain of low significance because they do not fit into the dominant 
research paradigm. The challenge is to break free from the shackles, as captured 
by a chapter in a 2001 book Ecological Integrity which addresses the usefulness 
of epidemiology to determine the links between human health, environmental 
concerns and ecological integrity:
“In contrast to this seemingly despondent view of the place of aggregate- 
type studies in the world currently driven by individual risk factor 
epidemiology, others have begun searching for a more holistic role for 
epidemiology to truly address public health concerns.”7’
The positivist nature of evidence based medicine
Defining firm evidence and deciding what constitutes firm evidence is not a 
straightforward matter, and the narrow paradigm within which scientific medicine 
operates is responsible for some of the conceptual confusion that lies at the heart 
of the effectiveness debate. The problem starts w'ith trying to agree on what is 
exactly meant by firm or reliable evidence.
This seems initially straightforward and most scientists would accept a definition 
which included the idea of ‘weight of objective proof, about which consensus has 
been reached in the scientific community’.80 In the earlier parts of the twentieth 
century the logical positivists argued that the development of knowledge is 
essentially the accumulation of meaningful statements about the world (either 
logical propositions or statements based on empirical observation) and that 
progress in science is dependent on the increasing accumulation of such 
statements and the development of theories based on them.1"
By the 1930s, in a seminal work, Ludwig Fleck argued that every scientific 
concept and theory (including his own ideas on the development of the
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Wasserman reaction as a test for syphilis) is culturally conditioned. Fleck 
advocated a sociological approach to epistemology, focusing on the nature of 
scientific inquiry itself, rather than its logical structure. He argued that scientific 
disciplines develop in stages, and that long accepted sets of beliefs (later termed 
paradigms) are overturned only after intellectual and practical crisis.82 In the mid- 
1960s Thomas Kuhn found further evidence of paradigms in science. The 
existence of such long transitional stages led Kuhn to question the notion that 
universal standards of rationality guide scientists in their investigations.83
Today it is widely (though not universally) accepted that we should not assume 
the existence of trans-historical or cross-cultural standards by which we can judge 
the value of scientific knowledge. In other words we should not assume that 
scientific inquiry is attainably objective. If this is the case then obtaining firm 
evidence, if defined by scientists as necessarily objective, may not be possible. In 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity the philosopher Richard Rorty argues that 
science is just one language among many, each with different ways of describing 
the world:
“... since truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for 
their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by 
human beings, so are truths ...”
Rorty is an epistemological relativist (the idea that knowledge claims are relative 
to their conceptual framework), and for him the notion of an undisputed fact is 
problematic, as he continues:
”... the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between 
alternative metaphors, that we can only compare languages or metaphors 
with one another, not with something beyond language called 'fact'."84
Of particular relevance to this section is that, if one accepts difficulties with the 
existence of objective fact, then a simple definition of firm evidence is equally 
problematic, and the same problems naturally extend to evidence based medicine 
and clinical effectiveness.85
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The corollary is that research methods that see the world differently and search for 
different kinds of evidence are denigrated rather than being understood as 
alternative metaphors. Qualitative research in particular, but also theoretic 
evidence, expert evidence, and ethics-based evidence are either found at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, or not considered to be part of the hierarchy at all.86 87 88 89
So, the effect for air pollution epidemiology is something akin to a double­
whammy. Within the hierarchy of scientific evidence it finds itself low down, and 
its position is further compromised by the impact of evidence based medicine on 
entrenching the perspective that the foundations of scientific medical practice are 
attainably objective.
Air pollution epidemiology as middle ground
Bringing together the different strands so far debated in this section, it could be 
argued that air pollution epidemiology represents a sort of contemporary 
theoretical middle ground. As described earlier in this chapter, historical 
developments in the latter half of the twentieth century reveal a rising pre­
occupation with technological and methodological precision in epidemiology, 
alongside an escalating search for associations between exposures and health 
parameters. Endeavours have remained largely underpinned by a biomedical 
model of (individual) health, focusing more on proximate risk factors, and less on 
what goes on inside the black box compared with associations found outside it.
However, time-series studies in air pollution epidemiology do, in some respects, 
represent a challenge to prevailing views. They embrace a commitment to more 
distal, or upstream, environmental determinants of wellbeing. And they 
investigate populations rather than individuals, often over time-periods of 
sufficient length to capture a more complete picture of community experience.
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Further, in the context of the lofty status afforded to evidence based medicine, air 
pollution epidemiology has managed to hold its own despite the apparent lowly 
status of aggregated data studies. Despite the evidence provided by such studies 
being positioned near the bottom of the hierarchy of scientific importance, policy­
makers and the public do appear to take the findings of such investigations 
seriously. Although not providing as dramatic an alternative to scientism as is 
offered by Rorty’s relativism, air pollution epidemiology does begin to ask 
questions about the relative validity of scientific truths.
Yet such change has been countered by containment within certain boundaries. In 
order to be taken (at least moderately) seriously by the scientific community, air 
pollution epidemiology has needed to stress methodological rigour, for instance 
through emphasis on control for apparent confounding factors. This, as discussed 
earlier, detaches the population under study from its social and historical context, 
so placing air pollution epidemiology back into the scientific paradigm that it 
partly challenges. And the focus on smaller and smaller pollutants within time- 
series studies has shown commitment within air pollution epidemiology to a 
reductionistic model of health, and the positivist scientific enterprise of which this 
is part.
So air pollution epidemiology might be seen as an example of a middle way, 
challenging the absolute scientific basis of public health, yet embracing it too. The 
difficulty of this position is further illustrated by looking at evidence based public 
health policy, and the ethical foundations of this in the positivist doctrine of 
utilitarianism.
Evidence based policy: ethical and political issues
There is a strong political component to the notion of quantifiability, which relates 
to the issues of what can be readily quantified, and what policy-makers actually 
want to have quantified information on. At their core both evidence based
medicine and evidence based policy are primarily directed at cost containment, 
which is understandable in the area of healthcare provision, where costs escalate 
with ever-increasing demand and expensive new technologies. But the values 
embedded within the politically and economically driven search for evidence 
should not be masked by the apparent objectivity of information on effectiveness. 
As Kerridge states, the concept of evidence underpinning allocation of resources 
may be seductive, and the desire for simplicity understandable, but only certain 
kinds of interventions are amenable to RCTs, the gold standard of research:
“Allocating resources on the basis of evidence may therefore involve 
implicit value judgements, and it may only be a short step from the notion 
that a therapy is “without substantial evidence" to it being thought to be 
“without substantial value”. ” 90
Certain areas of medicine are suited to RCTs, mainly the specialities, and 
especially those with high costs, often from new technologies. Activities “likely to 
receive serious research attention are ones that result in large unit costs, with 
substantial short-term effect, and a limited number of well-defined altematives.”<>1 
Meanwhile, general practice and primary care are less amenable because of points 
raised earlier; and palliative care and health care of the elderly are areas where 
research is traditionally difficult to do for unrelated reasons including, for 
instance, problems obtaining informed consent.
So political commitments are evident in evidence based medicine, through the 
areas in which specific kinds of evidence can be carried out, and the values 
. implicit in prioritising apparent objectivity and de-prioritising alternative 
conceptual frameworks. As Dickenson and Ashcroft postulate:
“... it should also be noted that the state has a great interest in the success 
of the EBM [evidence based medicine] programme, as a mechanism for 
providing an objective basis for cost control, and for defining standards of 
practice, which on the one hand protect the state and its employees against 
negligence actions, but on the other hand provide a scientific (rather than a 
policy or authority) based method for keeping clinicians to a clear, planned 
line.”1'2
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Rudolf Klein, the policy analyst, is even more forthright in condemning evidence 
based medicine as “an attempt to assert the hegemony of a particular type of 
evidence”. He argues that it privileges certain types of evidence [science], notably 
RCTs, over other kinds of knowledge or understanding, and privileges certain 
skills over others (e.g. statistics, epidemiology). Evidence based medicine 
promises a “spring-clean of existing clinical practice”, introduces a brake on new 
interventions and technologies and offers the mirage “of solving all health care 
funding problems by eliminating unnecessary, unproven and ineffective care.”1’3
While evidence based medicine emphasises the place of research evidence in 
clinical practice, it is only a short step -  or extension -  to seeing how the same 
factors, problems and conceptual flaws apply to evidence based policy-making. 
The most obvious example may be allocation of healthcare resources, but the 
extension has more subtle and deep-rooted effects. And these effects are most 
stark for health promotion policies, fiscal policies, and -  most relevantly for this 
chapter -  environmental and transport policies.
Research in these areas is hard to do, not scientifically merited, politically 
difficult, and often fails to inform policy, let alone result in policy change. 
Substantial improvements to air pollution levels and environmental quality are 
only likely to come about from dramatic shifts in the way evidence is perceived, 
the environment is valued, changed political priorities and, perhaps most 
fundamentally, from radical policies.
Historical developments in public health in England and Wales: separation 
from ‘the environment’
Having explored developments in epidemiological theory and also evidence base 
medicine, it is now important to look at how air pollution epidemiology and the 
QRA lit in to developments in the public health profession and public health
148
practice -  in particular, the changing capacity for public health to engage in 
environmental issues.
Public health in proximity to environmental issues
As discussed in the first case study the huge influx of people to cities in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, accompanied by changing working practices 
and conditions, brought new and worrying health problems. Infectious diseases 
spread easily in areas where people lived in close proximity and dreadful sanitary 
conditions, and the environment of factories and industries heralded occupational 
diseases and accidents on an unprecedented scale, and special threats to child 
health and development. Vaccination against smallpox, which was very common 
at that time, was the only statutory measure enforced upon local authorities, but 
cholera epidemics were a similarly huge concern.
These anxieties, accompanied by the need to have a healthy workforce in an era of 
expanding Empire, engendered a search for possible solutions. Two linked 
debates informed this search. The first was about infectious disease causation, 
whether miasma or contagion was aetiologically responsible. The second debate 
was about morality, in particular the moral nature of the poor. Darwinian ideas 
were being extended to the social domain substantiating the idea, among some, 
that those less fit be allowed to be selected out in the interests of the moral 
advance of the nation. This both supported allowing those morally inferior -  such 
as the poor -  to either languish or be weeded out through eugenic policies, and 
also justified aggressive imperialist action towards other nations and cultures.
But, whatever the reason for the behaviour of the poor towards hygiene, infectious 
diseases did not respect boundaries and the workforce needed to stay healthy. 
Believing that health improvement lay beyond the scope of the medical profession 
early ‘pioneers’ such as Edwin Chadwick advocated sanitary reform as the key in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Importantly these lawyers and engineers, despite
149
coining up against influential individuals and companies (such as the water 
authorities), were not promoting ideas in conflict with political will, but rather the 
opposite. This, as will be returned to later in this section, contrasts with the more 
contemporary position of public health practitioners taking on environmental 
issues.
Removal of environmental filth and improvements to sanitation would check the 
progress of infectious diseases, but the government soon felt that the medical 
profession should both determine how this could be achieved, as well as monitor 
the nation's health. The position of Medical Officer of Health (MOH) was created 
to advise and monitor locally, and John Simon (who had been one of the initial 
metropolitan MOsH) became the first adviser to, and planner for, central 
government. And, as appointment of MOsH became mandatory -  to metropolitan 
sanitary districts in 1855 and to provincial districts in England and Wales in 1875 
-  a State medical service had essentially been established.94
As the last quarter of the nineteenth century progressed, although no speciality 
existed as such, public health consolidated itself. In 1871 a postgraduate 
certificate was developed, which later became the Diploma in Public Health 
(DPH), first in Trinity College Dublin, then Edinburgh and Cambridge. By 1876 
Oxford and London had a certificate in Preventive Medicine and Public Health.
Although DPH courses varied a little depending on university the essential 
components were, and remained long-term, a combination of classroom and 
practical work. While the former consisted of lectures and study time, later 
accompanied by laboratory work, the latter involved a period of experiential 
training alongside an existing MOH, a method mirroring that practised in clinical 
medicine. Environmental issues were integral to learning. Both meteorology and 
climatology were required parts of the initial DPH curricula, receiving great 
emphasis, and stayed there for some decades.95
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Those training to be, and taking up posts of MOsH, were a mixture of experienced 
doctors and others going into the speciality soon after completing their medical 
training: some worked full-time and some part-time. Early on, the position of 
MOH carried gravitas, as well as political weight and power, and attracted high 
calibre physicians hoping it would boost their private practice and status. But, 
although a public health specialist qualification was made compulsory for 
metropolitan districts in 1891, by the end of the century the status of the MOM 
had declined. Those taking up posts tended to be either general practitioners 
wanting -  or needing -  to supplement their private income, or those attracted by 
the lure of a steady, albeit unremarkable, income from local government.96 
Despite this, naturally, there were some drawn by a passion for the job.x
At the turn of the century MOsH were well-established positions in local 
authorities. Working alongside sanitary inspectors, engineers, and those 
responsible for housing and town planning, they monitored the health of their 
local communities (including notification of infectious diseases from 1899), 
oversaw the health dimensions of local developments, were involved in industrial 
and occupational matters, and acted as advocates for health improvement, such as 
through reduction in smoke pollution. And, despite significant changes to the 
direction and nature of public health over the coming periods, these essential 
components of the public health doctor remit -  enabled by the location and 
working relations of the MOH -  remained present and active until the 1970s.
As the twentieth century dawned what did shift, however, was the emphasis in 
public health towards preventive medicine. Once the germ theory of disease was 
largely accepted, awareness grew of the importance of personal and social habits 
in the spread of infectious diseases. In tandem with this, concern mounted about 
national efficiency and the nation's health. X
X
General practitioners operated on a fee-for-service basis, and there was competition for patients 
and income. MOsH were salaried by local government although, in time, salaries were found to 
vary between locations, sometimes dramatically. Security was not such a draw, as tenure of 
appointment did not occur for some time.
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In response to these developments environmentalists demanded wider preventive 
services. While eugenicists unsuccessfully countered these calls,1'1 services were 
set up to advise, inform, improve, and monitor the health of groups in need, 
especially the young who were seen as both the nation’s future and also the 
starkest recipients of the detrimental health effects of poor hygiene. So welfare 
programmes for pregnant and post-natal mothers, infants and schoolchildren were 
established, as well as midwives and health visitors, the latter operating as 
hygiene instructors in early years rather than a resource for new mothers as 
today.97
These services, later alongside community health centres and social work, created 
teams based in public health departments, under the leadership of MOsH, that 
oversaw the health of the local community. But the traditional responsibilities of 
the MOH, and hence public health, for environmental health and as ‘community 
watchdog’ remained, as these officers were still best placed, and most suitably 
trained, to monitor and act accordingly. And strong allegiances existed between 
MOsH and, say, town planners, for instance in the creation of integrated 
municipal management systems to ensure health efficiency.94
The tasks and duties placed on the MOII and his department at this time were 
numerous and wide-ranging, but it was a good time for public health. When Lloyd 
George introduced the National Insurance Act in 1911, the numbers able to use 
municipal hospitals, then under the administration of MOsH increased, as did the 
status of these hospitals (in comparison with the ailing voluntary hospitals), so 
further adding to the responsibilities of the MOH and the good feeling within the 
profession. The inter-war period has been labelled by some commentators as the 
‘golden era’ of public health.97
M Some preventive services could be supported by eugenicists, e.g. family planning.
There is therefore an apparent paradox, created from the seemingly conflicting 
notions that public health both lost status after about 1900, and that the 1920s and 
1930s were a special, and good, time for the profession. This can be squared as 
follows. The loss of status was related to the change of direction away from 
surveillance and towards community health: individual prevention involving 
mainly mothers and children. Part of the loss was that this was seen to be 
primarily women’s work, and this resonates through the lowly position that 
community health still occupies today. On the other hand, however, management 
of the constantly expanding state medical service reached its maximum extent 
during the period 1929 to 1948 when the Poor Law medical services were 
incorporated into public health. This made the MOsH very powerful but at the 
same time had negative professional connotations if public health is conceived to 
be principally about surveillance of health rather than management of medical 
care.
In 1946 the National Health Act described a new health service that would 
become operational two years later. Planning, however, had been going on before 
and during the second world war, and MOsH had envisaged a three-tiered service 
with themselves in the coveted position of central co-ordinators and 
administrators. But government plans dashed all hopes of being at the heart of the 
new system and, instead, public health was placed at the periphery and 
disempowered. Bevan, along with most politicians and doctors at the time, 
equated improvements in medical care with improvements in health, a fallacy 
unmasked a few decades later but still widely ascribed to today;7 preventive 
medicine was relatively unimportant. The new service was orientated around State 
hospitals, which replaced existing municipal and voluntary hospitals, with 
teaching hospitals dominating the system. General practitioners would act as the 
gateway to the new establishments.'**
Public health was marginalised. It remained outside the NI1S, based in local 
authorities, with its functions substantially reduced and its status severely 
compromised. And for some of the community clinical services it had to compete
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with general practice. MOsH and their public health departments were pressured 
from both within and without the medical profession, and morale fell. It could be 
argued" that, despite a brief resurgence in the early 1970s, it is a position from 
which public health has never fully recovered:
“Just as the public health doctor was not able successfully to justify his 
continued work in personal prevention, so he failed to make a good case 
for the medical administration of welfare work. Thus MOsH increasingly 
found themselves accused of failure in respect to the delivery of effective 
community care, and squeezed between the twin pressures of general 
practice from without and social work from within.”100
Regardless, however, of the enthusiasm or mental state of its practitioners, public 
health remained -  and continues to remain -  a vital function. Responsibility for 
environmental health, among other important functions, stayed with public health 
departments in their local authority base. MOsH still held and built empires in 
their departments, although the prestige of these may have declined.
But, as Jane Lewis has importantly pointed out, public health lacked a 
philosophy.101 In the 1950s and 1960s an opportunity arose to till that void. Social 
medicine, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, offered the possibility to both bring 
together service and academic workers in public health, and to provide a 
theoretical framework through which a unified speciality could develop. But 
social medicine meant different things to different people at different times. 
Originally conceived as a socio-biology of health and disease, early proponents of 
social medicine postulated a new type of doctor, who searched to understand her 
patients -  their health and disease -  in the context of their communities, their 
environment, and their personal and social histories. Medical training needed to be 
revamped to create a new breed of clinicians, who practised whole-person 
medicine, a holistic endeavour combining clinical and preventive medicine and 
underpinned by a framework of social ecology.102 103
Academics, however, moved social medicine in a different direction. They 
conceptualised it, not so much as scientific humanism, but as a positivist
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intellectual enterprise to explain the social basis of illness in populations. Founded 
on scientific rationalism and epidemiology, social medicine would describe how 
health and disease in societies was produced, including social, environmental and 
biological determinants. Early proponents were caught in an ideological difficulty 
as they also largely held that medical care would solve health problems once it 
was available universally. But by the 1960s and 1970s this was challenged, both 
by MclCeown’s thesis that many of the health improvements in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries were due to improvements in sanitation and living 
conditions rather than the effects of medicine, and also with the introduction of 
qualitative methods into social medicine.7
The rifts, both within social medicine itself, and between its academic proponents 
and service-based public health practitioners, could not be reconciled. And, when 
major reorganisations of the NHS and public health were planned and 
implemented in the early 1970s, social medicine was side-lined. It did not, 
however, die and, as Dorothy Porter has highlighted,104 social medicine has had 
something of a revival recently with new university departments in Bristol and 
Birmingham, reflecting both a resurgence of interest and also the philosophical 
leanings of individuals.
Public health separated from environmental issues
At the end of the 1960s public health was at yet another cross-roads, but this 
juncture was to be highly significant for environmental health. Escalating costs of 
health care delivery and new medical technologies, accompanied by a realisation 
that demand for healthcare services was ever-increasing, prompted the 
governments of many countries to think of ways to contain costs/" In the early
x" When the NHS was set up, many believed that the need for health care could be fairly met by an 
improved system, and with efficiency gains. In the following decades, however, there was a 
growing understanding of the difference between demand and need for health care, and an 
appreciation that there were always opportunities for additional health gain, albeit at perpetually 
rising marginal cost.
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1970s the UK government planned a major reorganisation of the NHS which, 
eventually, saw the creation of area health authorities (coterminous with local 
government units responsible for social services) with 14 regional health 
authorities responsible for planning, and 205 District Management Teams below. 
Managerial negotiations would go on between health authorities and hospitals as 
to the level, nature, and of course cost, of provision of services. But who would 
arbitrate or broker the arrangements?98
Public health doctors, it was felt, might be in the best position to do this. As 
members of the medical profession they spoke the same language as their clinical 
colleagues, and enhanced training in administration, management and 
organisation of health services would serve them well. And a further carrot was 
dangled, one that would improve their standing within the profession, that of 
speciality status. Following negotiations between various public health 
professional groups and the General Medical Council, a new faculty was set up in 
1972 under the auspices of the Royal College of Physicians -  the Faculty of 
Community Medicine (FCM).XI"
Alongside the FCM a new medical speciality was created, that of community 
medicine, with a training and examination process (Membership of the Faculty of 
Community Medicine) paralleling the clinical specialities. This step was 
appealing to some public health doctors who felt their credibility would be 
boosted, and a new identity fonned; others, however, were resentful or took early 
retirement. It was anticipated, nevertheless, that community physicians would be 
the medical professionals of community health, monitoring the health of their 
local communities, assessing the need for healthcare, evaluating services, and 
acting as important administrators. In fact, the honeymoon period was short-lived
There had been discussion about an umbrella Faculty being multi-disciplinary, housing public 
health workers from different backgrounds, but it was felt this would not be allowed under the 
Royal College of Physicians, so the ‘doctors-only‘ option was preferred.
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and within a few years community medicine was confused and demoralised. 
Although there is insufficient scope to discuss that further here, Lewis surmises:
“... little thought was given to the way in which community medicine 
would be practised in the new NHS and community physicians 
experienced considerable tension in reconciling first their responsibility 
for the management of health services with that of analysing health 
problems and, second, their formal accountability to the NHS bureaucracy 
with their ethical accountability to their communities.”105
What is most relevant, however, is that public health -  now as community 
medicine -  moved out of local authorities and into the NHS. And local authorities, 
pushed to one side in the reorganisations, were left with the vital health related 
areas such as environmental health and community care. The position of MOH 
had been abolished, and existing public health doctors became community 
physicians/medical officers at a variety of levels. Occasional posts may have 
remained outside the NHS, but essentially public health split with local 
government, and newly qualified community physicians would be predominantly 
based in public health departments in NHS health authorities.106
And with this move, public health doctors and their departments became 
irrevocably separated from their colleagues working on matters of environmental 
health, sanitation, and local planning and development. Working contacts may 
have been retained for a while, but inevitably over time relationships 
disintegrated, the decline accelerated by the new workloads of public health 
departments as well as the different geographical boundaries within which the two 
authorities operated: it is difficult to co-ordinate activities when the district 
community of the health authority is defined differently to that of the 
corresponding local authority.
In 1982 another NHS reorganisation abolished the area tier, further polarising 
community medicine (now uncertain as to whether prime responsibility lay with 
management of health services, or analysis of health problems and needs), 
although the 1988 inquiry into the state of public health by Sir Donald Acheson107
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bolstered morale within the speciality as well as resulting in a name change to 
public health medicine.11''
Crucially, however, the divide forged by the 1974 reorganisation has never been 
bridged. While those in local authorities have reinforced their training and 
backgrounds -  as environmental health officers (EHOs, previously sanitary . .
officers), town planners and public health engineers (a sub-speciality of civil 
engineering) -  these skills have become harder for public health workers to tap in 
to.103 Although the QRA project illustrated that cross-organisational working is 
not impossible, it is only very recently, with the very latest restructuring of the 
health service (and public health), that the prospects of collaborative working 
have really improved. This is discussed further in the conclusions of the thesis.
Conclusions
This case study has been used to illustrate developments in the contemporary 
relationship between air (as air pollution), epidemiology and public health, and • 
also to demonstrate what this reveals about current ways of thinking in public 
health. The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) described, and the 
epidemiological research designs contained within it, show that air has been 
further reduced to its constituent components, and polluted air is perceived as 
these parts, separated from the population but whose impact on the health of a 
community can be calculated.
But the QRA is constrained by both its science, and the philosophical and policy 
dimensions that shape its science. As a research scientific process the QRA has 
methodological flaws, but the epidemiological framework that determines those 
flaws is itself confined. There are deep-rooted philosophical issues that both limit
MV A 2003 vote resulted in a further change to the Faculty of Public Health (FPII).
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and dictate current epidemiological thinking, such as problems with causality and 
the lack of coherent epidemiological theory. And the policy initiatives that 
promote certain notions of evidence and effectiveness are ethically contestable, so 
compounding the problem. Epidemiology and public health used to go hand-in- 
hand, but their paths have diverged.
At a practical level, the possibility of valuable local public health work on air 
pollution and other environmental issues is limited. Fragmented developments in 
public health have driven apart relationships with those working in environmental 
health. What we are left with is rather shallow environmentalism, theoretically 
problematic and practically restricted.
159
Figure 4.1 The hierarchical nature of epidemiological studies ranked by 
ability to establish cause and effect
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Source: Soskolne CL, Sieswerda LE, and H Morgan Scott. Epidemiologic methods for assessing the 
health impact of diminishing ecological integrity. In: Pimentel D, Westra L, Noss RF eds. Ecological 
integrity: integrating environment, conseivution, anil health. Washington: Island Press, 2000: 264.
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C h a p t e r  5
CASE STUDY 4 :  CLIMATE CHANGE, ETHICS AND NEW MORAL 
HORIZONS IN PUBLIC HEALTH
Overview of case study 4
This fourth historical case study of the relationship between air and public health 
explores the approach to dealing with climate change. The case study begins with 
a description of the scientific basis of global warming and climate change. The 
approach to dealing with climate change is then used as an instrument to probe 
utilitarianism as the moral foundation of public health. This historical case study 
(history of medicine and public health, history of science, history of philosophy) 
again has strong inter-disciplinary components: basic science (of climate change) 
and philosophy (moral philosophy, political philosophy, and environmental 
philosophy). Primary and secondary data sources were used, as described in 
chapter one, and inter-disciplinary connections are examined.
Introduction
In the approach taken to dealing with climate change, the debate about air has 
provided the opportunity to rethink the relationship between mankind and nature, 
and the moral dimensions of public health theory and practice. Often referred to 
synonymously as greenhouse warming, climate change presents an instance of the 
health effects of western lifestyles being borne by those at a distance in time and 
place. Unlike, say, passive smoking, those affected by climate change have little 
or no connection with the perpetrators, yet are left with the consequences. And 
this raises fundamental questions about the geographical, temporal and moral
166
boundaries of public (health) responsibilities, as well as the place of utilitarianism 
in public health theory.
Using the approach taken in dealing with climate change as the study area of this 
case, the case study is structured as follows. First there is an overview of the 
science of climate change and its effects on human health. Next, these health 
dimensions are used as a basis to challenge utilitarianism as the moral foundation 
of public health. Other possible moral frameworks for public health are put 
forward. First, John Rawls’s theory of social justice is presented, followed by an 
exploration of how this has been used in the climate change debate. Second, it is 
argued that environmental ethics could provide a framework for public health, and 
environmental ethicists have used the climate change debate to argue their case. 
Environmental ethics, in common with the perspectives of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and also virtue ethics, highlights serious concerns about the overall direction of 
modem western moral philosophy. These concerns have historical roots that 
connect to other developments in the history of science, medicine, and political 
philosophy.
Climate change: science and health
Climate change is one of a number of large-scale anthropogenic processes often 
collectively labelled global environmental change (GEC). Other processes under 
this umbrella include ozone depletion, acid rain, deforestation, and loss of 
biodiversity. Although no precise definition of GEC exists, the term encompasses 
detrimental environmental effects consequent to activities accompanying human 
development, most of which are relatively recent in terms of the history of the 
planet. The processes are often inter-locked, and inevitably have ramifications for 
human health.
As mentioned earlier climate change is often referred to inter-changeably as 
greenhouse warming, the greenhouse effect, or even global warming. To
167
differentiate, the greenhouse effect describes the bio-geo-atmospheric process, 
greenhouse and global warming refer to the resultant heating, and climate change 
depicts the meteorological consequences which include changes in temperature.
The greenhouse effect is a highly complex, incompletely understood, process that 
involves the geology and biology of the earth, as well as the oceans, the 
atmosphere and the sun. But the basic effect is a natural one. It is human activities 
that have distorted the natural effect. The scientific details are not relevant to this 
thesis, so the basic science will only be sketched.
In 1937 the term greenhouse effect was used “to describe how atmospheric gases 
stabilise the earth’s temperature by allowing the passage of visible and UV 
[ultraviolet] radiation from the sun, which wanns the earth’s surface, but block the 
escape to space of reflected infrared radiation.”1
This early proposition is not that dissimilar to what is understood of the process 
today. The earth’s atmosphere freely admits short-wave solar radiation from the 
sun, including visible light. Most of this incoming radiation is absorbed by the 
Earth’s surface, and warms it. Some solar radiation is reflected off the Earth’s 
surface back to space, but some longer-wave infra-red radiation is trapped by the 
atmosphere -  predominantly the troposphere1. This heat retention, or ‘radiative 
forcing’, causes the natural greenhouse effect.
The troposphere of this planet is composed of approximately 78% nitrogen, 21% 
oxygen and 1 % of the following: argon, traces of carbon dioxide, water vapour 
and methane, ammonia, hydrogen and other minor gases. It is these latter gases -  
making up just the 1% -  that are naturally occurring greenhouse gases, each
' The earth’s atmosphere extends approximately 100 kilometres from the earth's surface. It is 
comprised of the 10km troposphere closest to the earth, which contains 90% of the mass of the 
atmosphere; then the stratosphere band between 10 and 50 kilometres, which is less dense and 
contains the ozone ‘layer’; and finally the mesosphere.
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absorbing a particular wavelength of infra-red radiation, so trapping energy in the 
lower atmosphere and creating a heat blanket. The greater the concentration of 
greenhouse gases, the thicker the blanket. So, while the natural effect keeps the 
Earth around its life-promoting moderate temperature, man-made contributions to 
the greenhouse gases are likely to disturb this balance and heat up the 
atmosphere.2
Of most relevance to this case study is that an estimated massive 10,000 Gt of 
‘ancient’ carbon is locked away in sedimentary limestone deposits and, crucially, 
in fossil fuels. The combustion by humans of these fossil fuels creates more 
carbon dioxide, water vapour and nitrous oxide (oxides of carbon, hydrogen and 
water), transforming the natural greenhouse effect into an unnatural one.
There are three other main anthropogenic greenhouse gases, methane and the 
entirely synthetic chlorofluorocarbons 11 and 12 (CFC-11 and CFC-12), but 
carbon dioxide is the most significant because of its stability. With an atmospheric 
lifetime of up to 200 years, if all carbon dioxide emissions stopped today, global 
temperatures would continue to rise until about 2025, and most temperature 
excess would still be present in the year 2100.2
Emissions of various greenhouse gases into the atmosphere have increased 
substantially since about 1800, and dramatically since 1950, essentially as the 
product of industrialisation. Seventy-five per cent of anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide comes from combustion of fossil fuels, especially coal, an increasing 
amount from motor vehicles, and the remainder largely from rainforest burning. 
Methane is mainly derived from irrigated agriculture, cows, mines, gas pipelines 
and rubbish tips. And, nitrous oxide comes from fossil fuel combustion and 
fertilisers
Historically, there has been approximately a 100-fold increase in global energy 
use since 1800 and the same multiple in annual rate of carbon dioxide production. 
As a result, atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have gone up by a third,
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half of that increase since the 1950s. Between 1800 and 1988, developed countries 
have been responsible for about 83.8% of industrial carbon dioxide emissions, 
67.8% of total carbon dioxide emissions, and 66.9% of total combined carbon 
dioxide and methane (of which the United States contributes 33.2, 29.7, and 
29.2%). In comparison, developing countries have been responsible for 16.2, 32.2, 
and 33.1 % respectively.3
However, though developed countries are responsible for over four-fifths of 
historic carbon dioxide (in other words the total carbon dioxide now in the 
atmosphere), developing countries currently contribute 32% of annual global 
carbon dioxide emissions, expected to increase to around 44% by 2010.4 This is, 
of course, to do with industrialisation in many rapidly developing countries, for 
instance China.
According to most experts the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has 
resulted in a rise in surface temperature of the Earth. In 1988 the United Nations 
(UN) Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization 
established a multi-disciplinary body of over 300 scientists to advise 
governments, called the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). A 
1990 report by the IPCC suggested that average global temperatures had risen by 
0.3-0.6° C over the past 100 years.5 Eleven years on, the 2001 IPCC report 
concludes that global average surface temperatures have increased by 0.6° C +/- 
0.6° C over the twentieth century, and are projected to rise by 1.4. to 5.8° C by 
2100.6
Consequences to human health
The consequences to human health of a rise in temperature and associated climatic 
changes are diverse, and most conveniently grouped into direct and indirect 
effects.7 Most of these health effects are predictions based on new research 
techniques, such as scenario-based computed modelling. The direct effects result
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from increased exposure to thermal extremes -  changed mortality and morbidity 
from heatwaves and severe cold. Increased heatwaves, exacerbated by increased 
humidity and urban air pollution, impact greatest on the elderly, the sick and those 
without access to air-conditioning. Heat can also be connected with domestic 
violence, civil disturbances and riots. Other direct effects are mediated through 
destabilised ocean and air currents leading to extreme weather events such as 
floods, storms, cyclones, hurricanes and bushfires with their associated deaths, 
injuries, psychological disorders, and infectious diseases.
Indirect effects stem from disturbances to complex ecological systems. Changes 
in the ranges and activity of vectors and infective parasites -  through altered 
rainfall and temperature -  will affect the geographical range and incidence of 
associated diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, trypanosomiasis, and the viral 
encephalitides. Altered local ecology will impact on water-borne and food-borne 
infective agents -  compounded by floods and damage to public health 
infrastructures -  causing increased incidence of gastro-intestinal and other 
infectious disease.8 9
Changed food productivity, especially crops, will result in malnutrition, hunger, 
impaired child development and growth, with increased morbidity and mortality. 
Tropical and sub-tropical countries will be worst affected as the “poor and 
economically underdeveloped populations ... would be unable to offset 
agricultural yields by trade.”10 Despite the expected increased productivity in 
temperate countries, there will be an estimated additional 40-300 million hungry 
people attributable to climate change by 2060, against a background total of about 
600 million. Decreased water availability is expected for many populations in 
water-scarce regions, especially the sub-tropics.6
The IPCC anticipates a globally averaged sea-level rise of 0.09 to 0.88m by the 
end of this century with associated rise in population displacement, damage to 
infrastructure, psychological morbidity, and problems with disposal of sewage 
and waste. Half the world’s population lives within 60km of the sea, and rising
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waters would particularly affect those living near coasts, on small islands, and 
those with limited material resources. A 50cm rise would double the number 
experiencing flooding annually, currently about 46 million. Many fish populations 
will be put at risk from the sea-level and temperature rises rendering habitat 
unsuitable, and land-use changes are creating obstacles to migration.6
As has been mentioned, the poorest countries are likely to be most heavily 
affected by the health effects of climate change, as they lack the resources to adapt 
accordingly. The story, however, is somewhat different in the United Kingdom 
(UK). Warmer winters will be associated with less cold-related deaths: the UK 
currently has the highest seasonal excess mortality in Europe at 60-80,000, 
expected to decline to about 20,000 cold-related deaths in 2050. Warmer, and 
probably drier, summers, will increase heat-related deaths and hospital admissions 
but by a much smaller dimension, although an extra 10,000 cases of food 
poisoning could occur annually. More outdoor activity in the warmer weather may 
result in an additional 5000 cases of skin cancer and 2000 extra cataracts by 2050. 
In the same time frame indigenous malaria may have become re-established in the 
UK but probably only associated with the less threatening Plasmodium vivax. Sea- 
level rise and increased frequency of winter storms and gales will make flooding 
of low-lying coastal areas more likely. Most air pollutant levels are expected to 
decrease.11 12
Climate change and public health philosophy
From the perspective of public health philosophy, what is fascinating about 
climate change is that it throws open three new aetiological dimensions to 
population health and disease. First, the causes of greenhouse wanning, and the 
resultant climate change and its health effects are anthropogenic. Excluding 
‘lifestyle’ diseases -  which an individual predisposes him- or herself to through
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personal activity" -  there are plenty of examples of illnesses created by human 
activity, such as occupational cancers or the passive smoking example mentioned 
earlier. But in these situations only the populations that create the environmental 
hazard experience the consequences.
What is different about climate change is that certain communities (and the 
individuals within them), through their adopted activities, will affect the health of 
other communities that may well not have taken up such activities. And this opens 
up interesting, hitherto unexplored questions about personal responsibility, and 
also about the relationship between public responsibility and how this is expressed 
through policies such as those concerning public health. In other words, how do 
such responsibilities fit into the public health philosophy and practice of the 
perpetrating communities?
Second, the health effects of climate change are, to a substantial degree, likely to 
impact at a large geographical distance from their source. Aside from the equity 
issues relating to the differential impact and ability to mitigate or adapt 
accordingly -  which are looked at later in this case study -  it is difficult to think 
of any other example1" in which the activities of one community could so 
connectedly affect the health of a population afar. War is perhaps the closest 
parallel. Related to this point, the third new aetiological dimension that climate 
change throws up is that the health impacts of current (and past) activities will 
likely be the burden of generations to come. Once again, it is difficult to recall any 
similar example in the history of public health. So the question arises again of 
how do these spatial and chronological dimensions fit into the public health 
philosophy and practice of the perpetrating communities?
In some ways this brings us back to the third case study, in which it was argued 
that western epidemiology and public health lack a coherent theoretical
" Personal choice, however, such as the ability to stop smoking, may be affected by factors such as 
employment status and social support, both of which are linked to deprivation.
Apart from economic activity, which is of course related to human lifestyles.
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philosophy. But a different tack will be taken here, which looks more directly at 
the ethical foundations of public health. Like much public policy, public health is 
informed heavily by one moral theory, utilitarianism. Yet utilitarianism is 
problematic, and seems out of touch with the world’s current problems. As a 
guide for both personal and public morality, traditional utilitarianism appears 
anachronistic. Indeed, the roots of all the new dimensions of health effects of 
climate change outlined above, can be traced to the deficiencies of utilitarian 
theory.
So the next section looks specifically at utilitarianism, its moral limitations and 
the relevance of these to climate change and public health philosophy. After that, 
the first major challenging moral framework for public health is considered, one 
based on John Rawls’s vision of social justice.
Utilitarianism, climate change and public health
Utilitarianism falls into the consequentialist class of moral theories, in which the 
rightness or wrongness of an action, or rule, is determined by the consequences of 
that action or rule. Ethical egoism is also a consequentialist moral theory, but one 
in which only consequences to the self are deemed morally relevant. There is, 
however, far more to utilitarianism than the common parlance reference to the 
ends justifying the means. The other main class of moral theories comprises 
deontological theories,lv in which inherent characteristics of actions are of moral 
relevance, rather than an action’s consequences. These are duty-based theories 
and include Kantianism, religious philosophies and the ethics of natural law.
Despite relentless ongoing criticism utilitarianism has proved a remarkably 
tenacious moral theory, the comer-stone to liberal democracy, and both its 
persistence in and significance to western political philosophy inevitably tie
,v This supposition is challenged later in the chapter.
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utilitarianism to ethical issues in public health. Utilitarianism became applied 
politically in the eighteenth century, and is most famously associated with Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) and, a little later, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). But 
utilitarianism had antecedents, and the main tenets of the theory were laid down 
earlier by philosophers such as John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711- 
1776). Much of what Bentham and Mill had to say was not particularly new.
Bentham was a lawyer and was most interested in the relevance of his ideas to 
legislature. This element connected him strongly to one of his followers, Edwin 
Chadwick, because of a shared belief in improving the lot of those worst off 
through reform. But Bentham’s concept of equality was strikingly at odds with 
that of certain successors, such as Marx and Engels, who provided a very different 
explanation for the historical processes determining how inequalities arose, and 
what should be done to redress them. To Bentham, equality formed the basis of a 
calculusv in which each individual counted the same, and was the comer-stone of 
his utilitarianism.13
Bentham’s theory was founded on two linked principles, the principle of 
association and the principle of utility. The principle of association was a 
deterministic account of linked mental occurrences, akin to the modem 
‘conditioned reflex’ but without the physiology. The principle of utility, or the 
greatest-happiness principle is, however, what Bentham is best known for, and 
rests on the premise that what is good is pleasure, and what is bad is pain.
Bentham came to this position through the belief, articulated in his 1789 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, that human beings are 
subject to, and slaves to, two poles of sensation:
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure ... They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in 
all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will 
serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to
v The calculus referred to a calculation, rather than the modem understanding as a particular 
method in mathematics.
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abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the 
while.”14
Extraordinarily, Bentham came up with 58 synonyms for pleasure, all denoting 
the same sensation, and famously remarked that “Quantity of pleasure being 
equal, pushpin is as good as poetry”. From this perspective on human psychology 
Bentham took the leap of designating happiness as the moral goal, and his 
principle of utility “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, 
according to the tendency which it appears to ... augment or diminish the 
happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or what is the same thing in 
other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness”.15
Extrapolated from the individual to the larger, social domain, the principle of 
utility states that “the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question 
... [is] ... the only right and proper and universally desirable end of human 
conduct.”14 So, one set of affairs is better than another if there is a greater balance 
of pleasure over pain, or a smaller balance of pain over pleasure. Empiricism was 
thus brought firmly into the foreground, as the right action could -  in theory at 
least -  be determined by summing up individual experiences of these two 
sensations. This process of quantification was Bentham’s ‘felicific’ calculus,Vl in 
which the ‘audience’ to be considered was all those affected by the action, each 
counting equally. Animals were not excluded from the calculus, as Bentham 
believed “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk but, Can they 
suffer?”
In his 1863 book Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill, like Bentham, extended moral 
consideration to the whole of sentient creation but, differently, made qualitative 
distinctions between pleasures. Mill felt that “pleasures of the intellect, of the 
feeling and imagination, and of the moral sentiments” had higher value than those 
of mere sensation, so contrasting his non-hedonic, or ‘ideal’, utilitarianism with
Also known as the optimific, or hedonic, calculus.
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Bentham’s hedonic version.16 Mill felt it better to be a dissatisfied Socrates than a 
satisfied fool. But, in general respects, Mill was in accord with Bentham:
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the worst 
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; 
by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”17
Although critiques of modem utilitarianism, and their relevance to public health, 
will be looked at a little later, it is necessary to point out here a serious problem 
with the theory’s early forms. That is, utilitarianism as depicted by both Bentham 
and Mill, makes an erroneous conceptual leap of inferring from what “is” in the 
world to what “ought” to be. This move from description of fact to moral 
prescription has been coined the ‘naturalistic fallacy’.18
Bertrand Russell is straightforwardly damning:
“John Stuart Mill, in his Utilitarianism, offers an argument which is so 
fallacious that it is hard to understand how he can have thought it valid. He 
says: Pleasure is the only thing desired; therefore pleasure is the only thing 
desirable. He argues that the only things visible are things seen ... and 
similarly the only things desirable are things desired. He does not notice 
that a thing is ‘visible’ if it can be seen, but ‘desirable’ if it ought to be 
desired. Thus desirable is a word presupposing an ethical theory; we 
cannot infer what is desirable from what is desired.”19
With this basic mistaken leap in mind, it is perhaps surprising that utilitarianism 
has endured. Yet few would demur that utilitarianism strongly underpins much of 
contemporary moral and political thinking and action. Good national policies are 
judged to be those that increase overall wealth, the modem euphemism for the 
greatest happiness, and good public health policies are judged to be those that 
demonstrably improve population health. These two examples, however, also 
capture one way in which utilitarian beliefs have changed with time: the 
separation of the private and the public.
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For the early followers, there was no division. Utilitarianism, as a moral theory, 
provided a guide to both personal behaviour and also to public decision-making. 
But today it is quite acceptable -  and perhaps even the norm -  for individuals to 
draw on various ethical ideas to inform their private behaviour, while expecting 
governments, public bodies and institutions to essentially act for the common 
good. And while those private ethical ideas tend to have their roots in duty-based 
theories or, for some, religious beliefs, the notion of the common good is 
undeniably utilitarian. This is the moral pluralism of contemporary western, 
largely secular societies.
That is not to say that individuals in such societies do not seek to improve their 
own happiness, in fact quite the opposite. But the pursuit of happiness is removed 
from moral consideration, and has become something closer to a ‘taken-for- 
granted’, a lifelong endeavour shaped by society, unquestionably accepted and 
followed. And the inevitably elusive chase finds happiness disguised as, inter alia, 
healthism, obsession with risk aversion, and consumerism.20 21 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, faced with the significant lifestyle changes that would be required to 
offset climate change and its global health effects, most individuals do not really 
want to sacrifice or undermine pursuit of their own happiness-oriented goals, 
despite superficial environmental soundings to the contrary.
Picking up on this the philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre has put the blame for 
today’s moral ambivalence squarely on the shoulders of utilitarianism, and the 
selfishness it has engendered. He argues that “the individualism of modem society 
and the increasingly rapid and disruptive rate of social change brings about a 
situation in which for increasing numbers there is no over-all shape to the moral 
life but only a set of apparently arbitrary principles inherited from a variety of 
sources.” In such circumstances, he continues, “the need for a public criterion for 
use in settling moral and evaluative disagreements and conflicts becomes even 
more urgent and ever more difficult to meet”. He suggests that the utilitarian 
criterion, which appears to embody the liberal ideal of happiness, is apparently 
without rivals, “and the fact that the concept of happiness which it embodies is so
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amorphous and so adaptable makes it not less but more welcome to those who 
look for a court of appeal on evaluative questions which they can be assured will 
decide in their own favour.”22
Further, MacIntyre holds the early utilitarians directly responsible for today’s 
woes, and emphatically questions the price to be paid:
“But it is necessary to emphasize that the utilitarian advocacy of 
the criterion of public happiness is not only a mistake. That it seems so 
obviously the criterion to be considered in certain areas of life is 
something we owe to Bentham and Mill.
The concept of happiness is, however, morally dangerous in 
another way; for we are by now well aware of the malleability of human 
beings, of the fact that they can be conditioned in a variety of ways into 
the acceptance of, and satisfaction with, almost anything. That men are 
happy with their lot never entails that their lot is what it ought to be. For 
the question can always be raised of how great the price is that is being 
paid for the happiness.”23
This now brings us back to the ways in which utilitarianism has changed from its 
early forms. In the private sphere happiness has become morally detached, 
confusingly and ambiguously entangled with the ethos of western self­
centredness. But in the public sphere utilitarian theory has developed. As theorists 
began to recognise that summation of happiness was, not only practically difficult, 
but also an insufficient and incomplete reflection of human goals and needs, 
alternatives were sought, through for instance using preferences, interests or 
welfare.24
It is now appropriate -  with a broad picture of utilitarianism in mind -  to look at 
criticisms of utilitarian philosophy, and how these relate to climate change and 
public health.
Critiques of utilitarianism, and relevance to climate change
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The first criticism is that utilitarianism, in its classical or present economic form, 
necessitates the enumeration and summation of utilities in some shape or form.
And utilitarianism then uses the results of this process as the moral basis to guide 
actions or policies. In its classical form an obvious difficulty was how to quantify 
happiness, along with the problem outlined earlier of whether happiness is an 
appropriate moral goal in the first place. Preference- and welfare-based 
utilitarianism circumvent the latter issue, but do not get around the issue of 
quantification.
In fact, modem versions of utilitarianism do precisely the opposite. They are 
reliant, perhaps more than ever, on empirically obtained information as the basis 
for acting. They place, metaphorically, all the moral eggs in the basket of a 
positivist conception of science. In a classic contemporary book containing essays 
for and against utilitarianism, the philosopher Bernard Williams describes 
contemptibly the appeal of utilitarianism in that it picks up “little of the world's 
moral luggage”, preferring instead to place huge demands on information because 
“even insuperable technical difficulty is preferable to moral unclarity, no doubt 
because it is less alarming.”25
This moral side-step may be economically and politically advantageous, in the 
short term at least, but it (or perhaps because it) raises almost insuperable 
problems for climate change. There may be a general consensus now on the 
scientific proof that climate change is actually happening, as outlined earlier in the 
chapter, but there is no agreement about what should be done about it.26 27
And the same problem exists for assessing the health impacts of climate change. 
They are based on, at best, plausible predictions using models and methods 
(including expert judgement and inference) developed because of the newness of 
the topic and the lack of alternatives. But utilitarian calculations prefer concrete 
facts to ranges and possibilities. This provides an easy escape-route for policy­
makers, but also reflects the compounded difficulties of comparing or trading 
utilities in the climate change debate. With both health and monetary impacts
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fraught with empirical impracticabilities, weighing up options and alternatives is 
extremely hard.
More subtly, it raises the important point that some elements are more amenable 
to scientific enquiry and analysis than others. The environment, for example, is 
excluded from investigation. After all, how do you place a utility function on the 
value individuals may, or may not, place on retaining a beautiful area of 
wilderness, or an unpolluted atmosphere? This will be returned to later in the 
chapter, but it is clearly easier to calculate the economic costs of climate change 
and the mitigation strategies to prevent it, than to reliably quantify the health 
impacts or environmental utilities, so creating a bias in areas of consideration; and 
this does not even touch the question of how to compare different utilities. This is 
a fundamental issue recognised by MacIntyre:
“For to exercise utilitarian methods on things which at least seem to 
respond to them is not merely to provide a benefit in some areas which one 
cannot provide in all. It is, at least very often, to provide those things with 
prestige, to give them an unjustifiably large role in the decision, and to 
dismiss to a greater distance those things which do not respond to the same 
methods. Just as in the natural sciences, scientific questions get asked in 
those areas where experimental techniques exist for answering them, so in 
the very different matter of political and social decision weight will be put 
on those considerations which respected intellectual techniques can seem, 
or at least promise, to handle.”28
The second criticism of utilitarianism, and its framing of climate change policies, 
relates to proximity. As has been described, classical and modem versions of 
utilitarianism involve quantification and summation of individual utilities, 
whether happiness, preferences or interests. But who should be included in the 
arithmetic? Bentham and Mill predicated that the pleasures and pain of all 
affected by the action, the audience, should be considered, including -  to a lesser 
degree -  non-human animals.
Although circumstances in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were more 
contained than today by the technological allowances of the time, the same
181
concentration on individuals (the audience members) close in space and time 
applies to both eras. This is because, once again, the utilitarian calculus favours 
consideration of that over which there is greater certainty. The philosopher Robert 
Goodin highlights that utilitarians may want to include the utilities of all those 
affected by an action in any given calculation, but in practice it is unlikely:
”... utilitarians can go on to say, perfectly properly, that as a purely 
pragmatic matter their calculations will often lead us to show some 
apparent favouritism toward those near and dear to us. It is easier to know 
what people nearby need, and how best we can help; ... Those are purely 
contingent, pragmatic considerations, to be sure. In the ideal world, they 
may be absent. But in the real world, they are powerfully present.”29
This creates special problems for policies relating to climate change. At the 
national level, and at the local level within countries, policies usually take into 
account their effects on individuals contained by their boundaries. Climate change 
would appear to open up the borders by demanding that those from afar are 
considered too. But it is hard at present to know how to incorporate such 
requirements, and it remains difficult to believe that such tough decisions will be 
made by politicians with national, party, and their own interests at heart. The 
limited concessions to date in the high profile international climate change 
meetings affirm the somewhat bleak outlook, as is discussed later in this case 
study.
Similarly, public health policies within, say a health district in England or Wales, 
would need to take heed of their distant impacts. As recent authors in the global 
bioethics literature have put forward, western hospitals are heavy producers of 
greenhouse gas emissions and should be making every effort to substantially 
reduce these so as to avoid the irony of a health care system in one country adding 
to the health care problems of another.30 Yet it is difficult to envisage the dramatic 
changes needed, and token efforts are likely instead. This is because at the heart of 
that very problem lies the unrealistic notion of health that is a central feature of 
western living, and the corresponding reliance that has developed on health care 
services. Also, cause-effect relationships may often appear stretched. For
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example, few Londoners would be happy about the closure of an intensive care 
unit in central London, on the grounds of reducing greenhouse emissions to avert 
flooding in Bangladesh. But more straightforward examples in public health 
illustrate the proximate utilitarian spirit. Speed bumps, for instance, are hugely 
popular because they reduce traffic accidents locally, but they also increase 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.
So far, the focus of this second criticism has related to geographical proximity.
But utilitarianism also has a temporal bias. The utilitarian philosopher JJC Smart 
argues that it is impossible to envisage the total future situation because it 
stretches to infinity.31 According to Smart it is unnecessary in practice to consider 
very distant consequences, as these in the end approximate rapidly to zero like the 
furthermost ripples on a pond after a stone has been dropped into it. He defends 
this presentism:
“The necessity for the ‘ripples in the pond’ postulate comes from the fact 
that usually we do not know whether remote consequences will be good or 
bad. Therefore we cannot know what to do unless we can assume that 
remote consequences can be left out of the account.”32
This issue is particularly acute for climate change, and policies related to it, as the 
environmental, financial, and health impacts will not only occur in the future, but 
in the distant future. Economists have a general way of dealing with this 
phenomenon called ‘discounting’, an analytical tool to compare economic effects 
that occur at different points in time.v" But there are different discount rates 
available and “the choice of discount rate is of crucial technical importance for 
analyses of climate change policy, because the time horizon is extremely long, 
and mitigation costs tend to come much earlier than the benefits of avoiding 
damages.”33
v" The basic premise behind discounting is that a million pounds to me now is of more value than a 
million pounds in a year’s time.
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There has been extensive, unresolved debate about discounting in assessment of 
climate change policies, a debate which reminds us that facts alone cannot provide 
moral judgements. The latest IPCC publication emphasises that uncertainty 
regarding the discount rate “relates not to calculation of its effects, which is 
mathematically precise, but to a value judgement about the appropriateness of the 
present generation valuing services for future generations.”34 Environmental 
philosophers have pointed out that any form of discounting devalues the 
environment, and the benefits it holds for future generations.
The final criticism of utilitarianism relates to equity. The summation and 
averaging of utilitarian calculations insufficiently recognises the importance of 
how utilities are distributed within the population under consideration. Whether 
the utility is health or wealth, there is no difference between a population in which 
a small number have a lot of (good) health and the remainder have poor health, 
and a population in which everyone is reasonably healthy. And this does not sit 
comfortably with our common-sense morality, as Williams states:
"In this light, utilitarianism does emerge as absurdly primitive, and it is 
much too late in the day to be told that questions of equitable or 
inequitable distribution do not matter because utilitarianism has no 
satisfactory way of making them matter. On the criterion of maximising 
average utility, there is nothing to choose between any two states of 
society which involve the same number of people sharing in the same 
aggregate amount of utility, even if one of them is relatively evenly 
distributed, while in the other a very small number have a very good deal 
of it; and it is just silly to say that in fact there is nothing to choose here.”35
So, if climate change illustrates that utilitarianism is a limited moral determinant 
of public health policies, an alternative is needed. And here, recent developments 
in the climate change debate suggest an alternative might be emerging.
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Other moral frameworks for public health 1
Social justice and climate change
There is a huge literature on justice stretching back as far as the Greeks. Aristotle, 
for instance, in the Nicomachean Ethics considers just actions, and likens the 
characteristic of being just to the other ‘excellences’ -  or virtues of character. For 
Aristotle justice is a mean, injustice represents the extremes, and the just manvi" 
recognises how to determine an individual’s appropriate share. Justice is “that by 
which the just man is said to do by choice what is just and to be one who will 
distribute either between himself and another or between two others ... so as to 
give what is proportionately fair.”36 Aristotle's perception of justice, and some of 
its problems, are returned to later in the chapter.
In contemporary times social justice has come to embody aspects of the last part 
of Aristotle’s definition, fairness and proportionality. In contrast with legal and 
retributive justice, social justice is about the distribution of society’s benefits and 
burdens and the socio-political mechanisms that enable such distribution to occur. 
This distinction of degree is exemplified in the debate about healthcare 
provision.37 38 Despite extensive ethical and philosophical discussion about fair 
allocation (or rationing) of healthcare resources and services, in practice economic 
analyses have dominated decision-making, and it is questionable how much the 
debate has actually influenced the institutions and processes that determine 
decisions at national and local levels. Only recently has research begun to look 
more closely at these issues.39
As illustrated in this fourth case study, the approach taken in dealing with climate 
change has certainly extended the boundaries of moral debate in areas of public, 
and public health, policy-making. Because the causes and effects of climate
Vl" I am using man here, rather than person, to represent Aristotle’s depiction, which focused 
predominantly on men.
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change are differentially distributed, the reasonableness of basing decisions purely 
on utilitarian economic thinking has been questioned. Climate change has pushed 
to the forefront, and into the public realm, issues that appeal directly, and 
instinctively to people’s common sense morality. It simply does not seem fair that 
islanders in the south Pacific should lose their homes because of two centuries of 
industrialisation in the west, and the profligate lifestyles this development has 
engendered. And it simply does not seem fair that the next generation of children 
in coastal Peru might suffer cholera and dysentery for the same weather-related 
reasons.
As a result there has been a flurry of academic work looking at equity 
considerations in the climate change debate. But before outlining what this work 
has explored, it is necessary to consider what frameworks could be used. One way 
of determining how to distribute the costs of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation policies would be not to try to ‘falsely’ distribute such costs at all, but 
to allow the market to decide. But libertarian, or market utilitarian, approaches 
would likely lead to rich countries not valuing, or not wanting to pay, for such 
policies, and poor countries being unable to afford them. Unless there was some 
kind of catastrophic threat from climate change, poor countries might well be left 
to simply deal with the consequences.
An alternative framework would be contractarian, also sometimes called 
administrative utilitarian. In this approach, the limits of using total sum or average 
utility as a sufficient determinant of policy are acknowledged, and efforts are 
made to incorporate additional dimensions to economic calculations to allow for 
more informed, and apparently fairer, distribution. These have figured strongly in 
the debate and will be returned to, but criticisms can still be levelled at inherent 
deficiencies in valuing human health, the environment, communities at a distance 
and future generations.
The third framework has been intensely advocated as egalitarian, and has drawn 
heavily on the concept of social justice. In fact, one person’s theory has been
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stressed within this dimension of the debate, John Rawls, whose name can be 
found scattered among the articles, discussion papers, and policy-related 
documents on equity issues in climate change. But Rawls is also emphasised by 
those working on the contractarian approach mentioned above, so, before 
examining how Rawls’s ideas have been applied, it is necessary to look at the 
theory itself.
* * *
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice*0 was first published in 1971 and 30 years on the 
impact remains remarkable. And despite criticisms, revisions and reprints, 
arguably no rival theory of justice has contested its pole position, or lasted so 
well. And yet, most public health workers today would probably never have heard 
of it, a reflection that will be considered in the recommendations section of the 
thesis.
Rawls thinks of justice as fairness. He starts from the premise that utilitarianism is 
an inadequate, inappropriate, and ultimately unjust moral or politico-economic 
tool for making distributive decisions in society. For Rawls justice denies that 
“the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others.” 
And justice does not allow “that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed 
by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.”41 Instead Rawls defines 
justice as “a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties 
and for determining what they take to be the proper distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation.”42
Rawls makes two other key assertions. Firstly he argues that people's perceptions 
of entitlement -  and so too of justice or fairness -  are inevitably shaped by their 
own backgrounds, interests and social organisations. While Rawls accepts that 
human beings naturally have certain interests -  for instance striving for basic 
primary goals -  most interests are not of this nature and any agreed notion of 
justice needs to be reached before the undue influence of unnatural interests.
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Secondly, he predicates that any social advantages obtained through chance -  by 
birthright or natural endowment -  are essentially unfair.
Putting these together Rawls sets out to establish the principles of justice for the 
basic structure of society that would be agreed by individuals in an ‘original’ (or 
abstract pre-existence) state. Taking the form of a social contract these principles 
are those that “free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms 
of their association.”43 This initial, or ‘original’, position corresponds to the state 
of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. Rawls purports that the 
“original position is ... the appropriate initial status quo, and the fundamental 
agreements reached in it are fair.” This, he continues, “explains the propriety of 
the name “justice as fairness”: it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are 
agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.”44
So Rawls sets up this original position and makes procedural justice the basis of 
his theory: the procedure is the contract, or the principles of justice, that would be 
determined by those sitting in the hypothetical position. Rawls now recognises the 
importance of nullifying “the effects of special contingencies which put men at 
odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own 
advantage.” This he does by situating parties making the contract, and in the 
original position, behind ‘a veil of ignorance’ so that they “do not know how the 
various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to 
evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.”45
Behind this veil “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his intelligence and strength, ... his conception of the good, the 
particulars of his rational life, or even the special features of his psychology such 
as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism.”45 Of special 
significance to the climate change debate, Rawls also highlights the moral 
relevance of the environment and of future generations:
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“The persons in the original position have no information as to which 
generation they belong. These broader restrictions on knowledge are 
appropriate in part because questions of social justice arise between 
generations as well as within them, for example, the question of the ... 
conservation of natural resources and the environment of nature ... They 
must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to 
live with whatever generation they turn out to belong to.”45
So parties in the original position have facts concealed from them by the veil of 
ignorance. They do not know where they will fall in society, what ordinal levels 
of wealth and income they will receive, what opportunities will befall them by 
virtue of their social positions. They do not know what their lot will be. From this 
position Rawls argues that parties would agree to two principles of justice and, by 
extension, these are the principles that society should strive to promote and 
maintain. The two principles are:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all.46
The first principle sets out generally that all social values -  liberty and 
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect -  are to be 
distributed equally. These Rawls calls primary social goods, assets that every 
rational human being is presumed to want, but the attainment of which is unduly, 
and unfairly, influenced by historical and social fortune. In contrast Rawls labels 
individual talents and abilities, such as intelligence and vigour, as primary natural 
goods, the differential distribution of which is an acceptable aspect of the human 
condition. He acknowledges that these goods or characteristics are influenced by 
social structure but claims they are less directly under its control. Interestingly 
Rawls also brackets health as a natural good, a perhaps contentious point given
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the recent growing understanding of the relationship between income and health. 
This is touched on later in the section on inequalities in health.
Rawls is not concerned with challenging the allocation of natural goods, but 
justice requires fair distribution of social goods. So the second principle, named 
the difference principle, attempts to rebalance the arbitrary effects of the natural 
lottery, and gives weight to considerations he describes under the principle of 
redress:
“This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and 
since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these 
inequalities are to be somehow compensated for. Thus the principle holds 
that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of 
opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native 
assets and to those bom into the less favourable social positions. The idea 
is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality.”47
Rawls describes the two principles as providing together the ‘maximin’ (maximum 
minimorum) solution to problems of social justice. Any putative policy, and 
alternatives, will have a range of outcomes which may differentially impact on 
those well off and those less well off. The maximin rule ranks alternatives by their 
worst possible outcome and advises adopting the option, the worst outcome of 
which is superior to the outcome of the others. The worst outcome refers to the 
impact of the policy on those worst off, and the goal is to maximally improve their 
situation.48
Rawls elaborates that the best arrangement possible, a perfectly just scheme, is 
when the expectations (or lot) of the least advantaged are maximised, and no 
change in those better off can improve the situation of the worst off. But society is 
constantly changing, equilibrium is not fixed, so a just arrangement (but not the 
perfectly just arrangement) is that in which any increase in the expectations (or 
lot) of the more advantaged would increase that of the least advantaged. Any 
improvement in the welfare of the more fortunate must contribute to the welfare 
of the less fortunate. But the perfectly just state has not been reached, and only
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exists when the lot of the worst off has been maximised and any improvement to 
the better off would not improve the lot of the worst off.
Rawls adds a vital caveat, which is often under-emphasised. The situation 
described above could guide policies that widened existing inequalities, in say 
wealth, so long as the poorest had some, however tiny, gain. A policy that lead to 
the richest 10% earning an extra £1 million could be acceptable if the poorest 
resultantly earned an additional penny. Of course it would have to be ranked and 
considered against competing policy options, but nevertheless would be 
theoretically possible. So Rawls qualifies the conditions and stresses that a 
scheme is unjust when the lot or expectations of the advantaged are ‘excessive’ 
and a decrease in their situation would improve that of the least favoured.49
Fairness issues in the climate change debate
Armed with the basics of Rawls’s theory of justice, it is possible now to return to 
the climate change debate. The starting-point for the distributive concerns in 
climate change are three related questions: who is responsible for the problem; 
who will suffer (most) from the problem, and how; and who will bear the costs of 
abatement? The four fairness issues in climate change policy that correspond to 
these questions have been expressed as follows:50 51
1. What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that is 
still avoidable?
2. What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social consequences of 
the global warming that will not, in fact, be avoided?
3. What background allocation of wealth would allow international bargaining 
(about the first two points) to be a fair process?
4. What is a fair allocation of greenhouse gases over the long-term and during 
transition to the long-term allocation?
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In trying to address the fairness issues in climate change, debate has actually 
focused on an administrative utilitarian (or contractarian) approach, drawing in, to 
a degree, some Rawlsian ideas of social justice. The IPCC, for example, 
distinguishes two categories of equity as significant to climate change analyses: 
procedural equity and consequentialist equity. The former is largely about making 
policy, focusing on the criteria and methods for implementing fair procedures for 
design of, and participation in, the decision-making processes, as well as respect 
for legal rights. It is about inclusion, fairness and openness at all stages in the 
policy-making processes and corresponds to item four on the list on the previous 
page.
Consequentialist equity, in contrast, corresponds to items in the earlier list, and is 
about the outcomes of climate change (and policies addressing climate change): 
justice and fairness in respect of the impacts of climate change, and justice and 
fairness in respect of abatement, in other words the distribution of burdens and 
allocation of benefits associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
managing climate change. Consequentialist equity has been further divided into 
imrczgenerational equity (although actions by individuals in contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions may affect anyone, impacts reflect vulnerability and are 
borne differentially by social groups or countries depending on their geography, 
economic development and so forth) and m/ergenerational equity (costs of 
abatement may be borne now but benefits may not be realised well into the 
future). Consequentialist equity takes on board the widely flouted ‘precautionary 
principle’, which dictates that when there is serious doubt about likely 
environmental impacts and consequences, decisions should be made that err on 
the side of safety.52
The IPCC has postulated there are several traditions in attempting these 
calculations, some of which have an egalitarian base. But the traditions are, in the 
main, about how the cake is divided rather than how the cake is made, perceived 
or valued: ‘parity’ of burdens and benefits (equal distribution to all claimants, 
‘egalitarian’); ‘proportionality’ of burdens and benefits (distribution in proportion
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to contribution of claimants); priority (according to greatest need, emphasises 
basic needs and minimum level of wellbeing); classical utilitarianism (maximising 
total utility); and Rawlsian distributive justice (described as equal distribution 
unless unequal distribution operates to benefit the least advantaged). The IPCC 
sometimes appears to consider Rawls central:
“ A basic needs approach ... involves allowing countries the right to emit 
the minimum levels of greenhouse gases needed to meet the basic needs of 
their citizens, defined as the minimum consumption levels needed to 
support full participation in society, and then requiring countries to buy (or 
pay taxes on) the rights to emission levels above these ... This approach 
can be related to Rawlsian philosophy.”53
Such efforts to introduce elements of fairness, however, need to be considered 
against the backdrop of the domination of the economic weltanschaung in which 
they are placed, and indeed calculated. Early on, economic models -  collectively 
termed Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) -  were developed to allow detailed 
analysis of greenhouse gases (full cycle of anthropogenic gases, concentrations of 
gases in the atmosphere), resultant climate change, impacts on society and 
economy (economic losses as the ‘damage function'), and the costs of slowing 
climate change (‘cost function’). The belief was that, through “creating the same 
metric for cost and benefit assessments, IAMs [could] be used to develop 
economically efficient policies”.54
But limited attention is paid in such models to equity concerns and, despite more 
creative recent inclusions, to some the debate over climate change policies 
represents the discomforting conceptual imperialism of economics. As Harvey 
stresses , “some sort of hegemonic economistic-engineering discourse has come to 
prevail which ... has the effect of making us ‘puppets of the institutional and 
imaginary worlds we inhabit’... by commodifying everything and subjecting 
almost all transactions ... to the singular logic of commercial profitability and the 
cost-benefit calculus.”55
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Economic analyses such as IAMs have embedded within their methodology a 
picture of human manipulation of the natural world, and the natural world seen 
largely in terms of monetary value. As well as the deep-seated flaws in 
representing the world in such a way, such analyses also misrepresent that which 
people actually value:
“Many valuable goods escape the net of the national income accounts and 
might affect the calculations of the economic effects of climate change ... 
Among the areas of importance are human health, biological diversity, 
amenity values of everyday life and leisure, and environmental quality. 
Some people will place a high moral, aesthetic or environmental value on 
preventing climate change, but I know of no serious estimates of what 
people are willing to pay to stop greenhouse warming.”56
Yet despite acute criticisms of this kind, the range of criteria brought into the 
calculations do indicate efforts to address concerns about global social justice 
within the climate change debate. Linnerooth-Bayer suggests Rawls has been 
instrumental, postulating that “moral reciprocity in the veil of ignorance forces 
individuals to treat others as they would want to be treated themselves, making 
responsibility to fellow humans an intricate functional property of Rawls’s justice 
scheme.”57 But this inflated assertion perhaps misses the reality. There may have 
been a shift in social conscience, if not in practical policy outcomes, with Rawls a 
useful resource to draw on. But this has remained predominantly within an 
economic framework (and all the limitations embedded within that) built on 
administrative utilitarian thinking.
Climate change and climate justice
The intellectual and theoretical developments described in the previous section 
have been mirrored in two parallel, connected sets of processes in the climate 
change debate: developments in international policy around managing climate 
change; and growth in the campaigning efforts of pressure groups. There is not 
scope here to look at how international policy developments have captured
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Rawls’s ideas, although I have described these in Air, the Environment and Public 
Health,58 Instead, climate justice will be explored here.
In parallel to policy developments and negotiations (and sometimes providing 
evidence for them) there has been a groundswell in ‘independent’ think tanks, 
non-profit making organisations, and other new bodies established to press for fair 
and generally more aggressive policy targets relating to climate change. A number 
of these have expressed their opinions and activities in terms of global justice, and 
their mix of conscience-driven academics and pressure-group campaigners has 
provided both the intellectual base and the energy needed to drive activities 
forward. There is the feel of a throwback to the lobbying efforts of the first half of 
the twentieth century to clean the skies of air pollution, as described in the second 
case study.
The Global Commons Institute (GCI), for instance, was set up in 1990 in London, 
and has been encouraging awareness of its solution to climate change called 
Contraction and Convergence. Put forward as the suggested international 
framework for the arrest of greenhouse gas emissions Contraction and 
Convergence argues that economic growth can continue at current (‘business as 
usual’) rates only provided large efficiency gains are made and nearly all energy 
comes from renewable sources.59 60
Another group, the cleverly named US-based EcoEquity, is committed to 
advancing equal rights to global commons resources, in particular the principle 
mentioned earlier of equal per capita rights to the atmosphere. Lamenting both US 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and also the Byrd-Hagel resolution,1' EcoEquity 
argues that fairness “cannot and will not mean that the rich go on as before”, and 
that a climate treaty will have to embody a “fairness that is acceptable in China as
“ A campaign prior to the Kyoto negotiations o f 1997 led to 95 US senators demanding 
developing countries also take on firm reduction commitments, so challenging the UNFCC 
principle that developed countries take the lead in reducing emissions.
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well as the United States.” EcoEquity hopes to deepen and clarify the meaning of 
climate justice through drawing together academics and non-govemment 
organisations into the global justice movement: “What will we be doing?” poses 
the EcoEquity website, then answers, “Working to bring the many threads now 
being spun around climate justice together into a stronger web, one that can 
support a broader political strategy.”61
There are other individual groups or organizations,62 but a powerful coalition of 
groups -  including CorpWatch, Friends of the Earth International, OilWatch 
Africa and the World Rainforest Movement -  gathered as the ‘International 
Climate Justice Network’ at the final preparatory negotiations for the Earth 
Summit in Bali in June 2002. Tire coalition developed a set of principles aimed at 
‘putting a human face’ on climate change. The ‘Bali Principles of Climate Justice’ 
first list (as a series of ‘Whereas’) the nature of the problem (caused primarily by 
the rich; felt disproportionately by small island states, coastal peoples, women, the 
poor and others; violating human rights) then state 27 core principles of the 
international movement for Climate Justice. These include, as numbered by the 
network:
1. Affirming the sacredness of Mother earth, ecological unity and the
interdependence of all species, Climate Justice insists that communities 
have the right to be free from climate change, its related impacts and other 
forms of ecological destruction.
8. ... Climate Justice protects the rights of victims of climate change and
associated injustices to receive full compensation, restoration, and 
reparation for loss of land, livelihood and other damages.
26. Climate Justice requires that we, as individuals and communities, make ... 
choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's resources ... and make the 
conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles, re-thinking 
our ethics with relation to the environment and Mother Earth.63
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Within the context of this case study - the approach taken to dealing with climate 
change -  these principles illustrate that Rawls’s social justice has provided an 
alternative moral framework to utilitarianism for public health. The climate 
change debate has spawned a range of academic, policy and pressure group 
writings reflecting ideas articulated by John Rawls. Connected to this, the climate 
change debate has also become an arena for expression and discussion of the 
perceived reasons for many of the world's ills: the impact of industrialisation and 
of modem western lifestyles, global poverty, and the conceptual imperialism of 
economics.64 65 66
The approach to dealing with climate change is not the only public health-related 
area in which Rawls’s ideas have been invoked. The subject of inequalities in 
health has also drawn on Rawls, as I have discussed elsewhere.58 However, within 
this case study it is now important to look at how the approach to dealing with 
climate change has thrown up another possible moral framework for public health.
Other moral frameworks for public health 2 
Environmental ethics and public health
Separation and disconnection: science, nature and political philosophy
The origins of today’s environmental problems, and the relevance of this to public 
health, can be traced through the inter-connected paths of progress in medicine, 
science and political philosophy over the past few hundred years. It is necessary to 
outline these developments in order to understand the place of environmental 
ethics.
Prior to the seventeenth century western medicine still drew strongly on Greek 
ideas and beliefs, even though practical aspects had changed somewhat. Disease
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was understood as bodily imbalance, or disturbance of the equilibrium, interpreted 
by physicians through symptoms and signs. Treatment was geared towards re­
orientation of balance, both within the individual and with nature, and remedies 
used were of natural origin.
In the seventeenth century, Cartesian dualism split mind from matter and, in so 
doing, began the separation of facts from values.67 In the centuries to follow 
Descartes, huge strides were made in understanding the facts about the way the 
world works, both the physical world that surrounds us and also the matter that 
makes up our own bodies. Mechanistic philosophy pictured the world as a 
machine, with explanations needed for the mechanisms hidden behind the 
phenomena that we see or otherwise come to observe. Mechanisms have causes 
and effects and, however complex these may be, they can be broken down to 
simpler mechanisms as a means to understanding the larger processes better -  and 
what slowly emerged was the belief that mechanisms could be explained through 
objective scientific truths. In this way, Cartesianism paved the way for the 
development of what we think of now as modem medicine, based on the physical 
sciences.68
Making the distinction between mind and matter, however, not only corresponded 
with creating demarcations between values and facts, but it also altered the way in 
which we think about those values and facts themselves. The search for the 
objective has meant reducing, and then further reducing, complex natural 
relationships to far simpler ones. And in an effort to make the complex more 
simple and more amenable to scientific investigation, relationships change. 
Smaller concepts, simplified systems, linear relationships, more direct 
connections, all can seem to become more important than that from which they 
came. Believing that the world can be split and explained in such a manner entails 
commitment to a way of seeing the world that is value-laden in itself, a 
commitment at minimum to the reductionist vision.6'*
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The reductionist vision embodied within Cartesian philosophy marked a change in 
how we understand the world, and the values we place on different aspects of that 
world. In attempting to explain scientifically how we function, we see ourselves 
as individual entities disconnected from the natural world. The disconnection 
from other people and nature later shifted beliefs about social organisation and the 
place of citizens within society.70
But the natural world, it would seem, does not really exist in isolation, or 
disconnection, and modem thought -  even scientific -  seems to suggest we are 
much more connected than we realised. The Greeks were aware of this, in their 
understanding of the importance of balance and harmony to human health, both 
for the individual and in relation to the natural world. The political philosophy of 
Plato and Aristotle mirrored this perspective in picturing the social organisation of 
the Greek city-state as an organism, different elements working together for the 
good, or just, functioning of the whole. And within this framework fitted the 
individual pursuit of a virtuous life.71
In the centuries of Hobbes and Locke, however, this outlook changed 
dramatically. The development of mechanistic philosophy and progression of 
science somewhat removed humans from the natural environment, which itself 
was mechanistically objectified. The era of individualism had begun, with 
justification of self-interested behaviour and an emphasis on individual and 
private rights. Personal morality no longer had a special relationship to the State, 
whose role became that of partner in a dispassionate arrangement that primarily 
provides an environment suitable for promotion of the individual.72 Mary Midgley 
captures this well:
“Since the Renaissance, this kind of contraction has in any case been 
happening in political philosophy in the West. Political thinkers of the 
Enlightenment systematically shrank morality by making it essentially a 
civic affair -  a matter of mutual bargaining between prudent citizens 
within a limited society. Contract thinking sought to abolish the idea of 
duties towards anyone or anything outside that society ... But this move 
had unintended side-effects. It now makes it quite hard for us to make
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sense of our responsibility towards humans outside our own society, and 
almost impossible to explain our responsibilities towards non-human 
nature.”73
The seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke’s emphasis on individual rights 
and property rights illustrate how the era also proclaimed mankind’s dominion 
over nature. The natural environment was articulated in inert, demarcated terms, 
largely devoid of value, and humans would be morally justified in manipulating it 
however necessary to further legitimate personal interests. This tied in with 
ownership, rather than stewardship, of nature, and began to set in stone an image 
of the natural environment -  detached and there for human needs -  which has 
only relatively recently been challenged by environmentalists.74
In fact, despite some romantic inclinations, this image of nature was reinforced 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as utilitarian political philosophy 
took hold.7S As discussed earlier in this case study, utilitarianism has (indirectly) 
reinforced moral justification for individual pursuit of that which gives pleasure, 
with maximising human happiness as the overall goal. Manipulating nature to 
meet these ends has ethical validation, and modem welfare economics -  the 
comer-stone of liberal democracies -  is grounded in these ideals. Yet 
utilitarianism focuses proximally, both in terms of the "audience’ within its 
calculation (failure to include impacts on those at a distance) and with regard to 
time -  the difficulty of incorporating the needs and desires of future generations. 
And there is little or no accounting for the intrinsic worth of nature.
As shown in the first case study, utilitarianism emerged politically at a time of 
corresponding changes in science, medicine and biology. The connection of 
human health with nature through miasmatic theories of disease was gradually 
replaced at the end of the nineteenth century by bacteriological explanations, 
which catalysed the reductionism of medical science. And at that time Darwin and 
his colleagues were providing a vision of nature that placed self-interested 
behaviour at its very core, the driver for change, integrally related to adaptation to, 
and manipulation of, the environment. Not only did this vision reinforce utilitarian
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thinking, it also provided a basis for ideas of hierarchies of human social 
organisation, and justification of social Darwinism.76
Brought together, developments over the last 400 years or so have -  in secular 
western living at least -  disconnected mankind from nature through a mixture of 
mechanistic philosophical understanding, scientific and medical reductionism, 
validation of self-interested behaviour and utilitarian-based political philosophy. 
Individuals have simultaneously become seen as disconnected from other 
individuals, flitting around as distinct particles within some form of social 
apparatus, separated from others and the natural world, with purpose, values and 
goals narrowly defined. Midgley again captures this well:
“It is the social atomism that lies at the heart o f individualism -  the idea 
that human beings are essentially separate items who only come together 
for contingent reasons of convenience [author’s italics]. This is the idea 
expressed by saying that the state is a logical construction out of its 
members, or that really there is no such thing as society. A social contract 
based on calculations of self-interest is then supposed to account for the 
strange fact that such things as human societies do actually exist.”77
These developments have clearly impacted on how public health has progressed. 
There has, however, been a recent counter-vision, in the form of environmental 
ethics, which has provided a different way of understanding the world. A look at 
environmental ethics, and its relevance to this chapter’s case study, will enable a 
synthesis of the implications for public health theory and practice.
Environmental ethics
Although environmental ethics has blossomed as an academic activity over the 
last two decades, its main tenets can be traced back to earlier this century. And, 
though these fundamentals have been subject to considerable theoretical and 
philosophical debate, they have also become inescapably linked to socio-political 
ideologies and movements.7X
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It is difficult to place the various philosophical perspectives on the environment 
into a bag labelled ‘environmental ethics’, as they differ in many important 
aspects, but what they share is a fundamental questioning of the value, or values, 
ascribed to nature. Yet even here there are different approaches, or ways in, to 
examining this core. One such approach, a sort of starting point in environmental 
ethics, is to distinguish between anthropocentric (human-centred) and non- 
anthropocentric ethics. This is seen as a good place to begin because an oft shared 
belief in environmental ethics is that the roots of today’s environmental problems 
lie in the moral favouritism given to human interests, this in itself linked to 
developments in science and political philosophy discussed in the previous 
section. The moral favouritism, the anthropocentric ethical framework, is then 
disapproved of in different ways, and for different reasons.
In trying to summarily address what an environmental ethic is, Robert Elliot 
captures this overview, and presents five sub-divisions. The first, ‘human-centred 
ethics’, has modem utilitarianism as an exemplar, in which facts are needed to 
calculate the happiness yielded by options, but only humans are treated as morally 
considerable i.e. are included in the calculus. An ‘animal-centred ethic’ treats 
individual animals as morally considerable, but may allow ranking to account for 
different interests and capacities. Treating equal interests equally and unequal 
ones unequally, for example, would accommodate human ranking above animals 
based on a different capacity for rational autonomous action. A ‘life-centred 
ethic’, on the other hand, counts all living things as morally considerable, not just 
humans or non-human animals. However, while some would ascribe equal moral 
considerability to all life, such as the ‘biotic egalitarianism’ of Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess, others allow differentiation, for instance by complexity. 
This may favour, for example, the biosphere over humans, and leads to a special 
kind of life-centred ethic termed 'ecological holism’, which grants moral 
considerability to wholes, such as large ecosystems or the biosphere: individuals 
or species are only important in relation to these wholes. The final environmental
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ethic, called ‘rights for rocks’ by Elliot, extends moral considerability to all as an 
‘everything ethic’.79
Underlying these divisions, or different perspectives, is the justification for any 
kind of environmental ethic, which is the question of what makes something 
worthy of moral considerability -  worthy of consideration when judging the 
morality of action.80 Humans are morally considerable because they have interests 
that can be promoted or harmed, based on their human capacities -  for rational 
thought and action, and sentience. However, not only is sentience shared by some 
animals (which could extend moral consideration to them), but moral 
considerability could lie elsewhere, in some other intrinsically valuable property, 
for instance complexity or even beauty. This in turn would shift moral 
considerability to non-sentient animals, plants,* ecosystems or the wilderness, and 
could include non-living*' entities.
The different perspectives within environmental ethics lie within a spectrum, 
which stretches from humans to animals, plants, all living and non-living things, 
incorporating different concepts of what matters morally. Des Jardins, for 
example, divides the spectrum up a little differently, but it still incorporates the 
same elements. His grouping are: biocentric ethics, which is centred around (all) 
life and has correlative duties;*" ecological ethics, which focuses on ecological 
communities and embraces ethical holism; the ‘land ethic’, articulated first by 
Aldo Leopold in 1949, which embraces living things, ecosystems and the land;81 
‘deep ecology’, especially that of Naess, which emphasises the deep roots of 
environmental crises, the radical cure needed (personal and cultural 
transformation) and forcibly expresses its distinction from shallow 
anthropocentric environmentalism; and social ecology and ecofeminism, which
* The difference between having interests and goals lias been stressed by philosophers. A plant 
may grow towards light or a tree may wither and die, but neither the plant nor the tree, arguably, 
has attitudes towards these happenings.
*' The distinction between living and non-living is often neither biologically or philosophically 
clear. For instance, a rock may be considered non-living or inert, but what about soil? 
x" These are non-maleficience (to any organism), non-interference, fidelity (to not betray or 
deceive wild animals) and restitutive justice (to restore balance if harm done).
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explore how social structures serve the interests and power of certain groups, 
reflected in and reinforced by domination over nature.82
However the continuum within environmental ethics is separated out 
academically or theoretically, a common thread is the difficulty, or failure, to 
ascribe ‘inherent’ value to non-human nature, whether that be other animals, 
vegetation or alternative concepts of what might exist. The anthropocentric nature 
of western ethics gives, at best, ‘instrumental’ value to anything non-human; in 
other words wombats, wild flowers and the wilderness are of value only by way 
of serving human interests -  as pets, for rambling, or as potential new medicines. 
This has arisen because of entwined developments in science, medicine, and 
moral and political philosophy that have already been described. It may be fair to 
reflect that dominion over beasts was heralded back in Aristotelian times, but the 
contemporary situation is rather different in terms of the success and value placed 
on liberal individualism, materialism, and the socio-political structures enshrining 
these ideologies. The present situation is also vastly different in terms of the depth 
of environmental crises affecting the planet, of which greenhouse warming is just 
one example. The Australian philosopher Peter Singer, despite holding sentience 
alone as morally considerable, is sure of the seriousness of the problem, and the 
extent of change needed:
“Now we face a new threat to our survival. The proliferation of human 
beings, coupled with the by-products of economic growth, is just as 
capable as the old threats of wiping out our society -  and every other 
society as well. No ethic has yet developed to cope with this threat. Some 
ethical principles we do have are exactly the opposite of what we need.
The problem is that... ethical principles change slowly and the time we 
have left to develop a new environmental ethic is short. Such an ethic 
would regard every action that is harmful to the environment as ethically 
dubious, and those that are unnecessarily harmful as plainly wrong."83
Singer then outlines his environmental ethic as including consideration of all 
sentient creatures now and well into the future, aesthetic appreciation of wild 
places and nature, rejection of materialistic ideals, promotion of frugality and 
reassessment of extravagance. He espouses these further, and in more detail, in his
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popular classic How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-interest .84 For Singer, 
and many others, the connection between environmental ethics and environmental 
activism (or environmentalism) is strong.
Environmental ethics, environmental justice, climate change and public health
Through the 1990s ideas and values articulated within environmental ethics have 
spawned developments in two related directions, global ethics and environmental 
justice. Global ethics, and a spin-off global bioethics, are both broadly concerned 
with relationships between current western values, damage to the natural 
environment (often in global terms, for instance around acid rain or loss of 
biodiversity), and impacts on human health. The latter with its ‘bio’ prefix pays 
special attention to the place of the health care system in the same debates.
Alongside has been the emergence of environmental justice. With a broad agenda, 
this field of academic debate and social activism has been concerned with many of 
the same areas as global ethics, but with special attention to fairness of 
distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, as well as just treatment of 
individuals in respect of environmental matters. Issues of interest range from 
unfair distribution of the causes of ozone depletion and its unequal health impacts 
to local matters such as unequal access to green spaces; and of course there is 
overlap in the climate change area with climate justice. The environmental justice 
movement embodies is a mixture of environmentalism, environmental ethics or 
philosophy, together with concern for local community health and global public 
health. In the main, however, it is not about the health of the environment per se 
(its intrinsic worth), but the health of the environment in relation to human use 
and its impact on human health -  its instrumental value.
It is now more apparent how this chapter's case study fits in. It is now widely 
accepted that climate change has arisen due to man-made pollution accompanying 
industrialisation and modem western development. The sequelae of climate
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change will impact on the health of the planet, and of humans, now but especially 
in the future. The causes and consequences of climate change are unequally, and 
unfairly, distributed. Calls for ‘climate justice’ have been increasing in reaction to 
these inequities, as well as due to slowness of progress in policy around mitigation 
and adaptation.
What this case study highlights, however, is an accumulation of malcontent 
around western living, western values, care of the environment and global poverty 
-  along with displeasure with policy-makers’ efforts to address these. Climate 
change captures the dissatisfaction of environmentalists and environmental 
ethicists with the way the planet and its natural resources (which include air) are 
treated, and is often used as an example or case-study in books and journals of 
these disciplines.
Climate change, however, still pushes forward anthropocentric views of nature, 
through its emphasis on the impact on humans. In this sense it is strange to find it 
in the environmental activist’s toolkit, but it is there because it is a powerful 
example of what happens when nature is inappropriately valued. It is there 
because it can progress an important agenda, and because it represents growing 
disillusionment with the way things are.
But changing the way things are has proven hard, as stumbling climate change 
policy has shown, because the roots of our current problems lie very deep, and 
have become ingrained in western lifestyles. To have purchase, attempts to 
seriously tackle problems such as climate change need simultaneously to address 
the roots that have bred liberal individualism, dominant utilitarian-based political 
philosophy, materialism and social atomism.
For environmental work within public health, similar arguments apply. As a sub­
section of public health, ’environmental health’ has always been concerned with 
the impact that the environment has on human health -  not surprising given that 
‘public health' by name attends to the health of human communities. Not only,
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however, is the environment here considered as an instrument, a means, to human 
well-being, but environmental health largely encompasses man-made damage to 
the environment and the subsequent effects on humans: contamination of the land 
with hazardous chemicals; landfill sites; factory products; unwanted effluents into 
water supplies; and of course air pollution as addressed in the third case study.
More recently, through a combination of attention to inequalities in health and 
general environmentalism, there has been growing attention to so-called 
environmental injustices, whether these be global matters such as climate change 
or more local concerns such as residents in deprived areas living 
disproportionately close to industrial pollutants. These are important and valuable 
advances, but in Naess’ language they reflect shallow environmentalism, touching 
only the surface of the problem, and unlikely to yield substantial results. Deep 
environmentalism, in contrast, requires commitment to radical cures such as 
significant personal and cultural change.
So far the climate change debate would concur with this. Without addressing the 
deep roots of the current environmental crisis, without valuing the environment 
for its inherent worth, real progress in protecting the environment -  and indirectly 
human health -  may be hard to achieve. Therein lies the challenge for public 
health theory and practice -  to embrace environmental ethics, as well as social 
justice, as underpinning moral frameworks.
Conclusions
This final case study has looked at the relationship between air and public health 
in the context of the approach taken in dealing with climate change, and has 
explored what this represents and tells us about current and future prospects for 
public health.
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While climate change is a global problem, it is also a global public health problem 
as the health consequences are severe, and are likely to impact differentially on 
poorer countries with their limited abilities to cope or adapt. The case study has 
illustrated some of the deficiencies of utilitarianism as a moral framework for 
public health.
Within the climate change debate there has been a distinct focus -  academically 
and in policy -  on the unfair, or inequitable, distribution, of the causes and 
consequences of greenhouse warming. This has both involved and spawned an 
activist movement, which one could collectively call climate justice, involving a 
combination of intellectual work, debate, websites, and advocacy. The climate 
justice movement reflects a general growing interest in health inequalities, and 
health inequities, which have drawn significantly on John Rawls’s ideas about 
justice and fairness. Social justice provides an alternative moral framework for 
public health.
Not only, however, does climate change reflect interest in health inequities but it 
also embraces contemporary concerns about the plight of the environment. The 
activist component of climate justice is an extension of the environmentalism of 
the 1960s and 1970s-, which has been accompanied by emergence of the field of 
environmental ethics. However, while commitment to reducing inequities is 
laudable, as is commitment to improving the environment, environmental ethics 
reminds that the roots of current environmental ideas lie deep. Several hundred 
years of separation in western thought of mind from matter, subject from object, 
values from facts, has resulted in the dominance of scientific reductionism over 
holism, and the devaluing of nature. Connected developments in moral and 
political philosophy have ingrained utilitarianism and liberal individualism, 
justifying self-interested behaviour and leading to social atomism. The depth of 
the problem means meaningful solutions need to be radical.
For public health, the environment has predominantly been of instrumental 
interest, as it relates to concern with the human health consequences of .
208
environmental damage. While environmental matters such as chemical hazards 
and even outdoor air pollution are undeniably important, they really only attend to 
the superficial end of the spectrum, representing shallow environmentalism. For 
the future of the public’s health a more substantial change in attitudes is required, 
and the discipline of public health needs to embrace the ideals of environmental 
ethics.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has aimed to explore historically (and thereby increase our 
understanding of) the relationship between air and public health, and to use 
analysis of the theme of air and public health as a vehicle to critically examine 
generic problems in contemporary public health theory and practice, and how 
these problems relate to current environmental issues.
As was presented in the introduction, this thesis has adopted Sweeney’s helpful 
five-stage framework (pi 9) for undertaking a piece of historical research:
i) identification of a researchable phenomenon;
ii) forming research questions and hypotheses, and identification of a 
theoretical framework;
iii) systematic location of source materials;
iv) analysis/evaluation of evidence and information, forming generalisations 
and conclusions; and
v) writing the report, involving description and interpretation of findings.1
In the introduction there was a description of the first stage -  the personal journey 
of the candidate, and evolution of the thesis idea into a researchable phenomenon 
(pi5-18). In chapter one the methods used in the thesis were put fonvard, 
beginning with presentation of the research questions that the thesis would aim to 
address (Sweeney’s second stage, p22-23). These research questions will be 
returned to shortly when bringing together the main findings of the thesis.
Other aspects of the methods used were presented in some detail in the first 
chapter, for instance location of source materials, and it is not necessary to return 
to these here. There was also discussion in chapter one of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, and how analysis, evaluation and interpretation of the
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evidence occurred in an ongoing manner as the research progressed. The analysis 
and interpretation has been presented accordingly within the main thesis chapters.
In this final chapter it is most appropriate to further interpret and bring together 
the main findings of the thesis, and to examine what conclusions can be drawn 
and what challenges remain. In order to do this the chapter is divided into three 
main sections. First, the limitations and benefits of the methods used are 
discussed, including reference to an important debate about the relationship 
between historical progress and historical research Next, the main findings and 
conclusions of the thesis are brought together, with reference to the research 
questions posed. Finally, future challenges are presented.
Limitations and benefits of the methods used
As described in chapter one, this has primarily been a thesis in the history of
medicine, using historical case studies. There are four historical case studies, each
around the theme of air and public health, together making a case series. Each
case study has also had inter-disciplinary components built into the historical
research, integrating methods and techniques from different academic disciplines,
notably philosophy (moral philosophy, political philosophy), health policy and
science (epidemiology). Incorporation of other disciplinary techniques has
2 3become an accepted part of academic historical research.
The case study may have had clinical origins, but has been adopted largely as a 
qualitative research instrument over recent years, firstly within sociological 
studies and later within historical research. There is no agreed definition of what a 
case study constitutes, and this thesis has taken a flexible approach to defining the 
nature and parameters of the case study. Each case study in this thesis is around 
the relationship between air and public health, with a different framework and 
definition provided for each.4
215
There are difficulties and advantages around using a case study approach.
Important difficulties lie in defining the case study, and in knowing what 
conclusions can reasonably be drawn from such a methodological approach. At 
the beginning of each chapter in this thesis a definition of the case study, and its 
parameters, has been provided, to aid clarity and guide the work. However, it 
could be argued that this inevitably involves selection and may introduce bias. For 
instance, in the first case study the perspectives of only some Greek philosophers 
are provided; and, in a broader sense, the case studies that constitute the series 
have been self-selected.5 These issues have presented real challenges for the 
project, and can be countered by the need to be expansive because of aims of the 
thesis and the nature of the research questions,6 7 and efforts have been made 
within each chapter to comprehensively cover relevant areas of that case study.
Another criticism of historical and other qualitative research is that it is difficult to 
generalise from the findings of, say, any particular case study or even from a case 
series. Such accusations have receded in more recent times with a better 
understanding of the foundations and goals of qualitative research. Where 
quantitative science aims to simplify and reduce, historical and other qualitative 
research aims to explore the complexities of the human and social worlds.8 
Inferences are made from the findings of such research that inform our 
understanding of social connections, interactions and developments.l,
Challenges are also posed by bringing other methods into historical research: in 
this thesis the case studies inter-disciplinary elements.10 Each research discipline, 
whether history or epidemiology, has its own methodological limitations, so an 
inter-disciplinary approach would appear to add a further layer ot methodological 
difficulties. These real challenges have been embraced in the thesis, through 
efforts at methodological rigour within each discipline that has been adopted, 
whether gathering historical material, analysing epidemiological data, or applying 
moral philosophical theories.
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There are, however, significant and important benefits of bringing inter­
disciplinary elements into historical research.11 The social world is not 
demarcated along the lines of academic disciplines, and understanding 
developments within the social world, such as developments in public health, can 
be enriched through effective blending of disciplinary methods and approaches. 
This does not replace the need for, or value of, uni-disciplinary research, but 
complements it.12
Historical progress and historical research
It is important at this point to note that there has been a significant academic 
debate, of relevance to this thesis, about the relationship between historical 
progress and historical research.13
This debate relates in particular to applied historical research, that is research that 
pertains to have practical application. For instance, in history of medicine this 
might be a piece of research that aims to inform or influence current, or new, 
health policy. This contrasts with more classical historical research, that intends to 
generate new knowledge by helping better understand the past.
Applied historical research has been criticised, to some degree, by virtue of the 
way it views historical progress. The traditional way of viewing historical 
progress employs a ‘processual’ mode, meaning understanding historical change 
in terms of sequential development (from past through to present). This, literally, 
sees historical progress as a process, and research employing this mode allows for 
understanding the uniqueness of different historical stages or periods.14
An alternative way of viewing historical progress employs the ‘analogical' mode. 
Research employing this mode might compare a topic (such as the nursing 
profession in past and present examples) in different historical periods, arguing by 
analogy and applying the findings to current policies. To classical historians this
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approach has sometimes been seen as more controversial, as it risks negating the 
gulf between past and present, the intervening periods between the analogies.2
Contemporary applied history, however, especially around health and health 
policy, has increasingly rejected these dichotomous positions, and argued the 
strength of open-mindedness. It is possible to employ the analogical mode without 
losing the depth of the past, and contrasts in time can bear fruitful illumination on 
current issues. It is also possible to combine modes, thereby opening up debates 
and broadening discussions.15
In this thesis, both modes have been employed. There is a processual tone to the 
chronological connections between the case studies, producing one case series.
But there is also some reasoning by analogy, as findings in the case studies are 
compared with each other, and the overall conclusions build on such analyses.
Main findings and conclusions
As mentioned in chapter one, within each case study there has been integrated 
ongoing analysis, with conclusions described at the end of the chapter. In this 
section of this chapter the main findings of each case study, and the case series as 
a whole, are brought together, along with the conclusions that can be drawn from 
them. These synthesised findings and conclusions are presented with regard to the 
four main research questions (p22-23) that were described in chapter one: •
• What is our understanding of the historical relationship between air and public 
health?
• How has the relationship between air and public health changed over time?
• What does this relationship tell us about developments in professional public 
health, in particular in England and Wales?
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• What does the relationship between air and public health tell us about 
problems in contemporary public health theory and practice, and how these 
problems relate to current environmental issues?
The first case study (chapter two) charted changes in the relationship between air 
and health from ancient civilisations to the bacteriological era at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In Egyptian medical thought, air had a special, supernatural 
place as the creator and sustainer of life, not dissimilar to the life-force qi in 
Chinese medicine, or early Judeo-Christian vitalism, in which the breath of life 
lay in air, imbued with the Spirit of God.
Greek medicine attempted to remove religious elements and provide the first 
rational medical theory; but supernatural ideas remained, as the concept of 
pneuma connected air with the soul in the Hippocratic Corpus, and also later in 
the works of Plato and Aristotle. As well as an emphasis on empirical observation, 
Greek medicine was, however, naturalistic, understanding mankind as part of 
nature, and illness as a natural phenomenon. Balance within the body, and 
between the body and the natural environment maintained health, and imbalance 
resulted in disease. Air was part of the natural environment, and epidemics were 
felt to be carried by polluted air, or miasma. But air was also internalised, 
connected in this capacity with specific illnesses, such as the sacred disease, now 
known as epilepsy.
The connectivity between air and health in Greek medicine embodied a holistic 
relationship both within the human body, and between humans and the natural 
environment. This relationship between air and health continued with Roman 
medicine, and through to the Enlightenment. By that time, however, air was at the 
centre of a debate about the causation of infectious diseases. A spectrum ot beliefs 
about disease causation existed, incorporating at one end the idea that poor 
sanitary conditions created polluted air, miasma, that was responsible for 
epidemic outbreaks; and, at the other end, minute particles, contagion, were held 
to be the cause -  or a combination of the two explanations was invoked. The
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terms miasma and contagion were used unpredictably, sometimes to answer 
different questions, but air was the medium of disease in both.
This debate about disease causation was framed by a wider debate through the 
nineteenth century, about the role of the environment in shaping biological and 
social evolution. Professional public health emerged in the middle of that century 
with an emphasis on improving the insanitary environmental conditions of the 
poor. The context was the need for a healthy workforce at a time of economic 
expansion, but to some the immoral poor were responsible for their adverse living 
conditions, and assistance would run counter to moral progress.
As scientific rationalism began to underpin medicine, the relationship between air 
and health lost the spiritualism and holism of earlier epochs. Air became equated 
with polluted air, first as miasma, then more visibly as smoke pollution. As 
discussed in the second case study (chapter three), naturalism also disappeared 
from the conception that was developing, of man-made polluted air and its effects 
on human health. Industrialisation in the cities led to increasing output of smoke 
from factories, and also from domestic coal fires. The atmosphere darkened, and 
air in relation to public health corresponded with the adverse effects of the smoke- 
filled skies on human wellbeing: deaths, respiratory illnesses such as pneumonia 
and tuberculosis, and psychological effects of the gloom.
As air became reduced to the polluting component of smoke, the statistical search 
for associations between smoke pollution and mortality or morbidity began. This 
was repeatedly demonstrated through the early twentieth century but, despite the 
evidence, and in the face of a growing anti-smoke campaign, policy to reduce 
smoke levels failed to deliver. The developing public health profession, and 
Medical Officers of Health in particular, worked with campaigners and with 
communities, advocating improvements to environmental and atmospheric 
conditions.
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The great smog of 1952 was possibly the straw that broke the camel’s back, in 
terms of leading to change in policy. The severity of that episode, along with 
public concern and mounting pressure from campaigners, led to a significant 
legislative event, the Clean Air Act. But this Act was a watered down version of 
the Beaver committee’s recommendations, in particular the Act’s failure to cover 
domestic smoke pollution. And the fall in smoke production that was to ensue 
over the following decades probably had more to do with falling prices of 
alternative fuels, as well as a growing emphasis through the 1960s on personal 
responsibility for matters relating to health -  the encouragement of householders 
to make the change.
The period between the world wars has been referred to as the heyday for the 
(medical) public health profession, with authority and control at their highest. The 
profession, however, lost influence over significant medical services with 
formation of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948, and its powers were 
further diminished by the removal of control over sanitary officers and social 
workers. As public health moved into health authorities, connections with local 
authorities (where environmental health officers would be located) were 
attenuated, as was the ability of the profession to engage substantially in matters 
of environmental health.
Public health may have been bolstered in terms of status in the 1970s through 
formation of the Faculty of Community Medicine, and through recognition as a 
medical speciality, but the costs included increased managerial responsibilities 
over provision of health services, and marginalisation of those not medically 
qualified. For public health, improving population health became dominated by 
improving health services, with less emphasis on social determinants and the 
environment.
During the second half of the twentieth century, the relationship between air and 
public health continued to centre around polluted air and its effects on human 
health. But, as described in the third case study (chapter four), polluted air was
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gradually reduced to its constituent components. First smoke and sulphur dioxide, 
then oxides of nitrogen, ozone, and particulate matter: particulates have been 
further divided by diameter, with differential health impacts associated with 
different diameter particles. The epidemiological search for associations between 
components of polluted air, and mortality or morbidity, has been extensive over 
the past two decades.
As the quantitative risk assessment case study illustrated, this reductionistic 
orientation has been driven by technological and methodological advances -  in 
measurement of pollutants, measurement of health effects, and in data handling 
and statistical analysis. But the case study also brought out some of the constraints 
of modem epidemiology: the limitations o f‘black box’ thinking and the focus on 
proximate risk factors; the dominance of evidence based medicine and evidence 
based policy, and the limitations of their positivist nature; the lowly status of 
cross-sectional studies within hierarchies of what counts as evidence; and the lack 
of theoretical development around population health.
The fourth case study (chapter five), the approach taken in dealing with climate 
change, represents the final conception of air and public health, and completes the 
case series. Industrialisation and western lifestyles have led to a warming of the 
atmosphere, which has resulted in meteorological changes including a rise in 
average temperature, more extremes of temperatures, and increased incidence of 
events such as heatwaves and floods. These climatic changes will have a variety 
of adverse health effects, direct and indirect, although there may be some health 
benefits. The negative health effects, and the ability to adapt or mitigate against 
them, are likely to be unequally borne by rich and poor communities and 
countries.
This last case study raises important questions about the philosophical foundations 
of public health, and the links between these foundations and other developments 
in the history of science and moral philosophy. Utilitarianism has traditionally 
been the foundation of public health practice. But climate change illustrates the
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limitations of utilitarian thinking: the focus on proximate impacts (many health 
effects will occur at a distance from the emitters of greenhouse gases); the 
presentism (many health effects will occur well into the future); the reliance on 
empirical data; and the difficulties of taking sufficient account of equity (fair 
sharing of the burdens of climate change).
First espoused by John Rawls, social justice has emerged as an alternative to 
utilitarianism, arguing for more equitable distribution of societal burdens and 
benefits.16 It remains, however, a contractarian approach, and has been thrust into 
the climate change debate to press for fairer mechanisms of dealing with the costs 
(and other burdens) of the damage from greenhouse warming. Extensive academic 
work around equity issues has informed the climate change policy debate, 
buttressed by the climate justice movement with its environmentalism and activist 
component.
However, as is argued in chapter five, social justice is not the only alternative to 
utilitarianism as a moral framework for public health, and environmental ethics 
provides another dimension. As is described in the case study, historical 
developments in moral philosophy are linked to developments in political 
philosophy and the history of science, and understanding how we value the 
environment today needs bringing these together to see the bigger picture. The 
Cartesian separation of mind from matter, value from fact, has impacted in 
different, but connected ways. In scientific medicine the body, stripped from the 
environment and earlier holistic conceptions, has become a material entity within 
which disease may occur. Progressive reductionism has demarcated the body into 
separate sections, corresponding to different specialities.1
In political philosophy, the concern of the Greeks tor the well-being ot the whole 
(the city-state), and how this meshed with individual flourishing, has been largely 
lost -  within western capitalism at least. The brutal world of Thomas Hobbes
1 Parallel reductionistic tendencies have occurred in epidemiology, as discussed in chapter four.
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oriented morality around a social contract needed for self-protection and, together 
with Locke’s attention to ownership rights, heralded the individualism that is now
17the cornerstone of modern liberalism.
Importantly, any way of seeing the world entails a belief about that which should
be valued, a moral component. The way we think about our material selves is
connected to how we think about our duties to other humans, animals, and the
natural world. The accepted emphasis on the individual, and his or her rights, has
shifted duties towards others to the responsibility of the state. At the same time,
manipulation of the natural environment has become understood as fundamental
to individual and utilitarian aims. But reducing nature to an instrument for human
18needs has dramatically changed the way we see the natural world.
Environmental ethicists would argue that this slow shift, from perceiving the 
natural environment as having inherent value to having instrumental value (to 
human needs), is at the core of the current environmental crisis. But the roots of 
the problem lie deep, and resolution will require considerable effort, and radical 
reform.
The climate change debate illustrates how most current efforts at environmental 
improvement really just scratch the surface. And the case study also identifies that 
public health has adopted a largely instrumental stance towards the environment. 
For the sake of the health of the environment, and the health of those affected by 
the environment, it may be advisable for public health to embrace environmental 
philosophy, and adopt an environmental ethic that accepts the inherent value of 
the natural environment.
It should be noted here that, while the final case study has indicated that social 
justice and environmental ethics provide the real alternatives to utilitarianism as 
moral frameworks for public health, there are other possibilities. In particular, 
interest in the importance of virtue ethics has been growing, as well as
the perspectives of the most renowned modem philosopher, Ludwig
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Wittgenstein.24 25 However, there is insufficient scope to explore these here, and I
7 fthave done so elsewhere.
* * *
Taken in totality it is apparent how the four case studies have addressed the 
research questions posed. Although the case studies differ qualitatively from one 
another, presentation of the findings as a series (in the previous section) illustrates 
how the historical relationship between air and health has changed over time -  
from a more spiritual and holistic relationship, through the emphasis on smoke 
pollution and policy, to the epidemiological focus and finally the broader compass 
of climate change.
In parallel, the sequence of case studies has shown how the relationship between 
air and public health has progressed historically. Air had a very close relationship 
with understanding of disease around the period when professional public health 
emerged in Britain, and public health efforts were important to smoke pollution 
policy. In more recent times, however, the relationship has separated, both 
conceptually with the impartiality required of a scientific discipline such as air 
epidemiology, and also in practice as public health professionals find it harder to 
engage with environmental matters.
Seeing developments in public health in England and Wales in the context of the 
case series helps understand the roots of some of the difficulties encountered 
today. The deficiencies of the theoretical underpinnings -  scientific and 
philosophical -  of modem public health are evident, and it is apparent how these 
deficiencies impact on tackling local environmental issues as well as global 
concerns such as climate change.
Connections and challenges ahead
Finally, it is important to think about other connections between the case studies, 
and how these may relate to challenges for the future. There are two types of 
connections that warrant touching on here.
The first broad connection between the case studies is the issue of complexity. 
Historical research of the kind adopted in this thesis is valuable to public health 
because it allows a form of bigger picture examination of a particular subject. 
Within each case study the complexity of the subject matter emerges (and 
complexity has been a theme for each), yet using the different disciplines -  while 
remaining within a historical framework — allows one to see the subject matter 
from differing perspectives. Then, looking at the case series in entirety provides 
an even broader overview.
The value of seeing the bigger picture,27 28 together with the importance of 
complexity and multi-disciplinarity, presents a challenge ahead for public health.
It is understandable and appropriate that the scientific basis of public health is 
taught, but it is imperative that history, ethics and philosophy play a more 
prominent part in public health education, training,30 31 and practice. In the 
UK at present, the educational syllabus for the theoretical component of the public 
health professional examination suggests that there is still some way to go (Table 
6.1, p228). In a similar vein, it is also vital that history, ethics and philosophy are 
central to the development of public health theory, which to date has been limited.
34 35 36 37
The second broad connection between the four case studies relates to the pivotal 
place of the environment within public health, and ethical issues pertaining to this. 
The natural environment used to have a more integrated place in understanding 
and improving individual and community health. This has been largely lost, and 
considerations of environmental ethicists would indicate that it should be mote 
prominent. But re-positioning needs to go further than tokenistic shallow 
environmentalism.38 Climate change has starkly illustrated the need for deeper 
environmental perspectives, and has also laid bare some of the limitations of
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current ethical and theoretical thinking in public health. But, most significantly, it 
has also presented the world with the biggest challenge ever to global public 
health and to global governance.39 40
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Table 6.1 Part A MFPII Syllabus -  knowledge tested (at March 2007)1
1. Research methods (epidemiology, statistics, needs assessment, health 
economics, qualitative methods)
2. Disease causation and prevention, and health promotion (specific diseases and 
their epidemiology, screening, genetics, health and social behaviour, 
environment, communicable diseases, principles and practice of health 
promotion)
3. Health information
4. Medical sociology, social policy and health economics (includes some aspects 
of equality, equity and social justice)
5. Organisation and management of health care
1 This table has been drawn from the website oi the Faculty of Public HeaUh (UK).
www.fph.org.uk/exams/part_l/knowledge_testing.asp (accessed 9 March .. ).
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Appendix: additional information on methods
This appendix provides supplementary information, largely pertaining to the methods 
used in the conduct of the research and to the preparation of the thesis. The details in 
this appendix augment the methods described in Chapter 1, but draw on the same 
references -  hence no additional references are provided here. A Gantt chart of key 
milestones is provided as an aid to describing the course of the thesis.
Overall points on methods
This thesis has robustly followed accepted methods in academic history, as captured 
in Sweeney’s ‘Five stages in historical research’ that are described in Chapter 1.1 first 
gained methodological instruction in social historical methods during my MPhil 
degree in History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge University. For this thesis 
there was academic supervision in historical methods (Dr David Greaves, advisory 
role of Prof. Virginia Berridge) and academic supervision in public health and ethics 
(Professor John Porter, Professor Tony McMichael). Further details below are divid 
according to Sweeney’s five stages.
Stage 1 - Identification of a researchable phenomenon
This stage is discussed in the Introduction, with an explanation of the broad 
development of the thesis and a description of the importance of the enthusiasm of the 
researcher and the need for familiarity with the subject matter. This thesis also has 
important connections with clinical practice, which is encouraged within the MD 
regulations. In particular, such connections include the candidate’s experience of the 
current challenges of meaningfully engaging in environmental matters in public health 
practice.
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Stage 2 - Forming research questions and hypotheses, and identification of a 
theoretical framework
It is important to note that the bedrock of historical research is its empirical nature and 
inductive direction, rather than theory. Historical research is scientific with its 
emphasis on empiricism, objectivity, and rigour, although of course it does not adopt 
experimental scientific methods. Impartiality and rigour were applied consistently in 
this thesis to data collection and analysis, as is discussed further in this Appendix.
The research questions are clearly defined in Chapter 1, alongside a discussion of the 
relationship between periodisation in academic history and the framing of the case 
studies. In historical research case studies are not used in the same way as in 
sociological research, just like interviews in historical research (oral history) are n 
used for the same purposes as in social science.
Academic historians describe the need to be theoretically eclectic and to use a 
theoretical approach relevant to the research questions. Historians stress the need to 
‘get above’ different theories, because the delineation of theories relates to the 
demarcation of different disciplines (which have separated for various reasons serving 
various interests), and the world out there is not artificially demarcated along such 
lines. This is especially relevant to the macro-historical approach taken in this MD, 
which combines primary material and secondary literature as relevant to current 
theory and practice of public health. This thesis has avoided the less practically 
relevant and more esoteric micro-historical approach.
The methods, and theoretical framework, in this thesis are those of social history, 
which embodies understanding how social factors, such as economics, politics and 
religion, shape historical change (in medicine / public health). Sub-categories of 
social history do exist, such as Marxist history or feminist history (the latter, say, 
would endeavour to understand historical change in the context of the oppression of 
women), but a broad social historical approach is adopted in this thesis. Examples of 
the social historical approach include: examination in the first case study of how 
economic factors in the nineteenth century allowed an understanding of the place of 
miasma in infectious disease causation, within a broader debate about the role of the
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environment in directing animal and social evolutionary change; and exploration in 
the second case study of how political and economic factors dictated the lack of 
substantial developments in smoke pollution policy and legislation between 1850 and 
1956.
In relation to undertaking social historical research the closest theoretical analogy is 
probably ‘grounded theory’, with its iterative process of gathering data to generate a 
theory (or theoretical ideas), and then going back to data to check if the theory 
upholds. New data may result in changes to the theory, and further iteration, until a 
final position is achieved.
This thesis also has a progressive inter-disciplinary component, with the incorporation
i
of ethics, and this is discussed in some detail in Chapter 1.
Stage 3 - Systematic location of source materials
For each case study a systematic approach/plan was used to identify historical 
material, but the approach differed between case studies. For instance, in the second 
case study there was extensive material to review, which began with literature 
searches and guidance from supervisors, and developed through further tracking of 
referenced citations, snowballing, as well as hand searching and exploration of 
specific resource centres. Appraisal of historical material ended when it was felt that 
no new data was being generated. In the third case study, the approach was similarly 
systematic and methodological, but there is less material available on philosophy of 
epidemiology and the history of public health, so it was clearer when to be able to 
stop reviewing the material. The plan for identification and review of material for 
each case study was agreed and discussed regularly with supervisors.
Historical research is empirically rooted, so gathering and appraisal of evidence ends 
when it is felt that no new data/ideas are forthcoming. Inevitably this involves a 
degree of judgement as searching could prove endless, but academic historians would 
argue that such judgement occurs in other related disciplines, such as social science 
and anthropology. The types of data sources that were used are described in Chapter
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1, and predominantly these were primary sources (original documents, publications, 
legislation, policy documents, newspapers, pressure group publications and secondary 
sources (articles/books written on those subjects). It was deemed not relevant or 
possible to use archival sources (e.g. original research notes), given the nature and 
scope of the thesis.
There is a description in Chapter 1 (p31-32) of some of the resources used, but an 
expanded description includes: other libraries (also Cambridge University library and 
Cambridge History of Medicine and History and Philosophy of Science library, 
LSHTM, UCL); electronic and paper sources for journals (many-fold); institutions 
and organisations (e.g. Faculty of Public Health, Royal College of Physicians,
NSCA); websites (activist groups, environmentalist groups), and web-resources (e.g. 
History and Policy website).
In this MD there has been substantial use of diverse materials. For example in the first 
part of the first case study primary sources included Greek philosophers (H ippocrates, 
Aristotle, Plato), and secondary sources included historical accounts/commentaries 
on these and other sources (Galen, ancient civilisations). In the second part primary 
sources included Chadwick’s Report, original legislative Acts, Darwin’s books, 
Spencer’s books, and original research publications (BMJ pieces), and secondary 
sources included historical books (Hamlin, Porter, Darwin books), academic articles 
(History and Philosophy of Science journals and academic history journals such as J 
Hist Biol, and J Hist Behav Sci).
In the second case study primary sources were Government legislative Acts pertaining 
to smoke pollution (all Bills and Acts), government policy papers and reports, local 
policies and laws (e.g. local regulations on smokeless zones), local reports (e.g. of 
local sanitary inspectors), publications from campaign groups (e.g. NSAS), press 
material (newspapers), and magazines (e.g. Readers Digest). Secondary sources were 
published academic articles (medical journals, history journals, meteorology journals, 
NSAC journal, WHO reports, history textbooks).
In the third case study primary sources were epidemiological data, policy documents 
on environment and health, original research publications (air pollution,
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epidemiological), and secondary sources were some of the extensive journal 
publications (epidemiological commentaries, philosophy of science articles), and 
textbooks (history of public health, philosophy, pressure group/advocacy, WHO 
documents). Corroborating this case study also involved drawing on current personal 
experience working in public health.
Stage 4 -  Analysis / evaluation of evidence and information, forming 
generalisations and conclusions
In social historical research narrative (accurate descriptive account of the past) and 
analysis (placing those accounts in social, political or economic contexts) go on in 
combination -  as they do in the chapters of this thesis. Analysis is a fluid, ongoing 
process in historical research, and there is no distinct point where it starts or ends. 
Historians talk about using the material flexibly.
In this thesis (for each case study in turn) evidence was marshalled, and progressive 
assessment was made of such evidence, resulting in a coherent discourse. An 
interpretive/analytical approach was employed in the analysis, looking for 
correspondence and patterns, synthesising themes and concepts. The closest analogies 
in social science are thematic analysis and grounded theory, the latter of which was 
described earlier.
Throughout data gathering and analysis the verification of authenticity (‘external 
criticism’ cross-checks the validity of different sources and ‘internal criticism’ checks 
the credibility of a particular source) is an important part of the historical research 
process. Such verification ensures rigour and enhances the accuracy of the narrative. 
In this thesis there was constant, and repeated, verification of authenticity, especially 
around particular key areas. Examples include: verification of the reported differences 
between the Beaver Report, the Clean Air Bill and the Clean Air Act (different 
sources reported differences for different purposes, requiring my verification of all 
original documentation and production of Table 2.2 on pi 13); verification and clarity 
about chronological developments in coal/smoke use and production (different 
sources used different metrics, resulting in some confusion - 1 distilled and
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synthesised reports from different sources to aid clarity into Table 2.3 on pi 14); and, 
in the fourth case study, numerous references are made in the climate change debate 
to approaches adopting Rawlsian social justice. The authenticity of such claims could 
only be tested by reference to Rawls’s original work, which was presented.
It is important in historical research to create a critical synthesis across (sometimes 
conflicting) accounts. Use of diverse sources is an essential part of this process, and 
exploration for conflicting or corroborating accounts is key. However, the goal is not 
to establish the absolute ‘validity’ of accounts, but to note differences as part of the 
research process. Historians, like sociologists of knowledge, would argue there is no 
such thing as ‘facts’, and all apparent facts are contingent upon the framework within 
which they are constructed. The MD is limited to 60,000 words, so this has meant 
synthesis of materials down to manageable amounts. I have elided from the evidence 
obtained and drawn generalisations/conclusions in the writing. One example of 
critical synthesis is in case study two, in which different accounts of the problem of 
smoke pollution are presented -  these varied between political interests, medical 
opinion on health effects, and accounts by campaigners and pressure groups.
Stage 5 - Writing the report, involving description and interpretation of findings
Data gathering and analysis were undertaken in an iterative process in this thesis, as 
described earlier. When data gathering and analysis ceased, interpretation and writing 
up of the findings began. Each case study was written up in turn as a coherent 
narrative, through building up and clearly articulating the arguments. The 
chronological nature of the case studies aided the development of the thesis as a 
whole. Conclusions were drawn and that chapter was written up at the end. A whole 
process of review and revision then followed, including extensive discussion with 
supervisors (for instance around interpretation and credibility of the findings), 
eventually resulting in the final thesis.
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Key milestones in development and progression of the MD
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